¹ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 18 01 1975, p. 114.Google Scholar

² Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 11 1974, p. 3120.Google Scholar

³ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 18 01 1975Google Scholar – though, since majorities in the Steering Committee voted against the two leaders, it might appear that some were more surprised than others.

⁴ Hinckley, Barbara, ‘Congressional Leadership Selection and Support’, Journal of Politics, XXXII (1970), pp. 268–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Fenno, Richard, ‘The Internal Distribution of Influence: The House’, in Truman, David, ed., Congress and America's Future (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 52–76.Google Scholar

⁶ Congressional Record, 3 01 1973, H3.Google Scholar

⁷ See Polsby, Nelson, ‘The Growth of the Seniority System in the House of Representatives’, American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), 787–807Google Scholar; and Abram, Michael and Cooper, Joseph, ‘The Rise of Seniority in the House of Representatives’, Polity, 1 (1968–1969), 52–85.Google Scholar

⁸ And see Huitt, Ralph, ‘The Morse Committee Assignment Controversy: A Study in Senate Norms’, American Political Science Review, LI (1957), 313–29, pp. 319, 320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ See Hinckley, Barbara, The Seniority System in Congress (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971)Google Scholar and for a summary of the argument, Stability and Change in Congress (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 70–4.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Polsby, , ‘The Growth of the Seniority System’, and ‘The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives’, American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), 144–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Hinckley, , ‘Congressional Leadership Selection and Support’.Google Scholar

¹² Davidson, Roger et al. , Congress in Crisis (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1968), pp. 86, 87.Google Scholar

¹³ Hinckley, , The Seniority System in CongressGoogle Scholar. The argument is developed throughout the book. For the correlations reported in the text, see pp. 50, 51.

¹⁴ Hinckley, , The Seniority System in Congress, p. 52.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Wolfinger, Raymond and Heifetz, Joan, ‘Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress’, American Political Science Review, LIX (1965), 337–49Google Scholar, with updating by the same authors in Wolfinger, Raymond, ed., Readings in Congress (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 36–7Google Scholar. See also Ornstein, Norman and Rohde, David, ‘Seniority and Future Power in Congress’, in Ornstein, Norman, ed., Congress in Change (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 72–87.Google Scholar

¹⁶ The first ballot went against Patman 11–13; it took two more to nominate Reuss. The first ballot against Hays tied 12–12; it took three more to nominate Thompson. Hebert was recommended by the slim margin of 14–10. The others won easily.

¹⁷ See Hinckley, , The Seniority System in Congress, p. 41Google Scholar, for the earlier decades reported. The book followed Congressional Quarterly's thirteen-state ‘southern’ definition including Oklahoma and Kentucky in the South. The present paper uses the eleven states of the Confederacy. So to compare Table 2 with the earlier results, by a thirteen-state definition, the southern membership reported would be slightly higher (averaging in the middle rather than the low 30s in per cent) and the proportion of chairs would also be slightly higher (averaging 45 per cent before the violations and 42 per cent after). In short, both southern definitions supply the same results.

¹⁸ See Polsby, , ‘The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives’Google Scholar; Bullock, Charles, ‘House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition’, American Political Science Review, LXVI (1972), 1295–300Google Scholar; Fiorina, Morris et al. , ‘Historical Change in House Turnover’Google Scholar, in Ornstein, , Congress in Change, pp. 24–57Google Scholar. Polsby's ‘mean terms of service’ drops from 5·65 in 1973 to 5·31 in 1975; median terms drops from 5 to 4. Bullock's ‘careerists’ (i.e. winners of ten or more House elections), at 2 percent in 1911 climbing to 20 per cent in 1971, drops from 18 per cent in 1973 to 14 per cent in 1975. The percentage of freshmen increases from 15 per cent in 1973 to 20 per cent.

¹⁹ Note in the scores reported below the strongly conservative voting records of re-elected chairmen Henderson (North Carolina), Roberts (Texas), Haley (Florida) and Mahon (Texas). Note also that Patman can be more closely compared in voting record with some of the moderate northern leaders than with his southern colleagues. The scores are taken from the 93rd Congress (the congress immediately before the seniority violations), though they may be taken to represent a consistent voting pattern for these members extending across many congresses.

The scores report conservative coalition support and opposition – a widely used index of liberal-conservative voting. Since failure to vote lowers the score, both support and opposition scores are included and should be considered together. The scores report for the 93rd Congress the number of times (per cent) the member voted with or against the conservative coalition. A conservative coalition is said to form when a majority of southern Democrats and a majority of Republicans oppose a majority of northern Democrats. For scores and definitions, see Congressional Roll Call 1974, Congressional Quarterly, 1975, pp. 21–6.Google Scholar

Conservative Coalition Support and Opposition, 93rd Congress

²⁰ In fact Poague's successor Foley publicly defended Poague's procedure against the charges. And even liberal defense critic Les Aspin has admitted that Hebert's procedure could not be criticized. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 18 01 1975, p. 165Google Scholar, quotes an earlier Aspin comment: ‘It's really hard to object to anything Hebert does on procedural grounds. He's very fair.’ ‘Of course,’ added Aspin, ‘he can afford to be because he's got the votes. Only five of us oppose him on most things in committee.’

²¹ One other irony concerning Patman's defeat deserves mention. In one of his last great fights, in the fall of 1972 before the presidential election, Palman sought to subpoena Nixon Administration witnesses to testify before his committee on the Watergate break-in. He lost his fight in committee, conservative Democrats and Republicans joining to vote down his request for a subpoena. So the Congress elected after the later congressional hearings, the scandals and Nixon's resignation in 1972, in a wave of reform in large part brought on by these events, overturns one of the first House Watergate critics. The ‘reform’ Congress defeats one of the great self-styled House reformers.

²² See note ∥ in Table 4.

²³ Though the range is wide in age of successors: Price 70, Reuss 62 and Foley 45.