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⁷¹ Pettit, Phillip, The Common Mind, pp. 272–278; ‘Functional Explanation and Virtual Selection’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47 (1996), 291–302; and ‘Rational Choice, Functional Selection and Empty Black Boxes’, Journal of Economic Methodology, 7 (2000), 33–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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