¹ Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, ‘Governance Matters: From Measurement to Action’, Finance & Development, 37 (2000), 1–6, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/06/kauf.htmGoogle Scholar.

² See, e.g., Knack, Stephen and Keefer, Philip, ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures’, Economics and Politics, 7 (1995), 207–227CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mauro, Paulo, ‘Corruption and Growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 681–712CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clague, Christopher, Institutions and Economic Development (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Alesina, Alberto, ‘The Political Economy of High and Low Growth’, in World Bank, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1997 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1998), pp. 217–237Google Scholar; Porta, Rafael La, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., ‘The Quality of Government’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 15 (1998), 222–279CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de and Root, Hilton, eds, Governing for Prosperity (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Knack, Stephen, Democracy, Governance, & Growth (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feng, Yi, Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003)Google Scholar.

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⁴ Weiss, Thomas G., ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges’, Third World Quarterly, 21 (2000), 795–814CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁰ Kaufmann, Daniel, ‘Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy’ (World Bank Discussion Paper, 2003), pp. 1–47, at p. 27, available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/rethink_gov_stanford.pdfGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ For an insightful analysis of what we know, and what we do not know, about the economic and political sources of economic growth, see Helpman, , The Mystery of Economic Growth.Google Scholar

¹² For comprehensive reviews of this vast literature, see Barro, Robert J. and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995)Google Scholar; Barro, Robert J., Determinants of Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998)Google Scholar; Aghion, and Durlauf, , Handbook of Economic GrowthGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Helpman, , The Mystery of Economic GrowthGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ For a thorough review of the new political economy of growth, see Drazen, Allan, Political Economy in Macroeconomics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 457–525Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Feng, , Democracy, Governance and Economic PerformanceGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Michael E., Cheibub, José Antonio and Limongi, Fernando, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 178CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Feng, , Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance, pp. 320–321Google Scholar (emphasis added). On these ambiguous results, see also Sirowy, L. and Inkeles, A., ‘The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 25 (1990), 126–157CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Przeworski, Adam and Limongi, Fernando, ‘Political Regimes and Economic Growth’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (1993), 51–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lane, Jan-Erik and Ersson, Svante, Democracy: A Comparative Approach (New York: Routledge, 2003)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Another research stream has looked at the ‘indirect’ effect of democracy on growth. In particular, there is evidence that democracy contributes to growth through better income distribution and improvements in public health and education. See, e.g., Feng, , Democracy, Governance and Economic PerformanceGoogle Scholar; Baum, Matthew A. and Lake, David A., ‘The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital’, American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003), 333–347CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brown, David S. and Hunter, Wendy, ‘Democracy and Human Capital Formation: Education Spending in Latin America’, Comparative Political Studies, 37 (2004), 842–864CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Earlier attempts to test the impact of property rights on growth in international regressions include: Kormendi, Roger C. and Meguire, Philip G., ‘Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 16 (1985), 141–163CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Grier, Kevin B. and Tullock, Gordon, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth, 1951–80’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 24 (1989), 259–276CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scully, Gerald W., ‘The Institutional Framework and Economic Development’, Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 652–662CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ Knack, and Keefer, , ‘Institutions and Economic Performance’Google Scholar.

²¹ Mauro, , ‘Corruption and Growth’Google Scholar.

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²³ See, e.g., La Porta, et al. , ‘The Quality of Government’Google Scholar; Hall, Robert E. and Jones, Charles I., ‘Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1999), 83–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A., ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development’, American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 1369–1401CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A., ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (2002), 1231–1294CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Easterly, William and Levine, Ross, ‘Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (2003), 3–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rodrik, Dani, Subramanian, Arvind and Trebbi, Francesco, ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development’, Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (2004), 131–165CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a review of this literature, see Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A., ‘Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth’Google Scholar, in Aghion, and Durlauf, , Handbook of Economic Growth, pp. 385–472Google Scholar.

²⁴ Olson, Mancur, ‘Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich and Others Poor’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1996), 3–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Knack, , Democracy, Governance, & GrowthGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Kaufmann, Daniel and Kraay, Aart, ‘Growth without Governance’, Economia: The Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, 3 (2003), 169–215, p. 169Google Scholar.

²⁶ Problems may arise not only because causality runs from income to institutions, but also because the institutional variables are measured at the end (or too close to the end) of the growth period.

²⁷ Chong, and Calderon, , ‘On the Causality and Feedback between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth’Google Scholar.

²⁸ Kaufmann, and Kraay, , ‘Growth without Governance’Google Scholar.

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³⁰ Glaeser, et al. , ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’ p. 285Google Scholar.

³¹ A recent paper, using dynamic panel and linear feedback analysis, shows that there is double causality between institutions and inequality. See Chong, Alberto and Gradstein, Mark, ‘Inequality and Institutions’, Review of Economic and Statistics, 89 (2007), 454–465CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² E.g., Sachs, Jeffrey D., ‘Tropical Underdevelopment’, NBER Working Paper No. 8119 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001)Google Scholar.

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³⁴ E.g., Hall, and Jones, , ‘Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?’Google Scholar North, Douglass C., Summerhill, William and Weingast, Barry R., ‘Order, Disorder, and Economic Change: Latin America versus North America’, in Bueno de Mesquita and Root, eds, Governing for Prosperity, pp. 17–58Google Scholar.

³⁵ E.g., La Porta, et al. , ‘The Quality of Government’Google Scholar; Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei, ‘Courts’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2003), 453–517CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ E.g., Easterly, William and Levine, Ross, ‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1997), 1203–1250CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keefer, Philip and Knack, Stephen, ‘Polarization, Politics and Property Rights’, Public Choice, 111 (2002), 127–154CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Alesina, Alberto, Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William and Wacziarg, Romain, ‘Fractionalization’, Journal of Economic Growth, 8 (2003), 155–194CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ E.g., La Porta, et al. , ‘The Quality of Government’Google Scholar.

³⁸ Bardhan, , Scarcity, Conflicts, and Cooperation, pp. 7–19Google Scholar; Bates, Robert H., ‘The Role of the State in Development’, in Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 708–722Google Scholar; Moore, Mick, ‘Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries’, International Political Science Review, 25 (2004), 297–319CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the role of the state in East Asia, see also Amsden, Alice, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Wade, Robert, Governing the Market (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Evans, Peter, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995)Google Scholar. For large-N studies on the effects of state structures, see Evans, Peter and Rauch, James, ‘Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of Weberian State Structures on Economic Growth’, American Economic Review, 64 (1999), 748–765Google Scholar; Rauch, James and Evans, Peter, ‘Bureaucratic Structure and Economic Performance in Less Developed Countries’, Journal of Public Economics, 75 (2000), 49–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a recent effort to bring the state back into the discussion, see Lange, Matthew and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, eds, States and Development (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁴⁰ Acemoglu, et al. , ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development’. See also Easterly and Levine, ‘Tropics, Germs, and Crops’; Rodrik et al. ‘Institutions Rule’Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Acemoglu, et al. , ‘Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth’, p. 463Google Scholar.

⁴² Helpman, , The Mystery of Economic Growth, p. 125Google Scholar.

⁴³ Przeworski, , ‘The Last Instance’, p. 166Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Sangmpam, S. N., ‘Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in Developing Countries’, Political Studies, 55 (2007), 205–207CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Uncertainties remain even within the ‘institutions rule’ consensus. For example, in a review article Rodrik qualifies the strong institutionalist flavour of Rodrik et al.’s ‘Institutions Rule’, suggesting that that work should not be seen in the frontline of institutions fundamentalism (see Rodrik, Dani, ‘Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?’ Journal of Economic Literature, 44 (2006), 973–987CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 979). Similarly, Robinson, one of the co-authors of AJR, says that the Latin American equilibrium of poor institutions is deeply rooted in a given distribution of political power (see Robinson, James A., ‘El Equilibrio de America Latina’, in Francis Fukuyama, ed., La Brecha entre America Latina y Estados Unidos: Determinantes politicos e institucionales del desarrollo economico (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2006), pp. 197–230)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Landman, Todd and Häusermann, Julia, ‘Map-Making and Analysis of the Main International Initiatives on Developing Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance’ (unpublished paper, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 2003)Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Inkeles, Alex, On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants (Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991)Google Scholar; Foweraker, Joe and Krznaric, Roman, ‘Measuring Liberal Democratic Performance’, Political Studies, 47 (2000), 759–787CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Munck, Gerardo L. and Verkuilen, Jay, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices’, Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 5–34Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert A., Shapiro, Ian and Cheibub, José Antonio, eds, The Democracy Sourcebook (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Bowman, Kirk, Lehouck, Fabrice and Mahoney, James, ‘Measuring Political Democracy: Case Expertise, Data Adequacy and Central America’, Comparative Political Studies, 38 (2005), 939–970CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁷ For interesting developments in this area, see Weiss, , ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance’Google Scholar; Landman, and Häusermann, , ‘Map-Making and Analysis of the Main International Initiatives on Developing Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance’Google Scholar; Knack, , Democracy, Governance, & GrowthGoogle Scholar; Woodruff, Christopher, ‘Measuring Institutions’, in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Henry Luce, eds, International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2006)Google Scholar; Arndt, Christiane and Oman, Charles, Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators (Paris: OECD Development Centre Studies, 2006)Google Scholar; and the insightful exchange between Kurtz and Schrank, ‘Growth and Governance’, and Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo, ‘Growth and Governance: A Reply’, Journal of Politics, 69 (2007), 555–562CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ Knack, and Keefer, , ‘Institutions and Economic Performance’; Mauro, ‘Corruption and Growth’Google Scholar. The first generation of empirical studies on institutions and growth measured countries’ institutional environment through Gastil indices (e.g., Kormendi and Meguire, ‘Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth’; Grier and Tullock, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth’; Scully, ‘The Institutional Framework and Economic Development’) or objective counts of political violence (e.g., Barro, Robert J., ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1991), 407–443CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Alesina, Alberto, Ozler, Sule, Roubini, Nouriel and Swagel, Phillip, ‘Political Instability and Economic Growth’, Journal of Economic Growth, 1 (1996), 189–211CrossRefGoogle Scholar). However, those measures delivered questionable proxies of concepts such as the rule of law, contract enforceability and the security of property rights. See Knack, Stephen, ‘Governance and Growth: Measurement and Evidence’ (paper presented at the Forum on the Role of Institutions in Promoting Growth, IRIS Center and USAID, Washington, D.C., 2002)Google Scholar.

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⁵¹ At the conceptual level, these authors claim that ‘human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions’ and that ‘poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators’. See Glaeser, et al. , ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’ p. 271Google Scholar.

⁵² Kurtz, and Schrank, , ‘Growth and Governance’, p. 538Google Scholar. For a defence of the World Bank Governance Indicators, see Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo, ‘Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data’, in Rose-Ackerman and Luce, eds, International Handbook on the Economics of CorruptionGoogle Scholar; Kaufmann, Daniel and Kraay, Aart, ‘Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going?’ World Bank Research Observer, 23 (2008), 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁸⁸ Hall, Peter A. and Soskice, David, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an application in transition countries, see Feldmann, Magnus, ‘Emerging Varieties of Capitalism in Transition Countries: Industrial Relations and Wage Bargaining in Estonia and Slovenia’, Comparative Political Studies, 39 (2006), 829–854CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁹³ See Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Shepsle, Kenneth A., ‘Discretion, Institutions and the Problem of Government Commitment’, in Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman, eds, Social Theory for a Changing Society (Boulder, Colo.: Western Press, 1991), pp. 245–263Google Scholar; North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R., ‘Constitutions and Commitments’, Journal of Economic History, 19 (1989), 803–832CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levy, Brian and Spiller, Pablo T., ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 10 (1996), 201–246Google Scholar.

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¹⁰⁰ See Riker, , ‘Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions’; Tsebelis, Nested GamesGoogle Scholar; Bates, Robert H., ‘Contra Contractarianism’, Politics and Society, 16 (1988), 387–401CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ordeshook, Peter C., ‘The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy’Google Scholar, in Alt, and Shepsle, , Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, pp. 9–30Google Scholar.

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¹⁰³ Weingast, , ‘Rational-Choice Institutionalism’Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g. Knack, , Democracy, Governance, & Growth; Chong and Gradstein, ‘Inequality and Institutions’Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ Weiss, , ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance’, p. 796Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁶ The 1997 World Development Report signalled a pivotal change in the development game by stating that ‘good government is not a luxury; it is a vital necessity for development’ (World Bank, The Role of the State in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)). At almost the same time, the IMF declared that ‘a much broader range of institutional reforms is needed if countries are to establish and maintain private sector confidence and thereby lay the basis for sustained growth’ (International Monetary Fund, Good Governance: The IMF’s Role (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997)). Some critics argued that the good-governance discourse aimed at legitimizing the new politics of development. See Kothari, Uma and Minogue, Martin, Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁰⁸ Alesina, , ‘The Political Economy of High and Low Growth’, p. 217Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁹ Alesina, , ‘The Political Economy of High and Low Growth’, p. 217 (emphasis added)Google Scholar.

¹¹⁰ For example, the analysis covers neither the critical 1990s nor the periods in which most of today’s rich countries became developed.

¹¹¹ Another issue is the distributional implications of institutional conditionality. Which actors are going to bear the burden of the policy? What is the role and bargaining power of those actors in the game of institutional change?

¹¹² Feng, , Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance, p. 37Google Scholar.

¹¹³ Przeworski, , ‘The Last Instance’, p. 168Google Scholar.

¹¹⁴ Feng, , Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance, p. 86Google Scholar.

¹¹⁵ Knack, , Democracy, Governance, & Growth, p. 294Google Scholar. With the aim of unbundling particular manifestations of misgovernance, the World Bank and other organizations have begun to develop surveys and in-depth in-country governance diagnostics.

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¹¹⁷ See, e.g., Ades, Alberto and Tella, Rafael Di, ‘The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results’, Political Studies, 45 (1997), 496–515CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tanzi, Vito, ‘Corruption around the World’, IMF Staff Papers, 45 (1998), 559–594CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹²¹ Knack, , Democracy, Governance, & Growth, p. 295 (emphasis added)Google Scholar.

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¹²³ See especially North, Douglass C., ‘Five Propositions about Institutional Change’, in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds, Explaining Social Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 15–26Google Scholar, at p. 20. As Levi explains: ‘[P]ath dependence has to mean, if it has to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct any easy reversal of the initial choice’ (see Levi, Margaret, ‘A Model, a Method, and a Map’, in Lichbach and Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics, pp. 19–41Google Scholar, at p. 28 (emphasis added)).

¹²⁴ In his last book, North stresses that beliefs are at the core of the process of change. The complex structure of institutions affecting political economy performance is the result of beliefs and the way they are altered by feedback from changed perceived reality. See North, , Understanding the Process of Economic Change, p. 4Google Scholar.

¹²⁵ See Knack, , Democracy, Governance, & Growth; Bardhan, Scarcity, Conflicts, and Cooperation.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ For an innovative attempt to look at the cognitive constraints to development, see Reis, Elisa and Moore, Mick, eds, Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality (London: Zed Books, 2005)Google Scholar.

¹²⁷ North, , Understanding the Process of Economic Change, pp. 163–164Google Scholar.

¹²⁸ Rodrik, , In Search of Prosperity, p. 15Google Scholar.

¹²⁹ Rodrik, , In Search of Prosperity, p. 12Google Scholar. See also Rodrik, Dani, ‘Growth Strategies’Google Scholar, in Aghion, and Durlauf, , Handbook of Economic Growth, pp. 967–1014Google Scholar.

¹³⁰ See, e.g., Bank, World, Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, Rodrik shows that there are contending interpretations in the Washington community in relation to the role of institutions. See Rodrik, ‘Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?’

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¹³³ Even Chile, Latin America’s growth star, still has very high levels of inequality (though poverty has declined markedly). On the historical impossibility of reconciling growth and equity in Latin America, see Fajnzylber, Fernando, Unavoidable Industrial Restructuring in Latin America (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

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¹³⁶ See Glaeser, et al. , ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Nowhere is this pattern clearer than in Argentina, where the collapse of the convertibility system in 2001 destroyed the reputation of self-finding structural reforms and led to the adoption of a discretionary approach to policy making.

¹³⁸ See Alesina, , ‘The Political Economy of High and Low Growth’, and Feng, Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance.Google Scholar

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¹⁴⁵ Tsebelis, George, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 204CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁴⁹ See, e.g., Weingast, Barry R., ‘The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 245–263CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Boix, , Democracy and RedistributionGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁶² Some scholars even suggest that it is worth revisiting the merits of dependency theory. See Foweraker, Joe and Landman, Todd, ‘Economic Development and Democracy Revisited: Why Dependency Theory is Not Yet Dead’, Democratization, 11 (2004), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lake, , ‘International Political Economy’Google Scholar.

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¹⁶⁶ Campos, and Root, , The Key to the East Asian MiracleGoogle Scholar, p. 1. On the contrasting distributional paths of Latin America and East Asia, see also Root, Hilton L., Capital and Collusion (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁶⁸ Hall, and Soskice, , Varieties of CapitalismGoogle Scholar.

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