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The Responsive Legislature: Public Opinion and Law Making in a Highly Disciplined Legislature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 March 2007

ERNESTO CALVO
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Houston

Abstract

This article analyses how institutional and contextual factors explain the approval of presidential initiatives – presidential legislative success – in highly disciplined and cartelized assemblies. Of particular importance is to test whether public opinion, the electoral cycle and the use of different institutional rules affect the approval of presidential initiatives in Congress. Using a multilevel Bayesian model of legislative success, I model bill approval rates at individual and aggregate levels. This strategy is extremely flexible, allowing us to disentangle the different institutional and contextual factors that determine the approval of presidential initiatives in the Argentine Congress.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
2007 Cambridge University Press

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