¹ When I wrote my article, but see note 4 below.

² On p. 212, it is true, I said ‘Rawls wants to show how two principles of justice, one of them being the principle of equal liberty, might “arise”…’ I mentioned equal liberty explicitly, since my quotations and discussion mentioned principles in the plural: I feared confusion if this first principle were not identified! Another remark of mine on p. 215 may have contributed to this misunderstanding of my emphasis.

³ Rawls, , ‘Justice as Fairness’, p. 133.Google Scholar

⁴ Rawls', principles intertwine: the second defines how the first's ‘presumption’ against inequalities may be ‘rebutted’ (Justice as Fairness, p. 134).Google Scholar Even if ‘liberty’ be defined (more strictly than I think Rawls intended) to mean only absence of legal and direct extra-legal coercion, almost all inequalities (perhaps all except inequality of respect) involve inequality in the variety and extent of activities individuals may pursue. This characteristic is absent from inequality of respect (when separate from inequalities of formal status and wealth — such separation is rare and often impermanent): however inequality of respect still matters, for a similar reason — because it may lead those of low regard to restrict their own activities and attempt less.

⁵ Were Charvet's argument valid, it would discredit also the ‘meaningful’ principle he ‘would not dispute’ — ‘distribution of opportunities equally in proportion to individuals’ just claims’. Imagine this principle applied to all opportunities in society, with parents applying it (untempered by love) between their children: would real (or good) human beings and society result?

⁶ Rawls, , Justice as Fairness, p. 133.Google Scholar