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² See, for example, Schock, Kurt, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Non-democracies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005)Google Scholar.

³ These incidents include demonstrations, protests, strikes, disruptive collective petitions, sit-in demonstrations, fasting, posting slogans, attacking state agencies, surrounding leaders, blocking traffic, looting and damaging property (Zhaxu, Chen, ‘Actively Preventing and Appropriately Dealing with Instances of Collective Action’, Research on Public Security, 5 (2001), 16–19Google Scholar).

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⁶ On 28 July 2005, The People's Daily, the Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, published a front-page commentary entitled ‘Maintaining Stability, Promoting Development’, urging citizens to obey the law and warning that any threats to social stability would not be tolerated by the authorities.

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¹⁰ One important factor that affects the state's response is the power of the resisters. See, among others, Gamson, William, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1990), pp. 81–2Google Scholar; McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, p. 56.

¹¹ Goldstone and Tilly, ‘Threat (and Opportunity)’, pp. 192–3.

¹² Piven, Frances and Cloward, Richard, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Vintage, 1993), p. 172.Google Scholar

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¹⁴ Lohmann, Susanne, ‘The Dynamics of Information Cascades: The Monday Demonstration in Leipzeig East Germany, 1989–1991’, World Politics, 47 (1994), 42–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kurzman, Charles, ‘Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979’, American Sociological Review, 61 (1996), 153–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Davenport, Christian, ‘Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions’, American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), 683–713CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldstone and Tilly, ‘Threat (and Opportunity)’, pp. 192–3.

¹⁶ Gartner, Scott and Regan, Patrick, ‘Threat and Repression: The Non-Liner Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence’, Journal of Peace Research, 33 (1996), 273–88Google Scholar, at p. 285; Almeida, Paul, ‘Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings’, American Journal of Sociology, 109 (2003), 345–400Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 93Google Scholar; Moore, Will, ‘Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing,’ American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1998), 851–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Saxonberg writes, ‘even if the Soviet-type regimes never gained complete legitimacy in the sense of gaining popular support for the system, they certainly tried’ (Saxonberg, Steven, The Fall: A Comparative Study of the End of Communism in Czechoslovakia, East German, Hungary and Poland (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2001), p. 147Google Scholar).

¹⁹ Oberschall, Anthony, ‘Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern Europe Revolts of 1989’, in McAdam, Doug, McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N., eds, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 172–99.Google Scholar

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²¹ Lohmann, ‘The Dynamics of Information Cascades’; Kurzman, ‘Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory’; Kuran, Timur, ‘Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989’, World Politics, 44 (1991), 7–48Google Scholar.

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²⁵ The 1989 Tiananmen incident not only showed the consequence of a divided ruling elite but also revealed the serious impact of the lack of legitimacy on regime survival. Central leaders acknowledged that many people protested in the incident because of their resentment against corruption. What was more astonishing was the participation of state agents. Between 15 and 19 May 1989, about 700 work units had employees who held demonstrations in Beijing, including about seventy party and government agencies. Fifty of the seventy agencies, including the State Council, belonged to the central party committee and the central government (State Education Commission, The Soul-Stirring 56 Days (Beijing: Land Press, 1989), p. 138).

²⁶ Goldstone and Tilly describe how there can be a variety of undesirable scenarios that the state encounters in using repression or concessions because of the unknown consequences of a response (Goldstone and Tilly, ‘Threat (and Opportunity)’, pp. 188–92).

²⁷ McAdam, Doug, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 44–7Google Scholar; Tilly, Charles, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 114–15Google Scholar.

²⁸ Authoritarian regimes can be fragmented. The ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ model, for example, has been used to describe policy making in China. However, the ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ model focuses more on the horizontal divide among state agencies, whereas this article focuses on the vertical divide between the central and local governments. See Lieberthal, Kenneth and Lampton, David, eds, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).Google Scholar

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³² Lohmann, ‘The Dynamics of Informational Cascades’.

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³⁸ At the county and township levels, it is common for the party secretary to sign the so-called responsibility contract with upper-level authorities to ensure the fulfilment of assigned tasks, including achieving social stability. City-level party secretaries may not be required to sign such contracts, but they are certainly assessed for this responsibility (Dong Xueqing, Zhang Heping and Zhang Zeyuan, ‘The Life of County Party Secretaries’, Perspectives, 9 November 2005, pp. 21–4; Edin, Maria, ‘State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective’, China Quarterly, 173 (2003), 35–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ O’Brien, Kevin and Li, Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Edin, ‘State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China’.

⁴⁰ In the riot, police cars were torched, six police officers were wounded and a nearby department store was looted. It was later discovered that the party secretary was with his mistress in another city for relaxation, and he was annoyed by the phone calls and turned off his cell phone. He was later arrested for corruption (Zhong, Xiao, ‘An Investigation of the Removal of He Minxu, a Vice Governor of Anhui Province’, Inspections, 20 (2006), 21–2Google Scholar).

⁴¹ By non-political resistance, I mean that participants do not raise political demands that challenge the political authority of the party or the government. Such actions are normally based on legitimate or lawful claims or, as the government claims, are ‘internal conflicts within the people’. To be sure, non-political resistance may be ‘boundary-spanning’ or illegal according to the Chinese law. The government treats actions that aim to overthrow the party or the government or attack important facilities as unacceptable (see Xianlei, Long, ‘Sticking to Rule by Law and Appropriately Handling Instances of Collective Action’, Public Security Research, 12 (2001), 50–3Google Scholar; Fuming, Fan, ‘Characteristics of Collective Action in Blocking Railways and Some Countermeasures’, Journal of Shanghai Public Security Academy, 3 (2001), 30–4Google Scholar; O’Brien, Kevin, ‘Neither Transgressive Nor Contained: Boundary-Spanning Contention in China’, Mobilization, 8 (2003), 51–64)Google Scholar.

⁴² Ethan Michelson, ‘Peasants’ Burdens and State Response: Exploring State Concession to Popular Tax Resistance in Rural China’ (unpublished, 2005).

⁴³ Michelman, Frank, ‘Ida's Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System’, Fordham Law Review, 72 (2003), 345–62Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ O’Brien and Li, ‘Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China’; Bernstein, Thomas and Lu, Xiaobo, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁵ The central government prohibits the use of force in dealing with peaceful resistance. According to the 1998 directive issued by the central government, state authorities are required to settle instances of social unrest based on considerations of whether or not participants’ demands are political, there is organized violence, there is intentional confrontation, and there is support for the resistance from overseas. In dealing with organized attacks that are consciously directed at party and government agencies and other important facilities, force can be used, but it should not be used to deal with non-political and peaceful action by citizens with legitimate demands. Police officers who directly face participants can bring equipment but not weapons with them, while back-up officers can bring weapons with them if necessary (see Long, ‘Sticking to Rule by Law and Appropriately Handling Instances of Collective Action’).

⁴⁶ Zhilun, Li, ‘Strengthening the Discipline of Party Members and Governance and Doing a Good Job of Enforcing Anticorruption Measures’, China Discipline Inspection, 4 (2000), 5–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See, among others, O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, chap. 2; Cai, Yongshun, State and Laid-Off Workers in Reform China: The Silence and Collective Action of the Retrenched (London: Routledge, 2006)Google Scholar, chap. 7; Bernstein and Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China, chap. 5; Perry, Elizabeth and Seldon, Mark, eds, Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, 2nd edn (New York: Routledge, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ It must be acknowledged that this criterion for case collection has a limitation because cases whose results were not reported were excluded. This is also the reason why our collection only includes four cases that were tolerated or ignored by local governments.

⁴⁹ O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, chap. 2; Bernstein and Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China, chap. 5.

⁵⁰ According to the police department, a collective action involving more than 500 is seen as a large-scale action, and an action involving more than 1,000 participants is seen as an especially large-scale action (see Jinsheng, Chen, Research Report on Instances of Collective Action (Beijing: Mass Press, 2004), p. 32Google Scholar).

⁵¹ Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, p. 82.

⁵² Southern Urban News, 6 June 2004, p. 2.

⁵³ Guidi, Chen and Tao, Chun, Survey of Chinese Peasants (Beijing: People's Literature Press, 2003), pp. 82–120Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ South China Morning Post, 4 January 2005, p. 4.

⁵⁵ In several legal cases, the central government knew the problems but refused to intervene because those cases involved some provincial leaders (21st Century Global Report, 2 March 2003, p. 1).

⁵⁶ After the bloody confrontation, the city government exercised strict control over the village, preventing a free flow of information between villagers and external parties for months. Police searched for and arrested those who had participated in the riots. Not surprisingly, this incident was not allowed to be reported in the country (South China Morning Post, 12 December 2005, p. 4; South China Morning Post, 3 March 2006, p. 6).

⁵⁷ Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 97.

⁵⁸ Yan’an Daily, 27 March 2006, p. 4

⁵⁹ Li, Xie, ‘An Analysis of Administrative Reconsiderations in the Country in 2000’, Administration and Law, 6 (2001), 18–19.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ In addition, because the top leaders (i.e., the party secretary and the magistrate) in a county are directly under the management of the provincial authority, these leaders will not be effectively disciplined without intervention from the provincial authority.

⁶¹ Chen, Research Report on Instances of Collective Action, pp. 275–97.

⁶² China Economic Times, 20 June 2005, p. 3.

⁶³ Overseas Chinese News, 16 December 2005, p. 2.

⁶⁴ In the end, more than 140 people were sent to hospitals, a majority of them police officers and government officials, including a deputy city mayor (South China Morning Post, 3 March 2006, p. 2).

⁶⁵ The other four were the head and two deputy heads of the environmental protection bureau and the township head (Jinhua Daily, 1 January 2006, p. 1).

⁶⁶ South China Morning Post, 3 March 2006, p. 2.

⁶⁷ Cai, State and Laid-Off Workers in Reform China, p. 95.

⁶⁸ Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 104.

⁶⁹ Chen, Research Report on Instances of Collective Action, pp. 63–4.

⁷⁰ He, ‘Properly Handling Conflicts in Our Country’, p. 9.

⁷¹ Chen, Research Report on Instances of Collective Action, p. 32.

⁷² It was 13.6 per cent (out of 10,000) in 1994 and 14.5 per cent (out of 30,000) in 2000 (He, ‘Properly Handling Conflicts in Our Country’, p. 10).

⁷³ Chen, Research Report on Instances of Collective Action, p. 62.

⁷⁴ He, ‘Properly Handling Conflicts in Our Country’, p. 9.

⁷⁵ Kwan Lee, Ching, ‘The “Revenge of History”: Collective Memories and Labor Protests in Northeastern China’, Ethnography, 1 (2000), 217–37Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ New Beijing Post, 16 April 2006, p. 2.

⁷⁷ Western Business News, 9 February 2006, p. 2.

⁷⁸ China Youth Daily, 31 August 2001, p. 3.

⁷⁹ Shanxi Daily, 13 September 2005, p. 1.

⁸⁰ Li Junde, ‘Is Petitioning A Crime?’ Perspective, 7 April 2003, pp. 25–6.

⁸¹ Xi Chen, ‘Chinese Petitioners’ Tactics and Their Efficacy’ (paper presented at the Conference on Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China, Fairbank Center, Harvard University, October 2004).

⁸² Pingdingshan Daily, 2 January 2002, p. 3.

⁸³ della Porta, Donatella, ‘Protest, Protesters, and Protest Policing: Public Discourses in Italy and Germany from the 1960s to the 1980s’, in Giugni, Marco, McAdam, Doug and Tilly, Charles, eds, How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 66–96, at p. 82.Google Scholar

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⁸⁵ Takungbao, 20 January 2006, p. 4.

⁸⁶ Li, Lianjiang, ‘Political Trust in Rural China’, Modern China, 30 (2003), 228–58.Google Scholar

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⁹⁰ See, for example, Chen, Jie, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

⁹¹ In the former East Germany, the populace was by and large discontented with its standard of living and lack of political freedom, and it grew increasingly so in the period 1975–89. However, there had been little action taken until 1989 because the violent suppression of the 1953 mass uprising with the help of Soviet military forces rendered the cost of anti-regime protest prohibitive for all but a small minority. Nonetheless, repression also led the people to lose confidence in the communist system. See Lohmann, ‘The Dynamics of Information Cascades’.

⁹² O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, chap. 2.

⁹³ Chen and Chun, Survey of Chinese Peasants; Bernstein and Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China.

⁹⁴ Barghoon, Politics in Russia, p. 308.

⁹⁵ Bernstein and Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China, chap. 5.

⁹⁶ McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–70; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution.

⁹⁷ Almeida, ‘Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention’, pp. 387–8.

⁹⁸ Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 359.Google Scholar