Article contents
Peasant Autonomy, Peasant Solidarity and Peasant Revolts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
Extract
I have argued two points. Firstly, Skocpol has confused peasant autonomy and peasantstate alliances. The relationship between autonomy and revolt is spurious. Secondly, peasant solidarity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of peasant revolt. It is not necessary because revolt concentrated in a specific niche in a peasant community cannot be attributed to peasant solidarity. Nor is solidarity sufficient, because it has effects only in communities with relatively high skill levels. When solidarity does have independent social effects, it is as a community norm and tends to be associated with a sort of revolt that is not intended to change the lord—peasant relationship.
- Type
- Notes and Comments
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988
References
1 Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 115, 117, 134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Skocpol, , States and Social Revolutions, p. 116.Google Scholar
3 Skocpol, , States and Social Revolutions, pp. 116–17.Google Scholar
4 Skocpol, , States and Social Revolutions, p. 116.Google Scholar
5 On the loss of a check on exploitation provided by the central government when the Ching dynasty collapsed, see Rosenberg, William G. and Young, Marilyn B., Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 82Google Scholar; Thaxton, Ralph, ‘On Peasant Revolution and National Resistance: Toward a Theory of Peasant Mobilization and Revolutionary War with Special Reference to Modern China’, World Politics, 30 (1977), 24–57, pp. 27–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 Skocpol, , States and Social Revolutions, pp. 150–1.Google Scholar
7 See Salmon, J. H. M., ‘Venality of Office and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth Century France’, Past and Present, 37 (1967), 21–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pillorget, René, Les Mouvements insurrectionists de Provence entre 1598 et 1715 (Paris: Pédome, 1975)Google Scholar; Foisil, Madeline, La Révolte ties nu-pieds el les révoltes normandes tie 1639 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970)Google Scholar; Garlan, Yvon and Nièvres, Charles, Les Révoltes bretonnes de 1675: papier timbré et bonnets rouges (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975)Google Scholar; Bercé, Yves, Histoire des croquants: études de soulèvements populaires au XVII siècle dans le sud-ouest de la France (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1974), 2 volumesGoogle Scholar. On the shift towards indirect taxes and the visibility of the state, see for example, Hufton, Olwen H., ‘Attitudes Towards Authority in Eighteenth Century Languedoc’, Social History, 3 (1978), 281–302CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ardant, Gabriel, Théorie sociologique de l'impôt (Paris: SEVPEN, 1965), Vol. 2, p. 881Google Scholar. On the king's representatives at the local level, see for example the excellent case study by Root, Hilton Lewis, ‘Challenging the Seigneurie: Community and Contention on the Eve of the French Revolution’, Journal of Modern History, 57 (1985), 652–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a recent case study of counter-revolution, with a discussion of noble-peasant relations in collective action, see Sutherland, Donald, The Chouans: the Social Origins of Popular Counter-Revolution in Upper Brittany, 1770–1795 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)Google Scholar. For a summary of some of the literature on counter-revolution in the west of France, see Hutt, Maurice, Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution: Puisaye, the Princes and the British Government in the 1790s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Vol. 1, pp. 1–23.Google Scholar
8 Skocpol, Theda, ‘Review Essay: What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?’, Comparative Politics, 14 (1982), 351–75, p. 363.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
9 Skocpol, , States and Social Revolutions, p. 152.Google Scholar
10 Disputes between royal and seigneurial courts were one indication of state-elite competition. See Lemercier, Pierre, Les Justices seigneuriales de la region parisienne dc 1580 à 1789 (Paris: Les Editions Domat-Montchrestien, 1933), pp. 277–80, 48–57Google Scholar; Bataillon, Jacques-Henri, Lex Justices seigneuriales du bailliage de Pontoise à la fin de Ancien Régime (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1942), pp. 71, 161–2, 81–6Google Scholar; Villard, Pierre, Les Justices seigneuriales dans la Marche (Paris: R. Pichon and R. Durand-Auzias, 1969), pp. 294–303Google Scholar, and in addition, Root, Hilton L., ‘En Bourgogne, I'Etat et la communauté rurale, 1661–1789’, Annales ESC, 37 (1982), 288–302.Google Scholar
11 This argument arrives, by a somewhat different route, at a conclusion found in the literature on collective action. See Hardin, Russell, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1982). p. 81.Google Scholar
- 4
- Cited by