¹ Vazhnyi faktor rukovodyashchei roli KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1979), p. 71Google Scholar. I am grateful to Dr Ron Hill for referring me to this quotation.

² Hough, J., The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), especially Chaps. 6 and 7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ The most recent comprehensive account of the nationalities in the Soviet Union is d'Encausse, H. Carrère, L'Empire Eclaté (Paris: Flammarion, 1978)Google Scholar. For a nationality by nationality approach, see Katz, Z., ed., Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York: Free Press, 1975)Google Scholar or Simmonds, G. W., ed., Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin (Michigan: University of Detroit Press, 1977).Google Scholar

⁴ Dellenbrandt, Y., ‘Regional Differences in Political Recruitment in the Soviet Republics’, European Journal of Political Research, VI (1978), 181–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar, analyses Republican party and Komsomol figures for the period 1959–73 to answer a related but different set of questions.

⁵ The key work on party composition is Rigby, T. H., Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917–1967 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968)Google Scholar. An updating can be found in his ‘Soviet Communist Party Membership under Brezhnev’, Soviet Studies, XXVIII (1976), 317–37Google Scholar and in Harasymiw, B., ‘Les déterminantes sociales du recrutement et de l'appartenance au parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique’, Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, IX (1978), 43–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ On the local Soviets, see Jacobs, Everett M., ‘Soviet Local Elections: What They Are, and What They Are Not’, Soviet Studies, XXII (1970), 61–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hill, Ronald J., ‘Patterns of Deputy Selection to Local Soviets’, Soviet Studies, XXV (1973), 196–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ The Appendix lists all Republic, oblast and city party statistical handbooks known to the author.

⁸ We have had enough evidence from the Georgian scandal, the demotion of Shelest (and see the article by Thomas Remeikis, ‘Political Developments in Lithuania during the Brezhnev Era’, in Simmonds, , ed., Nationalism in the USSRGoogle Scholar, for Snechkus' relationship with Moscow), to suggest that we must rethink our view of centre-Republican relationships. How far does Republican decision making extend, and in what areas? To what extent do centre-Republican relationships differ from one Republic to another, and why? Should we not group together some of the little Republics with some of the RSFSR and Ukrainian oblasts or ASSRs, rather than thinking of the Republics as the unit, if we want to analyse chains of command and scope for decision making?

⁹ Bobkov, V. A., Kacheslvennyi rosi i organizatsiya parliinykh sil (Minsk, 1977), p. 49Google Scholar. We would not expect the Party Congress to reflect the national composition of the population; the Soviets are the population's ‘representative’ bodies.

¹⁰ See Appendix for complete reference. Congress data are available for 1976 but most of the Republics have not updated their party statistics; the Ukraine and Uzbekistan have done so but omit the nationality breakdown of Congress delegates in the newspaper reports. Ukraine, , 1971: Komm, parliya Ukraini, p. 13Google Scholar and Pravda Ukrainy, 18 03 1971, p. 6Google Scholar; Belorussia, , 1961: Kommunist Bel., 1962, no. 5, p. 57Google Scholar and Bobkov, , Kachestvennyi rost, pp. 48–9Google Scholar; 1971: Bobkov, , Kacheslvennyi rost, p. 51 and pp. 48–9Google Scholar; 1976: Bobkov, , Kacheslvennyi rost, p. 51Google Scholar and Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 5 02 1976, p. 8Google Scholar; Uzbekistan, , 1961: Komm, partiya Turkestana…, p. 173Google Scholar and Pravda Vosloka, 28 09 1961, p. 4Google Scholar; 1966: Komm, parliya Turkestana…, p. 204Google Scholar and Pravda Vostoka, 5 03 1966, p. 3Google Scholar; Kazakhstan, , 1961: Kompartiya Kazakhstana…, p. 241Google Scholar and Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 29 09 1961, p. 6Google Scholar; 1966: Kompartiya Kaz.…, p. 324Google Scholar and Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 11 03 1966, p. 5Google Scholar; Georgia, , 1961: Komm. partiya Grazii…, p. 214Google Scholar and Zarya Vostoka, 29 09 1961, p. 3Google Scholar; 1966: Komm. partiya Gruzii…, p. 265Google Scholar and Zarya Vostoka, 4 03 1966, p. 2Google Scholar; 1971: Komm. partiya Gruzii…, p. 265Google Scholar and Zarya Vostoka, 1 03 1971, p. 3Google Scholar; Azerbaijan, , 1961: Komm. partiya Azer., pp. 44–5Google Scholar and Bakinski Rabochii, 10 09 1961, p. 4Google Scholar; 1966: Komm. partiya Azer., pp. 44–5Google Scholar, and Bak. Rab., 26 02 1966, p. 3Google Scholar; 1971, Komm. partiya Azer., pp. 44–5Google Scholar and Bak. Rab., 12 03 1971, p. 2Google Scholar; Lithuania, , 1961: Komm. partiya Litvy, pp. 127–9Google Scholar and Sovetskaya Litva, 28 09 1961, p. 3Google Scholar; 1966: Komm. partiya Litvy, pp. 127–9Google Scholar and Sov. Litva, 5 03 1966, p. 4Google Scholar; 1971: Komm. partiya Litvy, pp. 127–9Google Scholar and Sov. Litva, 5 03 1971, p. 4Google Scholar; 1976: Komm. partiya Litvy, pp. 127–9Google Scholar and Sov. Litva, 22 01 1976, p. 4Google Scholar; Moldavia, , 1966Google Scholar: Ursul, D. P., Razvitiye obshchestvennykh otnoshenii v sovetskoi Moldavii (Kishinev, 1967), p. 355Google Scholar and Sovetskaya Moldaviya, 3 03 1966Google Scholar; 1971: calculation based on Rosi i organizatsionnoye ukrepleniye kom. partii Moldavii 1924–1974 (Kishinev, 1974), p. 346Google Scholar and Sov. Mold., 27 02 1971, p. 4Google Scholar; Latvia, , 1976Google Scholar: Simmonds, , Nationalism in the USSR, p. 154Google Scholar and Sovetskaya Latviya, 23 01 1976, p. 6Google Scholar; Kirgizia, , 1961: Rost i regulirovaniye, p. 258Google Scholar and Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 21 09 1961, p. 5Google Scholar; Turkmenia, , 1961: Komm. partiya Turkmenistana, p. 160Google Scholar and Turkmenskaya iskra, 16 09 1961, p. 3Google Scholar; 1966: Komm. partiya Turk., p. 196Google Scholar and Turk, iskra, 26 02 1966Google Scholar; Estonia, , 1961Google Scholar: calculated from Katz, , Handbook, p. 78Google Scholar and Sovetskaya Estoniya, 30 09 1961, p. 3.Google Scholar

¹¹ We do not know the national composition of the Armenian party but Armenian representation at the Party Congress rose from 88 per cent in 1961 to 91 per cent in 1971. This suggests that the Armenians account for approximately 85 per cent of Republican party membership. Given the pattern followed by the Republics in forming their Congresses, we can – in this way – make estimates of the percentage of a Republic's party held by the titular nationality, where we do not have the datum itself.

¹² Both older works such as Pipes, R., The Formation of the Soviet Union; Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957)Google Scholar, and d'Encausse, Carrère, L'Empire EclatéGoogle Scholar, suggest this: see also Connelly, Brian's article in Clem, R., ed., The Soviet West (New York: Praeger, 1975)Google Scholar and Zaprudnik's article in Simmonds, , Nationalism in the USSRGoogle Scholar, although the latter author would disagree with this interpretation.

¹³ A rather lurid account is given by Zemtsov, I., Partiya ili mafiya (Paris: Les Editeurs Réunis, 1976).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Macro-data of these kind do not tell us anything of regional density within a Republic or of relationships at local level, where discrimination, the existence (or not) of equal opportunities, and differences in political participation by different social or national groups take on meaning. It could be that among the 20–40-year-old age group, the rate of party membership is identical for all; what produces the differences are the sharply different rates among the older populations. The low figures for the Baits and Moldavians could be largely a reflection of their late incorporation into the USSR (the absence of party members among their older generations) or it could be that they reflect sharply different recruitment policies. The political implications of similar rates of recruitment from the new generations would be quite different from those where recruitment varied.

¹⁵ The variable ‘administrative intelligentsia’ has been assembled from Tables 3–17, Vol. VI of the 1970 census by taking the section ‘Employed primarily on mental labour’ and including all subsections as far as ‘legal personnel’ plus the leading personnel of ‘trade’, ‘planning’ and ‘kommunalnye (municipal) enterprises’. Party-membership figures have been calculated from the census data and Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya, Ezhegodnik, for appropriate years; other variables have been calculated from the census data: workers, 1959, Introductory volume, p. 95 and 1970, Vol. V, Table 4, pp. 26–33; education, 1970, Vol. III, Table 7, pp. 559–62 and Vol. IV, pp. 571–99.

¹⁶ Data on the national composition of the CPSU are available for 1961 in Partiinaya zhizn, 1962, no. 1, p. 49Google Scholar. We use this and the census data, 1959, Introductory volume, Table 54B on the age-structure of the nationalities to calculate the percentage of the adult population in the party 1961/59; for 1971/70 the calculation is based on Zakharov, I., Leninski kurs partii na ukrepleniye druzhby narodov SSSR (Moscow, 1972), p. 27Google Scholar and census data, 1970, Vol. IV, Table 32. The education variable is from 1970, Vol. IV, Table 36.

¹⁷ The 1976 Partiinaya zhizn article on party statistics gave figures on party membership for all the minor nationalities in the CPSU. We could estimate their rates of party membership in that year, based on projections of population growth rates 1959–70, but the degree of inaccuracy involved with such small numbers makes it a less than valuable exercise and we do not have their age-structure. We are on safer ground with the bigger groups, most notably the Jews and Tatars. Here others have made independent calculations. Jacobs has suggested a figure of 1 in 7 for the Jews in 1976 and 1 in 5 or 20 per cent of the adult Jewish population in the party in 1976 (Soviet Jewish Affairs, VIII (1978), 26–34, p. 31Google Scholar; see also his earlier ‘A Note on Jewish Membership of the Soviet Communist Party’, VI (1976), 114–15)Google Scholar. I suspect this is slightly too high – given the figures we have for individual Republics (see Table 5) – but what cannot be doubted is that they are the nationality with the highest party membership figures. The Tatars too do reasonably well, although not as well. Again, we can see this from figures for individual Republics (see Katz, , Handbook, p. 396, and our Table 5).Google Scholar

¹⁸ John Miller has suggested a refinement of this hypothesis: that an instruction would have gone out in 1964/65, based on 1964 population figures (as in Narodnoye khozyaistvo, 1963)Google Scholar, to take in a further 1·75 per cent of the population over the next ten years. This produces an even better fit. John Armstrong suggested that since it is obvious that a uniform population-target instruction will reduce the differential between those with high party membership and low party membership, there is no need to talk in terms of alternative policies; such a realization, he argued, lay behind recruitment policies in the United States directed at narrowing the gap between the percentages of, e.g., whites and blacks in higher education.

¹⁹ We exclude from the calculation the Ukraine and Kirgizia because data are only available for these Republics for one year; and we exclude the Tatars and Jews because of the basis on which the percentages were calculated. The education variable is from the census, 1970, Vol. IV, Tables 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50 and 52.

²⁰ Table not included.