¹ See, especially, Huntington, Samuel P., ‘Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century’, in Truman, David B., ed., The Congress and America's Future (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 5–31Google Scholar, and Shils, Edward A., ‘Resentments and Hostilities of Legislators: Sources, Objects, Consequences’, in Eulau, Heinz and Wahlke, John, eds., Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 347–54Google Scholar, originally under the title ‘The Legislator and His Environment’, in University of Chicago Law Review, XVIII (1950–1951), 571–84.Google Scholar

² Huntington, , ‘Congressional Responses’.Google Scholar

³ Recent changes in the congressional pension system in 1973 may be among the most important factors in speeding the departure of senior members.

⁴ See Huntington, , ‘Congressional Responses’Google Scholar; Shils, , ‘Resentments and Hostilities’;Google ScholarRieselbach, Leroy N., ‘Congressmen as “Small Town Boys”: A Research Note’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, xiv (1970), 321–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davidson, Roger H., The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), especially pp. 34–71Google Scholar; and Price, H. Douglas, ‘The Electoral Arena’Google Scholar, in Truman, , Congress and America's Future, pp. 32–51.Google Scholar

⁵ Shils, , ‘Resentments and Hostilities’, p. 353.Google Scholar

⁶ See Mayhew, David R., Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Fenno, Richard F. Jr., ‘If, as Ralph Nader says, Congress is “The Broken Branch”, How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?’ in Ornstein, Norman J., ed., Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 277–94Google Scholar; and Price, , ‘The Electoral Arena’, especially pp. 50–1.Google Scholar

⁷ Huntingdon, , ‘Congressional Responses’, p. 16.Google Scholar

⁸ Huntington, , ‘Congressional Responses’, p. 17Google Scholar; see also Long, Norton, ‘Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism’, American Political Science Review, XLVI (1952), 808–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Long argues that a wide range of interests is represented through the bureaucracy.

⁹ Shils, , ‘Resentments and Hostilities’, p. 350.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Such an analysis of European politicians and bureaucrats has been undertaken by Putnam, Robert D.. See his ‘Bureaucrats and Politicians: Contending Elites in the Policy Process’, in Gwyn, William B. and Edwards, George C. III, Perspectives on Public Policy Making, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. 15 (New Orleans, La.: Tulane University Press, 1975), pp. 179–202.Google Scholar

¹¹ There is, of course, a cadre of high level staff people in the federal bureaucracy. It is possible that their backgrounds and outlooks may differ from those of the program administrators in our sample.

¹² Agencies from which administrators were sampled include: Agriculture, Commerce, HEW, HUD, Justice, Interior, Labor, Transportation, Treasury, GSA, OEO, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, SEC, SBA and the VA.

¹³ An excellent summary of this evidence on American legislative elites can be found in Keefe, William J. and Ogul, Morris S., The American Legislative Process, 3rd edn. (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 113–50.Google Scholar More generally see Matthews, Donald R., The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (New York: Random House, 1954)Google Scholar, and Putnam, Robert D., The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), especially, pp. 20–44.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Shils, , ‘Resentments and Hostilities’, p. 350.Google Scholar

¹⁵ In this regard, it should be noted that only 12 per cent of our sample was retired by electoral defeat in the two elections (1972 and 1974) which have transpired since this was written. Of the nine members of our sample who were defeated, two have been returned and two lost in primaries contested by another incumbent as a result of redistricting.

¹⁶ Shils, , ‘Resentments and Hostilities’, p. 350.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 238.Google Scholar

¹⁸ According to David T. Stanley and his associates, in 1964, 93 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives had some college background and 79 per cent were graduates. In 1963,96 per cent of the top level civil servants had some college experience and in the 1961–65 period, 98 per cent of the political executives had some college background. See Stanley, David T., Mann, Dean E. and Doig, Jameson W., Men Who Govern (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 18.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Data collected by Bernard Mennis reveal about 35 per cent of the Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) to be Ivy League graduates. See Mennis, Bernard, American Foreign Policy Officials: Who They Are and What They Believe Regarding International Politics (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), p. 72.Google Scholar

²⁰ An old adage, according to Roger Davidson, is that ‘Ours [American government] is a government of lawyers and not of men.’ See Davidson, , The Role of the Congressman, especially pp. 37–40.Google Scholar Also see Matthews, Donald R., U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Press, 1960), especially pp. 35–40Google Scholar; and Keefe, and Ogul, , The American Legislative Process, especially pp. 116–20.Google Scholar

²¹ Twenty-eight per cent of all of the U.S. Senators analyzed by Matthews had begun their public careers as law-enforcement officials. See Matthews, , U.S. Senators, p. 51.Google Scholar

²² Huntington, , ‘Congressional Responses’, pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

²³ For some evidence on the power of organizational affiliation to predict attitudes see Axelrod, Robert, ‘Bureaucratic Decisionmaking in the Military Assistance Program: Some Empirical Findings’, in Halperin, Morton H. and Kanter, Arnold, eds., Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 154–72Google Scholar; Dearborn, De Witt C. and Simon, Herbert A., ‘A Note on the Department Identification of Executives’, Sociometry, xxi (1958), 140–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Aberbach, Joel D. and Rockman, Bert A., ‘Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy’, American Political Science Review, LXX (1976), 456–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For similar inferences drawn from career patterns within the federal bureaucracy see McGregor, Eugene B. Jr., ‘Politics and the Career Mobility of Bureaucrats’, American Political Science Review, LXVIII (1974), 18–26, especially pp. 24–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ Weber, Max, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 44.Google Scholar

²⁵ Weber, , ‘Politics as a Vocation’, p. 95.Google Scholar

²⁶ Putnam, , ‘Contending Elites’, p. 202.Google Scholar

²⁷ Huntington, , ‘Congressional Responses’, p. 30.Google Scholar

²⁸ Long, , ‘Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism’.Google Scholar

²⁹ The liberal-conservative attitude scale was designed to measure a respondent's policy preferences across a diverse set of topics throughout the entire interview. The liberal-conservative roll call scale was composed of eleven major issues in the second session (1970) of the 91st Congress. These issues were taken from among those cited by Congressional Quarterly as key votes. They include social spending and social welfare measures, civil rights issues, and foreign policy and international trade issues. Despite the fact that the coders had no knowledge of the congressmen's votes on these issues, the Kendall's T _b coefficient between the attitude scale and the roll call scale is ·48.

³⁰ Putnam, , ‘Contending Elites’, especially p. 195.Google Scholar

³¹ Putnam, , ‘Contending Elites’.Google Scholar

³² Putnam, , ‘Contending Elites’.Google Scholar

³³ Similar points are made by Shils. See his ‘Resentments and Hostilities’.

³⁴ Putnam, , ‘Contending Elites’, especially pp. 190–3.Google Scholar

³⁵ Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 109.Google Scholar

³⁶ See, for instance, Richard Neustadt's speculations about such trends in his ‘Politicians and Bureaucrats’, in Truman, , ed., The Congress and America's Future, pp. 102–20Google Scholar, see especially p. 119. The growth of public policy institutes in the late 1960s and 1970s indirectly could generate stronger unifying forces among federal executives in the future.

³⁷ See Davidson, Roger H., ‘Breaking Up Those “Cozy Triangles”: An Impossible Dream?’ (paper prepared for the Symposium on Legislative Reform and Public Policy, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1976).Google Scholar See also Freeman, J. Leiper, The Political Process Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations (New York: Random House, 1955).Google Scholar

³⁸ Sayre, Wallace S., ‘Bureaucracies: Some Contrasts in Systems’, Indian Journal of Public Administration, x (1964), 219–29, p. 227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ For example, 43 per cent of the congressmen gave more weight to the constituency service function then to the legislative function in describing the most important aspects of their jobs. Only 26 per cent gave greater weight to the legislative function than to constituency service.

⁴⁰ See for example Long, Norton, ‘Power and Administration’, Public Administration Review, ix (1949), 257–64, especially p. 262CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Long, Norton, ‘Public Policy and Administration: The Goals of Rationality and Responsibility’, Public Administration Review, xiv (1954), 23–31.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harvest, n.d.), p. 119.Google Scholar

⁴² This merely may be accelerating trends already under way. See for example Asher, Herbert B., ‘The Changing Status of the Freshman Representative’Google Scholar, in Ornstein, , ed., Congress in Change, pp. 217–39.Google Scholar

⁴³ For some interesting speculations on the durability of recent changes see Jones, Charles O., ‘Will Reform Change Congress?’ (paper prepared for a conference on ‘The Role of Congress’, sponsored by Time, Inc., Washington, D.C., 19 05 1975).Google Scholar