¹ The larger study on which this article rests is based partially on an examination of public documents and extensive reading of relevant books, journals and newspapers. Interviews provided the crucial information regarding central-local relations as well as those data concerned with elites' self-images and self-perception. Interviews were conducted among Milan's housing officials (especially within the Autonomous Institute for Public Housing in the Milan Province), elected officials, and officials working within the metropolitan planning agency (Piano Intercomunale Milanese) and its affiliated agency concerned with the metropolitan planning of public housing (Consorzio Intercomunale Milanese per l'Edilizia Popolare). In addition, interviews were conducted with the staff of the recently-instituted Lombardy regional government's executive and legislative committees dealing with the housing sector. Although this study is interested in processes before the advent of the regions, and the interviews with regional officials were therefore not used directly, they did provide a type of control for the information gathered at both the national and local levels. At the central level, interviews were conducted at the Ministry of Public Works, Gescal (the national housing agency), the National Institute of Planners (INU), and the National Association of Autonomous Institutes for Public Housing (ANIACAP). Interviews were also held in Milan and Rome with trade union activists, tenant union activists, and researchers. In addition, valuable information was gathered at two seminars in which both local and national administrators and politicians were active participants. The participants at these seminars were almost exclusively either from Milan or Rome. All interviews took place between October 1972 and December 1973. For the purposes of this study, public housing is defined as that publicly-financed housing built for lower-income groups. Publicly-financed housing destined for occupation-specific groups (such as state employees) or sponsored by housing co-operatives is not included in this study. For the study on which this article is based, see Sbragia, Alberta Mary, Urban Autonomy Within the Unitary State: A Case Study of Public Housing Politics in Milan, Italy (University of Wisconsin: unpublished dissertation, 1974).Google Scholar

² Housing for rent would also need to be administered by a public body. Such administrative activity was seen as similar to planning, that is, as unwarranted government interference in the housing market. The Christian Democrats, while sanctioning direct government intervention in the economy in the form of state-owned enterprises, strongly opposed such intervention in the housing and land markets, favouring instead incentives for private builders.

³ While such a sale would have been a once-for-all subsidy to tenants of rented public housing, its objective was to eliminate rented public housing altogether. See Associazione Nazionale fra gli Istituti Autonomi per le Case Popolari, Centro Studi, Cessione degli alloggi in base al D.P.R. 17 gennaio 1959, n. 2 e successive modificazioni, Quaderno n. 3, Rome (1971).Google Scholar

⁴ The impact of the Togni-sponsored legislation was more severe in some cities than in others. In the southern city of Messina, for example, the Messina Institute's housing stock was so depleted by the impact of this legislation that Parliament later appropriated special funds so that Messina could begin ‘reconstructing’ its public housing stock. In Milan, however, the Institute strongly resisted implementing the legislation. The Institute made the paper work so time-consuming and cumbersome that most requests never made their way through the bureaucratic maze. Consequently, Milan lost little public housing to private owners.

⁵ Parenti, Giuseppe, Una esperienza di programmazione settoriale nell' edilizia: L'INA-Casa (Rome: Giuffrè, 1967), p. 43.Google Scholar

⁶ For a general overview of the problems of the Italian bureaucracy see LaPalombara, Joseph, Italy: The Politics of Planning (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966)Google Scholar; Tarrow, Sidney, Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Putnam, Robert D., ‘The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Western Europe: A Preliminary Report’, British Journal of Political Science, III (1973), 257–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ The ‘special’ or semi-independent agency discussed here resembles a public corporation in many ways: its non-ministerial status, its extensive autonomy, the sums it handles, its profit orientation, and its ‘technocratic’ perspective are very similar to the characteristics of public enterprises. For a general discussion of the differences between traditional ministries and the ‘special administration’ which works outside ministerial structures, see Passigli, Stefano, ‘The Ordinary and Special Bureaucracies in Italy’, in Dogan, Mattei, ed., The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants (New York: Wiley, 1975), pp. 226–37Google Scholar; see also Posner, M. and Woolf, S., Italian Public Enterprises (London: Duckworth, 1967).Google Scholar

⁸ de Lucia, Vezio Emilio, ‘La questione della Gescal’, Alternativa, XIII (1971), 10–11Google Scholar; Cavalera, Giovanni, Intini, Ugo, Tortorelo, Emanuele, Italiani senza casa (Milan: Nuova Mercurio, 1970), p. 91.Google Scholar

⁹ Although both the Ministry and INA-Casa/Gescal paid for construction rather than carrying it out themselves, they used their funds differently. Whereas the Ministry provided money only to cover the interest charges on bank loans taken out by the Institutes in order to finance construction, INA-Casa/Gescal funds were used directly for house-building in the form of capital grants. The Ministry's funds naturally stretched much further than those of INA-Casa/Gescal relative to the actual number of units built. However, the Ministry's method of financing entailed a high degree of dependence on banking institutions. For a general discussion of the consequences of such dependence for Milan's housing politics, see Sbragia, Alberta, ‘Borrowing to Build: Private Money and Public Welfare’, International Journal of Health Services, IX (1979).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Under Fascism the Institutes were reorganized and their jurisdiction became a province rather than a single city. As provincial organs, they were placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Works, and their relations with Rome became increasingly centralized as the Fascists tried to use them as instruments for combating unwanted urbanization. After the Second World War the Institutes' jurisdiction remained provincial rather than strictly city-wide, but their ties to the Ministry were decentralized. The Institutes therefore became the Ministry's decentralized field agencies in the area of public housing – an ambiguous relationship at best.

¹¹ The Minister himself decided what proportion of the parliamentary appropriations should be allocated to each Institute. Members of Parliament served as important mediators between the Institutes and the Minister. When funds were to be allocated, a district's deputies in parliament, irrespective of party, would bring pressure upon the Minister both in their official capacities and personally – if they had developed a relationship with him. The home region of the Minister was always reputed to have had a competitive edge, and so also were those communities whose political leadership belonged to the ‘correct’ party and faction. The granting of funds by the Minister, then, was not based upon the quality or objectives of the proposed programmes; rather, it was a political decision. Thus the Institutes did not submit programmes or projects to the Ministry in attempts to justify their requests or pressures; they attempted to obtain as much money as possible, and only then did they develop programmes. In sum, the politics of the relationship between the Ministry and its field agencies centred on the allocation process, with members of Parliament acting as mediators.

¹² Although legally the Institutes had to obtain the approval of the Ministry for those building activities which used Ministry funds, such approval was usually proforma, especially with regard to the Institutes in the North. As one ministerial official put it, ‘We assume the Institutes in the North know what they are doing. It's those in the South we try to watch.’ In fact, the Milan Institute often received approval long after the construction in question had been completed.

¹³ For example, the Milan Institute at one point did threaten to refuse any further contracting with Gescal if certain procedures were not streamlined and simplified. It won, and Gescal agreed to its demands.

¹⁴ The ‘opening to the left’ refers to the Socialist party's entrance into the national governing coalition in 1963.

¹⁵ For a discussion of the debates surrounding passage of the Housing Reform Law of 1971 (Law n. 865), see Achilli, Michele, Casa: vertenza di massa (Padova: Marsilio, 1972)Google Scholar; for a legal interpretation of the law, see Predieri, Alberto, Morbidelli, Giuseppe, Brunetti, Vito Antonio, Bartoli, Maria Angela, La ‘Riforma della casa’ (Milan: Giuffrè, 1971).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Data provided by the Associazione Nazionale fra gli Istituti Autonomi per le Case Popolari (ANIACAP).

¹⁷ Because Milan's officials, unlike national officials, were worried by the possibility of public housing neighbourhoods becoming dominated by one class, such local control was sometimes directed at the prevention of one-class neighbourhoods developing.

¹⁸ Dalmasso, Etienne, Milan: capitale économique de l'Italie (Paris: Editions Ophrys, 1971), p. 13.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The diversification of Milan's urban economy stands in sharp contrast to the undiversified nature of the economy in other Italian cities. The urban economies of, for example, Turin, Genoa and Rome are dominated by a small number of corporate giants and consequently are likely to be seriously affected by the changing international fortunes of such firms. More precisely, in 1967, one half of the corporate sales activity within Turin was related to the activities of Fiat, eight-tenths of corporate sales in Genoa were related to four companies (one metallurgical and three petroleum companies – Esso, Shell and Mobil Oil), and a quarter of Rome's figures were due to the national airline, Alitalia, and the Italian communications industry. In Milan, on the other hand, the five major corporations accounted for only 32 per cent of corporate sales within the Milan province; the top twenty corporations accounted for only 63 per cent. Dalmasso, , Milan, p. 407.Google Scholar

²⁰ Dalmasso concluded that Milan ‘is central European. Spiritually speaking, it is further north than Zurich.’ Dalmasso, , Milan, p. 11.Google Scholar

²¹ Montanelli, Indro, Cavallari, Alberto, Ottone, Piero, Piazzesi, Gianfranco, Russo, Giovanni, Italia sotto inchiesta: ‘Corriere della Sera’, 1963/65 (Florence: Sansoni, 1965), p. 141.Google Scholar

²² The existence of private universities in Milan, almost unknown in Italy, provides evidence of this involvement. The technically-oriented university, the Politecnico, was founded in 1863 through the initiative of the Lombard industrial sector which had a great need for well-trained people in technical fields. Dalmasso classifies it as ‘the essential organ of Lombard capitalism’. Dalmasso, , Milan, p. 430.Google Scholar Affiliation with Lombardy's private industry has remained strong, and large corporations still contribute to the university. For example, Professor Natta, Nobel prizewinner for his work in chemistry, stated ‘I am a product of Lombardy's private industry’. Reported in Montanelli, et al. , Italia sotto inchiesta, p. 162.Google Scholar Bocconi University, specializing in commerce and economics, was founded in 1902 on the basis of contributions given by a wealthy chain-store owner and is still partially supported by gifts from various banks and corporations. The Catholic University was founded in 1921. The founding of the public university in 1924 was assisted by contributions from both public and private sources as well as by a fund-raising drive among the Milanese public at large. See Dalmasso, , Milan, p. 431.Google Scholar

²³ Fried, Robert C., Planning the Eternal City: Roman Politics and Planning Since World War II (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 98–9.Google Scholar

²⁴ Taken from Fried, Robert C., ‘Communism, Urban Budgets, and the Two Italics: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government’ Journal of Politics, XXXIII (1971), 1008–51, p. 1021.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ Fried, , Planning the Eternal City, p. 125.Google Scholar

²⁶ Casalengo, Francesco, ‘Situazione finanziaria degli Enti locali: interventi finanziari e questioni relative con carattere di priorità’, in Atti del Convegno Nazionale su Partecipazione ed efficienza nella costruzione delle strutture politico-amministrative regionali e locali (Pavia: Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Pavia, 1971), p. 180.Google Scholar

²⁷ But whether such an advantage would be actually reflected in the amount of state aid received is unclear. Sidney Tarrow, in a survey of 131 mayors of villages and small cities in Italy, found that Communist mayors received proportionately more financial support from the central government than did non-Communist mayors. He concludes that ‘under the Christian Democrats, political control of the bureaucracy was so poor that even the opposition could gain hefty state contributions to the municipalities it governed’. Tarrow, , Between Center and Periphery, p. 106.Google Scholar Furthermore, Tarrow found that mayors with a high level of party experience, no matter in which party that experience has been gained, received more state aid than did those mayors with less party experience. See Tarrow, , Between Center and Periphery, p. 196.Google Scholar

²⁸ For an excellent discussion of the politics of housing in Milan during the Fascist period, see Chiumeo, Rosa, ‘Edilizia Popolare a Milano tra le Due Guerre: 1919–1940’, in Franchi, Dario and Chiumeo, Rosa, eds., Urbanistica a Milano in regime fascista (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1972). 139–222.Google Scholar

²⁹ Galli, Georgio and Facchi, Paolo, La sinistra democristiana: storia e ideologia (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962), p. 162.Google Scholar

³⁰ Galli, and Facchi, , La sinistra democristiana, p. 235.Google Scholar

³¹ Budget report for 1951–52 of the Istituto Autonomo per le Case Popolari della Provincia di Milano, p. 8.

³² Lodola, Attilio, ‘L'Istituto dal 1909 al 1960’, Cinquant'anni di storia e di attività dell'edilizia popolare in Milano 1909–1960 (Milan: Istituto Autonomo per le Case Popolari della Provincia di Milano, 1962), p. 127.Google Scholar

³³ Lodola, , Cinquant'anni di storia, p. 129.Google Scholar

³⁴ By founding the journal Edilizia Popolare in 1954, Ripamonti was able to reach a nationwide audience. It became the official journal of the National Association of Autonomous Institutes; he was to be the journal's director for fourteen years. It is now the major journal dealing with public housing and is an important journal within the housing industry generally.

³⁵ Calculated from data presented by Parenti, , Una esperienza di programmazione settoriale nell'edilizia: L'INA-Casa, p. 114Google Scholar, and from data presented in the Milan Institute's budget reports from 1951/52 through 1960/61. It should be noted that the guidelines used for INA-Casa/Gescal allocations to an area did take into consideration the amount of earmarked taxes collected in that area. Milan therefore had a strong foundation upon which to base its requests. It exploited its advantage vigorously.

³⁶ In the Institute's 1951/52 budget report, Ripamonti called for the ‘establishment of new co-operative relationships with the city administration of Milan, with the provincial adminis tration and with the municipalities of the Province, so as to render possible, through the financial help of these units, a marked increase in the construction of public housing within our province’. (1951/52 Budget report of the Istituto Autonomo per le Case Popolari della Provincia di Milano, p. 8.)

³⁷ Lodola, , Cinquant'anni di storia, p. 124.Google Scholar

³⁸ Budget reports from 1951/52 to 1971 of the Istituto Autonomo per le Case Popolari della Provincia di Milano, p. 8.

³⁹ Data received in interviews.

⁴⁰ The political parties do not seem to have provided a mechanism of central control over Milan's housing policy. Local autonomy may well have been aided by the lack of priority given to housing at the national elite level (until 1968–69), which prevented the articulation of a coherent national policy. However, from 1968 until 1973, when interviewing took place, national elites had not intervened any more than previously, although housing had emerged as a ‘top priority’ problem. For instance, an interviewee who was a highly-ranked Socialist, a member of the city council's executive, and had been a representative of the city administration on the Institute's executive council since 1962, had never been contacted by anyone in the national Socialist office about housing.

⁴¹ Milch, Jerome, ‘Influence as Power: French Local Government Reconsidered’, British Journal of Political Science, IV (1974), 139–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴² For an excellent discussion of how Italian prefects have been used by the central government to intervene in local affairs, see Fried, Robert C., The Italian Prefects: A Study in Administrative Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963).Google Scholar

⁴³ See Martinotti, Guido, ‘Local Financial Problems in Italy’Google Scholar (paper delivered at the IXth World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Uppsala, Sweden, 1978), pp. 35–6.