¹ Bohman, James and Rehg, William, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), p. xiiGoogle Scholar.

² Risse, Thomas, ‘ “Let’s Argue!” Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 54 (2000), 1–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Eriksen, Erik O. and Fossum, John E., eds, Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation? (London: Routledge, 2000)Google Scholar.

⁴ Dryzek, John S.. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar.

⁵ See, for example, for empirical studies of deliberation in the European Union: Pollack, Mark A. and Shaffer, Gregory, ‘Risk Regulation, GMOs, and the Limits of Deliberation’, in Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace, eds, Unveiling the Council of the EU: Games Governments Play in Brussels (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 144–164CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Naurin, Daniel, Deliberation Behind Closed Doors: Transparency and Lobbying in the European Union (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007)Google Scholar; Niemann, Arne, ‘Between Communicative Action and Strategic Action: The Article 113 Committee and the Negotiations on the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2004), 379–407CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jacobsson, Kerstin and Vifell, Åsa, ‘Deliberative Transnationalism? Analysing the Role of Committee Interaction in Soft Co-Ordination’, in Ingo Linsenmann, Christoph O. Meyer and Wolfgang T. Wessels, eds, Economic Government of the EU (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 163–186CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Agné, Hans, Democracy Reconsidered: The Prospects of Its Theory and Practice During Internationalisation (doctoral dissertation, Stockholm Studies in Politics, 2004)Google Scholar; Pollack, Mark A., ‘Control Mechanism or Deliberative Democracy? Two Images of Comitology’, Comparative Political Studies, 36 (2003), 125–155CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Joerges, Christian and Neyer, Jurgen, ‘Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (1997), 609–625CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and for empirical studies of elite deliberation in other contexts, see Steiner, Jürg, Bächtiger, André, Spörndli, Markus and Steenbergen, Marco R., Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)Google Scholar; Öberg, Per-Ola, ‘Does Administrative Corporatism Promote Trust and Deliberation?’ Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (2000), 113–124Google Scholar, and the special issues of the Swiss Political Science Review, 13 (2007), and Acta Politica, 40 (2005); and, for an overview of the field, Thompson, Dennis F., ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (2008), 497–520CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Risse, , ‘ “Let’s Argue!” ’, p. 10Google Scholar.

⁷ See, for example, Joerges, and Neyer, , ‘Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving’Google Scholar; Niemann, Arne, ‘Deliberation and Bargaining in the Article 113 Committee and the 1996/97 IGC Representatives Group’, in Naurin and Wallace, eds, Unveiling the Council of the EU, pp. 121–143Google Scholar, and Niemann, ‘Between Communicative Action and Strategic Action’; Jacobsson and Vifell, ‘Deliberative Transnationalism?’

⁸ Pollack, ‘Control Mechanism or Deliberative Democracy?’ Pollack and Shaffer, ‘Risk Regulation, GMOs, and the Limits of Deliberation’Google Scholar.

⁹ That is not to say that case studies may not also provide insights with some general applicability if they are selected strategically, for example, as least likely cases.

¹⁰ Chambers, Simone, ‘Contract or Conversation? Theoretical Lessons from the Canadian Constitutional Crisis’, Politics & Society, 26 (1998), 143–172CrossRefGoogle Scholar, pp. 159f.

¹¹ Kanra, Bora, ‘Deliberating Across Difference: The Role of Social Learning in the Theory and Practise of Deliberative Democracy’ (paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions in Helsinki, 2007)Google Scholar, p. 2.

¹² Cf. Taber, Charles S. and Lodge, Milton, ‘Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs’, American Journal of Political Science, 50 (2006), 755–769CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who demonstrate that higher stakes tend to lead to more biased processing of information.

¹³ Fearon, James D., ‘Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation’, International Organization, 52 (1998), 269–305CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ See, for example, Dryzek, John S., Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in Action; Mendelberg, Tali and Karpowitz, Christopher, ‘How People Deliberate About Justice’, in Shawn W. Rosenberg, ed., Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 101–129CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Steiner, et al. , Deliberative Politics in Action, p. 82Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Elster, Jon, ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making’, in Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 97–122CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ For a critical test of the theory of publicity’s ‘civilizing’ effect, see Naurin, Daniel, ‘Backstage Behavior? Lobbyists in Public and Private Settings in Sweden and the European Union’, Comparative Politics, 39 (2007), 209–228Google Scholar, and Naurin, Deliberation Behind Closed Doors.

¹⁸ Cf. Risse, ‘ “Let’s Argue!” ’, pp. 18f.

¹⁹ Mansbridge, Jane, ‘Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity’, in Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 46–66Google Scholar.

²⁰ Grünenfelder, Rita and Bächtiger, André, ‘Gendered Deliberation? How Men and Women Deliberate in Legislatures’ (paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions in Helsinki, 2007)Google Scholar.

²¹ Mendelberg, and Karpowitz, , ‘How People Deliberate About Justice’Google Scholar.

²² For some recent contributions to this debate see, for example, Panke, Diana, ‘More Arguing Than Bargaining? The Institutional Designs of the European Convention and Intergovernmental Conferences Compared’, Journal of European Integration, 28 (2006), 357–379CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deitelhoff, Nicole, and Muller, Harald, ‘Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas’, Review of International Studies, 31 (2005), 167–179CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Holzinger, Katharina, ‘Bargaining through Arguing: An Empirical Analysis Based on Speech Act Theory’, Political Communication, 21 (2004), 195–222CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ulbert, Cornelia and Risse, Thomas, ‘Deliberately Changing the Discourse: What Does Make Arguing Effective?’ Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (2000), 113–124Google Scholar.

²³ Zurn, Michael, ‘Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other International Institutions’, European Journal of International Relations, 6 (2000), 183–221CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ Barry, Brian, Political Argument (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 87Google Scholar.

²⁵ Barry, , Political Argument, p. 86Google Scholar.

²⁶ Barry, , Political Argument, p. 86Google Scholar.

²⁷ Gutmann, Amy and Thompson, Dennis F., Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

²⁸ Schimmelfennig, Frank, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization, 55 (2001), 47–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 63.

²⁹ Chambers, Simone, ‘Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 12 (2004), 389–410CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ Walton, Richard E. and McKersie, Robert B., A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations; An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965)Google Scholar, chap. 4.

³¹ ‘Integrative’ and ‘distributive bargaining’ is the terminology used by Walton and McKersie. Cf. Schelling, who speaks of the ‘efficiency’ and the ‘distributional’ ‘aspects of bargaining’ ( Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 21Google Scholar.

³² Heisenberg, Dorothee, ‘The Institution of “Consensus” in the European Union: Formal Versus Informal Decision-Making in the Council’, European Journal of Political Research, 44 (2005), 65–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³³ Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona, Van Aken, Wim and Wallace, Helen, ‘When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44 (2006), 161–194CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁴ Steiner, et al. , Deliberative Politics in Action, pp. 59fGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ Öberg, , ‘Does Administrative Corporatism Promote Trust and Deliberation?’ p. 469Google Scholar.

³⁶ Joerges, and Neyer, , ‘Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving’, p. 618Google Scholar.

³⁷ Walton, and McKersie, , A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiation, pp. 84ffGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Fisher, Roger, Ury, William L. and Patton, Bruce, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In, 2nd edn (London: Arrow Business Books, 1997)Google Scholar, chap 3.

³⁹ Mackie, Gerry, ‘Does Democratic Deliberation Change Minds?’ Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (2000), 113–124Google Scholar; cf. Holzinger, , ‘Bargaining through Arguing’, p. 201Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ For example, Ulbert and Risse argue that negotiations in front of an audience may hinder a frank exchange of views, because actors have to stick to their ‘fixed preferences’ ( Ulbert, and Risse, , ‘Deliberately Changing the Discourse’, p. 358Google Scholar). In reality, what publicity may bring about is fixed positions (Naurin, Deliberation Behind Closed Doors).

⁴¹ Checkel, Jeffrey T., ‘Taking Deliberation Seriously’, Arena Working Papers, Oslo, 2001Google Scholar.

⁴² Skinner, Quentin, ‘ “Social Meaning” and the Explanation of Social Action’, in James Tully, ed., Meaning & Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 79–96Google Scholar, at p. 83.

⁴³ The survey is part of a broader project on cooperation and communication patterns in the working groups of the Council of the EU, which also includes a first survey in 2003 and a third survey in 2009. Daniel Naurin and Rutger Lindahl were responsible for the data collection.

⁴⁴ The higher level working groups were Coreper II and Coreper I (the ambassadors and the vice-ambassadors of the member states’ permanent representations in Brussels), the Economic Policy Committee, the Special Committee on Agriculture, the Political and Security Committee and the Article 36 Committee (the latter dealing with judicial co-operation in the field of criminal matters, police co-operation, organized crime and terrorism). In cases where we were unable to interview a Coreper II or Coreper I ambassador, we substituted them with their assistants (in EU-jargon these are called the Antici- and Mertens-delegates respectively). The lower level working groups were the Politico-Military Working Party, the Working Party on Agricultural Questions, the Working Party on the Environment, the Working Party on Tax Questions and the Working Party on Competition and Growth.

⁴⁵ Elster, Jon, ‘Strategic Uses of Arguments’, in Kenneth J. Arrow et al., eds, Barriers to Conflict Resolution (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 236–257Google Scholar, at p. 244.

⁴⁶ Heisenberg, , ‘The Institution of “Consensus” in the European Union’Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ This question concerns both whether the respondents at all communicated their position informally and whether they in that case gave reasons. The figure should therefore not be directly compared to communications at the meeting, where the percentage base only includes respondents who did state their position at the meeting.

⁴⁸ Taking into account also that women are underrepresented within the intergovernmental working groups compared to the supranational groups reduces the difference further. Taking only supranational working groups into account, men are still arguing more than women at the meetings (a difference of 8 percentage points), while women are arguing slightly more (3 percentage points) than men before meetings.

⁴⁹ Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.J.: Cornell University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.