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¹³⁰ And indeed the idea that central bank independence would be a step towards EMU was an important theme in media reports during May 1997.

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¹⁴¹ The Tories sought to limit the damage by claiming that independence was the first step towards EMU. According to a Conservative MP: ‘The fourth, and in many ways most important, reason for the change is to prepare the way for Britain to enter a single European currency managed by a European central bank that will be wholly independent of any form of democratic control’. Sir Tapsell, House of Commons, Hansard, 11 Nov 1997.

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¹⁵⁶ It is also worth stressing that structural inflation (and hence interests rates) in major capitalist economies was much lower in the late 1990s. This means that the issue of who controls interests was less contentious than in the past. This factor might have also affected Brown's decision.

¹⁵⁷ Gordon Brown, ‘Chancellor's Speech at the Mansion House’, 12 June 1997.

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¹⁶⁵ On this important issue, see Elgie and Thompson, The Politics of Central Banks.

¹⁶⁶ See Lawson, The View from No. 11; Lamont. In Office; Thatcher, The Downing Street Years; Major, The Autobiography.

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