¹ In this article, the terms ‘weak’, ‘small’, and ‘insecure’ are used interchangeably. When ‘small state’ appears in the text, it should be understood to mean ‘small’ in terms of power rather than size. For a similar conceptualization, see Handel, Michael, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), pp. 10–11Google Scholar; and Baehr, Peter R., ‘Small States: A Tool for Analysis?’, World Politics, 3 (1975), 456–66, at p. 461.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an alternative definition based on population size, see Clarke, Colin and Payne, Tony, eds, Politics, Security and Development in Small States (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).Google Scholar The most convincing definitions are those which view smallness in terms of capabilities as well as how those capabilities are applied against whom, when, and for what sets of goals. Resource capabilities necessarily constrain the scope and domain of foreign policy. Thus a small state can be defined by its limited capacity to: (1) influence the security interests of, or directly threaten, a great power; and (2) defend itself against an attack by an equally motivated great power. See Keohane, Robert O., ‘Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Organization, 23 (1969), 291–310, at pp. 295–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levy, Jack S., War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 9–10, 13Google Scholar; Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29Google Scholar; Handel, , Weak States in the International System, pp. 36, 68–9, 171Google Scholar; Fox, Annette Baker, ‘The Small States in the International System, 1919–1969’, International Journal, 24 (1969), 751–64, at p. 752Google Scholar; Labs, Eric J., ‘Do Weak States Bandwagon?’ Security Studies, 1 (1992), 383–116, at p. 409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Neorealism assumes that international constraints influence state behaviour. In general, international pressures will override domestic interests, internal political struggles, and the characteristics of particular states in foreign-policy decision making. Given that the international system is anarchic and that states must consequently ensure their own security, the exigencies of the international environment will be paramount in decision makers' calculations. Accordingly, a state's behaviour is viewed as a response to the constraints and incentives of its aggregate power relative to others (i.e., the distribution of capabilities) or the degree of aggressive intent on the part of external actors (i.e., the balance of threat). Neorealists assume that statesmen will respond rationally to these preconditions and will choose that foreign-policy course which is most likely to maximize security benefits and minimize security risks. While neorealists recognize that systemic/structural factors may prevent statesmen from pursuing optimal strategies, it is presumed that elites are domestically unconstrained. In contrast to this structural/systemic argument, unit or domestic level theories expect that state attributes and societal conflicts will affect foreign-policy choices. It is assumed that foreign policy will not always reflect national security interests or systemic/structural imperatives. Rather, the characteristics of particular states and the ideologies and local interests of societal and state actors will often render statesmen incapable of responding to the exigencies of the international environment. For seminal works that distinguish between external and internal levels of analysis as determinants of state behaviour, see Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, the Slate and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)Google Scholar and Singer, J. David, ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations’, World Politics, 14 (1961), 77–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For recent overviews of the debate, see Rosecrance, Richard and Stein, Arthur A., ‘Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy’, in Rosecrance, Richard and Stein, Arthur A., eds, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 21–3Google Scholar; and Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de and Lalman, David, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 12–17, 247.Google Scholar

³ By exploring small state foreign policy and showing that domestic politics counts, this article aims to question the assumed causal primacy of neorealism. However, I remain firmly rooted in the classical realist tradition, which never disregarded the important role of domestic level factors. As Snyder notes. ‘Realism must be recaptured from those who look only at politics between societies, ignoring what goes on within societies’ (Snyder, , Myths of Empire, p. 20).Google Scholar

⁴ Military strategy is how states decide ‘which wars shall be fought, or if war should be fought’ (see Posen, Barry R., The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 285).Google Scholar These cases comprise the three foreign wars that the United States fought as a weak state as well as the security issues which dominated domestic debate during the initial years of the American republic.

⁵ It is often argued that while neorealism can account for general recurring patterns of state behaviour, it does not attempt to explain the foreign policies of specific states. For example, Waltz says that a theory of foreign policy is required in order to explain how an individual state will respond to the constraints posed by the international system (see Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 71–2).Google Scholar Nevertheless, Waltz does derive different foreign polices, such as alignment strategies, from different distributions of power. Balancing, chain-ganging, and buckpassing behaviour, which Waltz depicts as the product of the system and its given polarity, are not general systemic or international outcomes but are rather alternative foreign-policy strategies. In short, neorealism is a theory of foreign policy. But it differs from other theories of foreign policy by assuming that state behaviour will be responsive to international constraints and incentives rather than domestic level pressures. For additional studies which employ the structural/systemic level of analysis in explaining particular foreign policies, see Posen, , The Sources of Military DoctrineGoogle Scholar; Miller, Benjamin, ‘Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management’, World Politics, 45 (1992), 1–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Grieco, Joseph M., Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).Google Scholar

⁶ See Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, pp. 194–5.Google Scholar With regard to the determinants of small state foreign policy, Waltz is ambiguous. On the one hand, he argues that small state security and foreign policy will be dependent on structural constraints, such as the degree of great power competition. Small states will need to be more attentive to these external constraints due to their ‘narrower margin for error’ (Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, pp. 184–5, 195Google Scholar). On the other hand, Waltz claims that the smaller the state, the more it is likely to take international constraints for granted, since nothing it does can significantly effect the international system. Moreover, because great powers focus their attention on those states most likely to present a security threat, they will be less interested in weak states. As a result, small states will face fewer external constraints and their behaviour will be more likely to reflect domestic political influences (Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, pp. 72–3).Google Scholar

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⁸ Rosenau, James, ‘Pre-theories and Theories of International Politics’, in Farrell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 47–8.Google Scholar

⁹ Jervis, Robert, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30 (1978), 167–214, at pp. 172–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Snyder, , Myths of Empire, p. 20.Google Scholar See also Nincic, Miroslav, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 16.Google Scholar

¹¹ Snyder, , Myths of Empire, pp. 62, 317–18.Google Scholar

¹² Schweller, Randall L., ‘Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?’, World Politics, 14 (1992), 235–69, at p. 267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Schweller, , ‘Domestic Structure and Preventive War’, pp. 253, 264–8.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 21–31.Google Scholar Walt's point is not that small states prefer to bandwagon, but rather that they will often be forced to select this course of action due to their vulnerable international position. Yet, Walt's insistence that weak states choose bandwagoning strategies ‘reluctantly’ makes it difficult to falsify his argument. If a small state bandwagons, Walt can point to its geographic proximity to a threatening great power or to the unavailability of allies–‘balance of threat’ theory scores a success. If a small state balances, Walt can always argue that this strategy should be its first choice even if it is a good candidate for bandwagoning–once again, ‘balance of threat’ theory scores a success. That Walt's theory is non-falsifiable highlights the ambiguity of neorealist policy prescriptions where virtually any foreign-policy action would appear to confirm the theory.

¹⁵ Labs, , ‘Do Weak States Bandwagon?’, pp. 385–6.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Labs, , ‘Do Weak States Bandwagon?’, p. 406.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Goldgeier, James M. and McFaul, Michael, ‘A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era’, International Organization, 46 (1992), 467–91, at p. 470CrossRefGoogle Scholar, see also pp. 475–6, 479. Contrary to Goldgeier and McFaul's assertions, much of the literature on developing countries does not insist that structural explanations are clearly dominant. For example, Rothstein frequently refers to domestic considerations in explaining the foreign-policy choices of underdeveloped countries. He argues that a variety of domestic level variables are salient for this category of weak state, primarily because ‘questions of legitimacy, authority, and national identification remain unsettled’ (see Rothstein, Robert L., The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 35).Google Scholar Recent analyses of Third World security and foreign policy which also focus on domestic political influences include David, Steven R., ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, World Politics, 43 (1991), 233–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ayoob, Mohammed, ‘The Security Problematic of the Third World’, World Politics, 43 (1991), 257–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Vogel, Hans, ‘Small States' Efforts in International Relations: Enlarging the Scope’, in Holl, Otmar, ed., Small States in Europe and Dependence (Vienna: Braumuller, 1983), p. 57.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Handel, , Weak States in the International System, p. 36.Google Scholar

²⁰ Handel, , Weak States in the International System, pp. 3, 261–2Google Scholar; see also Barston, R. P., ‘Introduction’, in Barston, R. P., ed., The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973), p. 19Google Scholar; Rothstein, , Alliances and Small Powers, p. 182.Google Scholar

²¹ Fox, Annette Baker, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World WarII (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).Google Scholar

²² Paul, T. V., Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation By Weaker Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 176.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Bjol, Erling, ‘The Small State in International Politics’, in Schou, August and Brundland, Arne Olau, eds, Small States in International Relations (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiskell, 1971), pp. 32–4.Google Scholar

²⁴ Stinchcombe, Arthur L., Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968), p. 25.Google Scholar

²⁵ Posen, , The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 38.Google Scholar

²⁶ Grieco, Joseph M., ‘Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory’, in Baldwin, David A., ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 306.Google Scholar

²⁷ In this article, I define democracy in its minimalist sense. A state can be categorized as democratic if government leaders are determined by elections contested by independent political groups; the transfer of power between these political groups is peaceful and is based on election results; government officials are not systematically controlled by non-elected individuals or institutions; and citizens have the right to express political views, organize for political action and seek alternative sources of information without fear of punishment.

²⁸ A seminal example of the societal approach is Milner, Helen, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

²⁹ Exemplars of this type of statist argument include Gilpin, Robert, US Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).Google Scholar

³⁰ See, for example, Katzenstein, Peter, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of the Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).Google Scholar

³¹ Thelen, Kathleen and Steinmo, Sven, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, in Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen and Longstreth, Frank, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 14.Google Scholar

³² See Thelen, and Steinmo, , ‘Historical Institutionalism’.Google Scholar See also March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 734–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ Thelen, and Steinmo, , ‘Historical Institutionalism’, p. 10.Google Scholar I define institutions here as sets of rules that prescribe permissible behaviour. Institutions define acceptable patterns of conduct which channel social behaviour in a certain direction rather than in the many directions that would otherwise be possible.

³⁴ March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P., Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Thelen, and Steinmo, , ‘Historical Institutionalism’, p. 2.Google Scholar

³⁵ Haggard, Stephen, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 46.Google Scholar

³⁶ Krasner, Stephen D., ‘Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective’ in Caporaso, James A., ed., The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 74.Google Scholar

³⁷ DePalma, Guiseppe, To Craft Democracies: An Essay in Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 214.Google Scholar

³⁸ Studies linking the international environment to national political developments have a long tradition in the Comparativist literature. See, for example, Tilly, Charles, ed., The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975)Google Scholar; and Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For concise overviews of this ‘second image reversed’ research agenda, see Almond, Gabriel A., ‘The International-National Connection’, British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 237–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Gourevitch, Peter, ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics’, International Organization, 32 (1978), 881–911.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ Munck, Gerardo L. and Leff, Carol Skalnik, ‘Structure, Process, and Choice in Regime Change: The Institutional Forms of Emerging Democracies in South America and Eastern Europe’ (paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, 1993), p. 4.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ DePalma, , To Craft Democracies, p. 29.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Casper, Gretchen and Taylor, Michelle, ‘When Competitors Cooperate’ (paper presented at the annual convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, III., 1993), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

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⁴³ Whitehead, Lawrence, ‘International Aspects of Democratization’, in O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C. and Whitehead, Lawrence, eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 3Google Scholar; see also Schmitter, Philippe C., ‘The International Context of Contemporary Democratization’, Stanford Journal of International Affairs, 2 (1993), 1–34.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See, for example, DePalma, , To Craft DemocraciesGoogle Scholar; Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 39Google Scholar; and Linz, Juan J., ‘Transitions to Democracy’, Washington Quarterly, 13 (1990), 143–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁵ Huntington, , The Third Wave, p. 107.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See, for example, Huntington, , The Third WaveGoogle Scholar; and Casper, and Taylor, , ‘When Competitors Cooperate’.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Students of regime transition rarely differentiate between alternative democratic arrangements, focusing instead on transitions to democracy in general. For example, Huntington claims that an analysis of the differences between democracies may facilitate explanations of the effects of democratic systems once created, but will provide little information on how democratic governments are initially forged. See Huntington, , The Third Wave, p. 109.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ On the role of distributional conflicts in the emergence of institutions see Knight, Jack, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), especially pp. 26–8, 40–1, 126–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁹ Dodd, Lawrence C., ‘Political Learning and Political Change: Understanding Development Across Time’ (paper presented at the annual convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, III., 1993), p. 48.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Katzenstein, , Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 37.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Kiser, Larry L. and Ostrom, Elinor, ‘The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches’, in Ostrom, Elinor, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 181Google Scholar. According to rational choice theories, institutions will tend to be ‘sticky’ because: (1) relying on pre-existing institutions is less costly than creating and enforcing new ones; and (2) institutions create interest groups with a stake in maintaining existing rules and structures.

⁵² Thelen, and Steinmo, , ‘Historical Institutionalism’, pp. 2–3Google Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 28, 61–2, 229.Google Scholar

⁵³ Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46 (1992), 391–425, at p. 417.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁴ Grafstein, Robert, Institutional Realism: Social and Political Constraints on Rational Actors (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁵⁶ See Almond, Gabriel, Flanagan, Scolt C. and Mundt, Robert, Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ The argument that fundamental institutional change occurs in an episodic and discontinuous manner bears a close resemblance to punctuated equilibrium theory. This evolutionary theory assumes that genetic change occurs rarely and rapidly. Once a sharp break in the ancestral lineage takes place, species do not change substantially over long periods of time. Recently, political scientists have noted the implications of punctuated equilibrium theory for institutional analysis. See Fendius, Miriam, ‘Punctuated Equilibrium and International Relations Theory: An Example of Cross Fertilization Between the Natural and Social Sciences’ (paper presented at the annual convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, III., 1993).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ For useful overviews of the ‘agent-structure’ problem in IR, see Wendt, Alexander, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, International Organization, 41 (1987), 335–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Dessler, David, ‘What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate’, International Organization, 43 (1989), 441–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁹ Thelen, and Steinmo, , ‘Historical Institutionalism’, pp. 10–17Google Scholar; Carlsnaes, Walter, ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis’, International Studies Quarterly, 36 (1992), 245–70, at pp. 256, 263.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁶³ In arguing that the period 1781–87 constituted a ‘critical period’ in early American history, I concur with American historians who view the US Constitution as a fundamental departure from earlier institutions rather than the ‘crowning success of the movement for a more popular government that had started with the revolution’. See Grob, Gerald N. and Billias, George A., Interpretations of American History, Volume I: To 1877–Patterns and Perspectives, 6th edn (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 161Google Scholar. Instead of the Revolutionary and Constitutional periods representing a continuous line of progressive political evolution, the period from 1781 to 1787 is a ‘dramatic story of change’. For a concise discussion of this tradition in US constitutional historiography, see Grob, and Billias, , Interpretations of American History, pp. 159–81.Google Scholar

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⁶⁵ Grob, and Billias, , Interpretations of American History, p. 168.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ On this view, see Kramnick, Isaac, ‘The “Great National Discussion”: The Discourse of Politics in 1787’, William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), 3–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁶⁹ Marks, , Independence on Trial, pp. 59–65.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Excerpted from Anastaplo, George, The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 249Google Scholar. That the Articles sought to limit federal powers is understandable given the ‘deep distrust of executive authority produced by the long colonial struggle with appointed English governors’ (see Polakoff, Keith J., Political Parties in American History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p. 8Google Scholar). Following the Revolutionary War, it is unlikely that elites would have opted for an institutional arrangement which centralized government power. After all, they had just rebelled violently in order to maximize the liberties of individual states. Limiting, rather than expanding, the powers of the central government was the primary objective.

⁷¹ British statesmen refused to take Congressional attempts to negotiate seriously, noting that Congress would not have the authority to enforce any commercial treaty. See Lang, Daniel G., Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of Nations and the Balance of Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), p. 83Google Scholar. Co-operation at the international level was, therefore, hindered because one contracting party, in this case the British, was aware of the other's domestic-level impediments. On how domestic institutional features can affect an executive's international bargaining abilities, see Putnam, Robert, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games’, International Organization, 42 (1988), 427–60, especially pp. 448–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁷⁶ Marks, , ‘Power, Pride, and Purse’, p. 310.Google Scholar

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⁷⁸ Marks, , Independence on Trial, p. 45Google Scholar; Graebner, , Foundations of American Foreign Policy, p. 41.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Farrand, Max, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1913), p. 45.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ While the Anti-Federalists acknowledged the need to revitalize Congress, they tended to emphasize the dangers that consolidation posed for republican government. On the Anti-Federalist viewpoint see Storing, Herbert J., What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Onuf, Peter, ‘State Sovereignty and the Making of the Constitution’ in Ball, Terence and Pocock, J. G. A., eds, Conceptual Change and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), especially pp. 86–8.Google Scholar

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⁸³ See Federalist Nos. 9, 10, 48 and 51 in Rossiter, , The Federalist Papers.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Quoted in Onuf, , ‘State Sovereignty and the Making of the Constitution’, pp. 80–4.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ By attaining an equal voting rule in the Senate, small state delegates guaranteed that state sovereignty would be preserved in the new system. Thus, distributional conflict led to the convention's decision to qualify the commitment to centralization and concede a larger role to the states. Ironically, equal representation in the Senate became a useful bargaining chip for the Federalists. Federalists could claim that they were just as concerned with states' rights as were the Anti-Federalists and that representation in the Senate was linked to preserving these rights. See Federalist Nos. 39 and 62 in Rossiter, , The Federalist Papers.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ On this issue, see Marks, , Independence on Trial, pp. 147–51, 181–3.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See Federalist No. 70 in Rossiter, , The Federalist Papers.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See Federalist Nos. 48 and 71 in Rossiter, , The Federalist Papers.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Farrand, , The Framing of the Constitution of the United States, pp. 78–9, 115.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See Federalist Nos. 10 and 64 in Rossiter, , The Federalist Papers.Google Scholar

⁹¹ DeConde, Alexander, The Quasi War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared Naval War with France, 1797–1801 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), pp. 22, 90.Google Scholar

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⁹³ Under the terms of the treaty, the United States recognized the British position on neutral rights in return for the evacuation of Northern military posts still held by the British. See DeConde, , A History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 52–67.Google Scholar

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⁹⁶ Polakoff, , Political Parties in American History, p. 44.Google Scholar

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⁹⁸ Lang, , Foreign Policy in the Early Republic, p. 152Google Scholar; Graebner, , Foundations of American Foreign Policy, p. 97.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁰ DeConde, , The Quasi War, pp. 90, 101.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ DeConde, , The Quasi War, p. 77.Google Scholar

¹⁰² DeConde, , The Quasi War, pp. 85, 328–9.Google Scholar In fact. Federalist war plans included an attempt to attack Louisiana as a way of avoiding French dominance and hence Republican influence in the area. See Lang, , Foreign Policy in the Early Republic, pp. 123–4.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁵ For example, the British army numbered approximately 300,000 in comparison to some 11,000 US troops hastily assembled in 1812. In naval strength, Britain had over 700 ships and approximately 150,000 men; the American navy totalled 16–20 ships and only 4,000 personnel. Moreover, the British, as the leading industrial nation of Europe, could easily produce enough goods to support a military engagement in North America. The United States, however, was primarily an agricultural society and could not support such a wide-scale military machine. See Williams, T. Harry, The History of American Wars from 1745–1918 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p. 97.Google Scholar Thus, we would expect the United States to assume a defensive position against Britain rather than pick a fight.

¹⁰⁶ Horsman, , The Causes of the War of 1812, pp. 186, 266.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Horsman, , The Causes of the War of 1812, pp. 24, 80, 112, 120, 136, 264–5.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See, for example, Graebner, , Foundations of American Foreign Policy, p. 121.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Perkins, , ‘Introduction’, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ DeConde, , A History of American Foreign Policy, p. 77.Google Scholar That these rules influenced policy options can be seen as early as 1807 when President Jefferson stated that ‘if the British do not give us the satisfaction we demand, we will take Canada, which wants to enter the Union’. Quoted in Horsman, , The Causes of the War of 1812, p. 169.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Snyder, , Myths of Empire.Google Scholar According to Snyder's criteria, the War of 1812 can be considered an instance of over-expansion. The United States was effectively ‘self encircled’ by Britain and, given its military power relative to that of Britain, US expansion into Canada extended ‘beyond the point where material costs [equalled] material benefits’. US foreign policy in this case corroborates Snyder's claim that, while democratic structures may predispose against over-expansion, they by no means rule out such dysfunctional behaviour.

¹¹² Pratt, Julius W., ‘The Bargain Between the South and West’Google Scholar, in Perkins, , ed., The Causes of the War of 1812, pp. 66–7.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Of the seventy-nine votes for war in the House, only nine came from Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio while a total of thirty-seven came from the South Atlantic states.

¹¹⁴ Horsman, , The Causes of the War of 1812, p. 183.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ DeConde, , A History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 94–8.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Young, James Sterling, The Washington Community, 1800–1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 251.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ See Williams, , The History of American Wars from 1745–1918, p. 161Google Scholar. While the ‘balance of power’ may have provided incentives for war, it did not require such a strategy. Since Mexico posed little threat, US statesmen had several options short of war. Thus, under permissive international conditions, neorealism proves indeterminate. Domestic level arguments are needed to explain the foreign policy ultimately selected.

¹¹⁸ The stabilization of relations with England and the diffusion of the dispute over Oregon occurred shortly after war with Mexico was under way.

¹¹⁹ Pratt, , A History of United States Foreign Policy, p. 106.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Schroeder, John H., Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846–1848 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 35.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Connor, Seymour V. and Faulk, Oddie B., North America Divided: The Mexican-American War, 1846–1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 28.Google Scholar

¹²² See Schroeder, , Mr. Polk's War, pp. 75, 149Google Scholar; Graebner, Norman A., Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion, 2nd edn (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1983), p. 91.Google Scholar

¹²³ Connor, and Faulk, , North America Divided, p. 20.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Merk, Frederick, History of the Westward Movement (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 297Google Scholar. That pro-annexationist forces used the Constitution to justify parochial interests is clear from President Tyler's support of the joint resolution. Previously a strict constructionist of the Constitution in matters of domestic policy, we would have expected Tyler to oppose annexation by any means other than that expressly listed in the Constitution. Yet, Tyler declared that Congress as well as the Senate was authorized to annex territory: ‘the power of Congress is fully competent in some other form of proceeding to accomplish everything that a formal ratification of a treaty could accomplish’. See Merk, , History of the Westward Movement, pp. 288, 293, 297Google Scholar; Polakoff, , Political Parties in American History, p. 153.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Schroeder, , Mr. Polk's War, p. 7.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Connor, and Faulk, , North America Divided, p. 27Google Scholar; see also Pratt, , A History of United States Foreign Policy, pp. 117–18Google Scholar; DeConde, , A History of American Foreign Policv, pp. 170, 178Google Scholar; Graebner, , Empire on the Pacific, p. 108.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Much attention has been devoted to whether Polk was drawn into war against his wishes due to Mexican belligerency or whether he instigated the war in order to acquire territory from Mexico. It is clear that Polk accepted Texas's annexation which commanded majority support of the Democratic party. On the other hand, Polk sought to end hostilities with Mexico and supported an expansion of the campaign only after Mexico proved unwilling to negotiate. My point here is that regardless of Polk's intentions, institutional factors crucially effected the executive's ability to realize its goals.

¹²⁸ Schroeder, , Mr. Polk's War, pp. xii–xiii, 24.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Schroeder, , Mr. Polk's War, pp. 87–8.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Schroeder, , Mr. Polk's War, pp. 124–6Google Scholar; Graebner, , Empire on the Pacific, pp. 186–9.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Schroeder, , Mr. Polk's War, pp. 130, 152, 155.Google Scholar

¹³² Perkins, Bradford, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume I: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 196–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³³ Rosecrance, and Stein, , ‘Beyond Realism’, pp. 17–18.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Posen, , The Sources of Military Doctrine, especially pp. 80, 239–40.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ I adapt this phrase from Ikenberry, G. John, ‘Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy’, International Organization, 42 (1988), 219–43, at pp. 221–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³⁶ Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Liberalism and International Relations Theory’ (Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Working Paper No. 92–6, 04 1993), p. 41.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Goldmann, Kjell, ‘Democracy Is Incompatible with International Politics: A Reconsideration of a Hypothesis’, in Goldmann, Kjell, Berglund, Sten and Sjostedt, Gunnar, eds, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of Sweden (Aldershot, Hants: Gower, 1986), pp. 1–3.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Nincic, , Democracy and Foreign Policy.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ See, for example, Lijphart, Arend, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lijphart, Arend, ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Rose, Richard and Suleiman, Ezra N., eds, Presidents and Prime Ministers, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981)Google Scholar; Shugart, Matthew Soberg and Carey, John M., Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Shugart, and Carey, , Presidents and Assemblies, p. 29.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ While executive–legislative division can generate inefficient foreign-policy outcomes, unified government does not automatically ensure that foreign policies will be tailored to international circumstances. Moderate foreign policy may coincide with divided party control of the executive and legislative branches while unified government may not. For instance, prior to the Quasi War, the fact that the Federalists held executive and senatorial majorities increased the likelihood of a costly war with Britain. The fact that Republicans dominated the House ensured against the conflict's escalation. Because the House and the presidency were controlled by different parties, foreign policies were less aggressive than they might otherwise have been.

¹⁴² Linz, Juan J., ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’Google Scholar, in Lijphart, , ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, p. 123.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Linz, Juan J., ‘Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?’, in Linz, Juan J. and Valenzuela, Arturo, eds, The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, Vol. I (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 9–10.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ Gunther, Richard and Mughan, Anthony, ‘Political Institutions and Cleavage Management’, in Weaver, R. Kent and Rockman, Bert A., eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 276.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Shugart, and Carey, , Presidents and Assemblies, pp. 170–3, 227Google Scholar; Weaver, R. Kent and Rockman, Bert A., ‘Assessing the Effects of Institutions’Google Scholar, in Weaver, and Rockman, , eds, Do Institutions Matter?, pp. 17, 33.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ See, for example, Linz, and Valenzuela, , eds, The Failure of Presidential Democracy.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have chosen parliamentary systems.

¹⁴⁸ Whereas severe external threat tends to be associated with presidentialism, the absence of exogenous pressures fails to produce any determinate domestic outcome. Under permissive international conditions, statesmen have an increased range of choice. Parliamentarism, presidentialism and regimes that present a mixture between the two are each viable alternatives. That the new Europe displays such a wide array of democratic institutional types lends support to this argument.