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¹⁰ Persson and Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions.

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³⁶ Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A. Pissarides, ‘Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium Labour Market Outcomes’ (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2989, 2001).

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⁴² McGillivray, Privileging Industry.

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⁸¹ For example, excluding the United Kingdom from the sample does not change the key results. Similarly, the key results are robust to alternative model specifications including ordinary least squares (OLS) models with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors and the Newey and West estimator with lag length 1. These results are reported in an online appendix.

⁸² This holds for approximately 10 per cent of the sample.

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⁸⁷ Persson and Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, demonstrate that these periods best describe the pattern of electoral system adaptation.

⁸⁸ If anything, correcting for potential endogeneity appears to reduce the standard errors on the estimated marginal effect of PR.

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