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The Effectiveness of the Plurality Rule

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

André Blais  and
R. K. Carty
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Extract

Plurality (first-past-the-post), majority and proportional electoral formulae all translate vote shares into seat shares in different ways. The consequences of these differences are the subject of a large literature, and the virtues and vices attributed to the plurality rule are particularly numerous. That is not surprising given the discrepancies between seat and vote shares it generates. What is surprising is that the literature has not examined the plurality rule's effectiveness, that is the extent to which it achieves its intended goals. We take effectiveness to be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for an electoral rule's acceptability. At the very least, a given rule ought to produce the consequences it is designed to create. This short Note is intended to assess the extent to which the plurality system passes this minimum test.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , October 1988 , pp. 550 - 553
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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References

1 We are concerned with the creation of a one-party legislative majority. This is not always synonymous with a one-party government for parties with a legislative majority may choose to form an oversized coalition.

2 The data are taken from Mackie, T. and Rose, R., eds, The International Almanac of Electoral History (London: Macmillan, 1982).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Blais, A. and Carty, R. K., ‘The Impact of Electoral Formulae on the Creation of Majority Governments’, Electoral Studies, 6 (1987), 209–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 It can be argued that the Japanese combination constitutes a semi-proportional system. See Lijphart, Arend, Pintor, Rafael Lopez and Sone, Yasunori, ‘The Limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote: Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish Examples’, in Grofman, Bernard and Lijphart, Arend, eds, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, Inc., 1986).Google Scholar

5 Rae called these manufactured as opposed to natural majorities. See Rae, D., The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 74.Google Scholar

6 Cairns, Alan C., ‘The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (1968), 55–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Taagepera, R., ‘Reformulating the Cube Law for Proportional Representation Elections’, American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 489–505.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 For a comprehensive analysis which concludes that the costs now outweigh the benefits in New Zealand see: Towards a Better Democracy, the Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (Wellington, New Zealand: 1986).Google Scholar