¹ In addressing the issue of democratization, however, I do not speculate about the possible future shape of post-communist societies, agreeing with Comisso that the ‘basic task of our field is not so much… to predict what socialist societies may be in transition to but… to illuminate some of the fundamental relationships among political, economic, and social variables that are vital to an understanding of all contemporary states and the emerging international order’ (Comisso, E., ‘Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going? Analyzing the Politics of Socialism in the 1990s’ (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1989, p. 2).Google Scholar

² Arato, for example, argues that the three most important crises in the region, i.e. the Hungarian revolution (1956), the Prague Spring (1968) and Poland's self-limiting revolution (1980), represent successive attempts to democratize state-socialist regimes. He sees each of these crises as a macro-historical experiment in society's struggle for democratization, claiming that opposition forces changed their strategies from popular revolution in the Hungarian case, to reform from above in the case of Czechoslovakia and, finally, to reform from below in Poland. However, if the notion of three distinct strategies is historically correct, the meaning of democratization and the goals of collective actors in these cases are different. See Arato, A., ‘Some Perspectives of Democratization in East Central Europe’, Journal of International Affairs, 38 (1985), 321–35.Google Scholar

³ J. Staniszkis argues that these early instances of crisis reproduced the existing type of domination by correcting deficiencies in the redistributive role of the state. At the same time party-states in the region were able to preserve their ideological vigour and political initiative; moreover, they were able to utilize existing reserves provided by extensive economic development and to extend margins of political relaxation within the existing institutional system (Staniszkis, J., Ontologia Socializmu (Warsaw: In Plus, 1989), p. 12).Google Scholar

⁴ According to P. Abrams the state-idea not only gives directions to the state's policies and influences the state's institutional design but also serves as a tool of legitimation and self-legitimation for ruling elites (see Abrams, P., ‘Notes on the Difficulties of Studying the State’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 1 (1988), 58–90, p. 79).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ See Jowitt, K., ‘Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime’, Soviet Studies, 35 (1983), 275–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ This crucial role of geopolitical constraints sets the transitions in East Central Europe apart from most other cases of democratization which have occurred in the last two decades in Southern Europe and Latin America (see Whitehead, L., ‘International Aspects of Democratization’, in O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C. and Whitehead, L., eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 3–47).Google Scholar

⁷ O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. C., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 53–6.Google Scholar

⁸ Kis, J., ‘Not with Them, Not with Us’, Uncaptive Minds, 2, no. 4 (1989), 33–4.Google Scholar

⁹ M. Mann makes a similar point in his analysis of state power. He argues that when the ‘infrastructural power’ of the state, that is, ‘the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society and implement logistically political decisions’, is weak, the most likely alternative is the resort to ‘despotic power’ – to state actions undertaken ‘without routine institutionalized negotiation with civil society’ (Mann, M., ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origin, Mechanisms, and Results’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 25 (1984), 185–214, pp. 188–90).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Stepan, A., ‘State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America’, in Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T., eds, Bringing the Stale Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 317–43, at p. 318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Ash, T. Garton, ‘The Empire in Decay’, New York Review of Books, 35, no. 14 (1988), 53–60, p. 53.Google Scholar

¹² Describing the collapse of totalitarian policies, Brzezinski argued that, ‘even totalitarian ideologies, dogmatic almost by definition, must respond in some measure to domestic aspirations and must reflect the existing reality, even while striving to change it altogether’ (Brzezinski, Z. K., The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 139).Google Scholar

¹³ Fletcher, G., ‘Against the Stream’, in Aczel, T., ed., Ten Years After (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1966), pp. 32–58, at p. 56.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Vali, F. C., ‘The Regime and the Nation’Google Scholar, in Aczel, , Ten Years After, pp. 137–53, at p. 152.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Brzezinski, , The Soviet Bloc, p. 493.Google Scholar

¹⁶ After the breakdown of Stalinism there were significant political differences between the countries of the region but, according to Brzezinski, ‘the new diversity was primarily a function of the diverging national interests of various communist regimes once the initial totalitarian revolution, common to all of them, had run its course’ (Brzezinski, , The Soviet Bloc, pp. 266–7).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Fletcher, , ‘Against the Stream’, p. 56.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Nee, V. and Stark, D., ‘Toward an Institutional Analysis of State-Socialism’, in Nee, V. and Stark, D., eds, Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 3–8.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Huntington, S. P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 1.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Korbonski, A., ‘Liberalization Processes’, in Mesa-Logo, C. and Beck, C., eds, Comparative Socialist Systems (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Center for International Studies, 1975), pp. 192–214Google Scholar; Korbonski, A., ‘Comparing Liberalization Processes in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Analysis’, Comparative Politics, 4 (1972), 231–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Little, R. D., ed., Liberalization in the USSR: Façade or Reality (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1968)Google Scholar; Jowitt, K., ‘The Concepts of Liberalization, Integration, and Rationalization in the Context of Eastern European Development’, Studies in Comparative Communism, 4 (1971), 79–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ Korbonski, , ‘Liberalization Processes’, p. 194.Google Scholar

²² According to Lamentowicz, humanization is an easily detectable process in the development of state-socialist regimes: ‘no new rights are won by the non-ruling groups but the style of ruling becomes more sensitive, more humane and, sometimes, more responsive to basic needs’. This process also involves limitation of ‘the scope and the level of the unpredictability of repressive measures’ (Lamentowicz, W., ‘Eastern Europe and the Emergence of Civil Society: Starting Point of a Long Process’ (paper presented at the annual meeting of the ASA in Atlanta, 1988, p. 15).Google Scholar

²³ Nee and Stark point to another motive behind this shift of perspective, namely, ‘the lack of fit between the analytical problem constructed by the competing theories and those faced in societies themselves’. They argue that ‘modernization theory misuses the comparative method and consequently produces inadequate understanding of the distinctive features of the economic institutions of socialism. [Also] by limiting its examination of interest groups only to elite actors in or around official circles, modernization/pluralist theory unnecessarily restricts our analytical field of vision and precludes the possibility that social groups outside the state play a role in shaping society’ (Nee, and Stark, , ‘Toward an Institutional Analysis of State Socialism’, pp. 7–8).Google Scholar

²⁴ Bunce, V. and Echols, J. M., ‘Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era: “Pluralism” or “Corporatism?”’, in Kelly, D. R., ed., Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 1–26, at p. 3.Google Scholar

²⁵ It can be argued that the popularity of the concept of corporatism stems in part from its tempting ambiguity. As Williamson points out, ‘Corporatism remains an ambiguous concept in the political vocabulary, encompassing a wide range of all too often imprecise definition’. His reconstruction of core dimensions or a general model of corporatism clearly casts doubt on its applicability to state-socialist regimes (Williamson, P. J., Varieties of Corporatism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 3).Google Scholar

²⁶ Chirot, D., ‘The Corporatist Model and Socialism’, Theory and Society, 2 (1980), 363–81, p. 373.Google Scholar

²⁷ Chirot, , ‘The Corporatist Model and Socialism’, pp. 376–7.Google Scholar

²⁸ Staniszkis, J., Poland's Self-limiting Revolution (Princeton, Conn.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 39.Google Scholar

²⁹ Staniszkis, J., ‘Martial Law in Poland’, Telos, 54 (1982/1983), 87–100, p. 93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Staniszkis, , Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution, p. 40.Google Scholar

³¹ Staniszkis, , ‘Martial Law in Poland’, p. 97.Google Scholar

³² Ost, D., ‘Towards a Corporatist Solution in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland’, East European Politics and Societies, 3 (1989), 152–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ost describes the likely corporatist solution in Poland as neo-corporatism or, following Schmitter, as societal corporatism. However, the notion of societal corporatism contradicts the very notion of corporatism itself because the latter's sine qua non is the strong state able to control and create interest groups.

³³ Cox, A., ‘Corporatism as Reductionism: The Analytic Limits of the Corporatist Thesis’, Government and Opposition, 16 (1981), 78–96, p. 85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ ‘An accord or only a contract’, News Solidarność, No. 130, 16–31 03 1989.Google Scholar

³⁵ See Ost, D., ‘Poland Revisited’, Poland Watch, 7 (1985), 75–96.Google Scholar

³⁶ See, for example, Bauman, Z., ‘Poland: On its Own’, Telos, 79 (1989), 47–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ost, D., ‘The Transformation of Solidarity and the Future of Central Europe’, Telos, 79 (1989), 63–95Google Scholar; Staniszkis, J., ‘The Obsolescence of Solidarity’, Telos, 80 (1989), 37–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ Kis, J., ‘Turning Point in Hungary’, Dissent, Spring (1989), 235–41, p. 241.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Kis, , ‘Not with Them, Not with Us’.Google Scholar

³⁹ Despite indications to the contrary, Hungary's complicated electoral system produced a clear result. The Democratic Forum won 165 seats out of 386 and together with the Smallholders (43 seats) and the Christian Democrats (21 seats) has a safe majority in the Parliament.

⁴⁰ As Kis points out in his analysis of Hungarian reform at the end of the 1980s, ‘the leadership and its apparatuses have never been so indecisive as to which elements of the regime are to be treated as untouchable and which permanent and which can be open to transformation’ (Kis, , ‘Turning Point in Hungary’, p. 238Google Scholar). Moreover, already at the beginning of the 1980s political initiative had shifted outside the space controlled by the regime. Urban, an official spokesman for the Polish regime, openly acknowledged this change in his confidential letter to the first secretary of the party written in 1981. In this letter he contended that ‘we are facing disaster, since in my opinion the time has already passed when PZPR could effect a renewal, remodel the system of government, advance a programme, and obtain the acceptance and support of society’ (Urban, J., ‘Letter to the First Secretary’, Uncaptive Minds, 1, no. 4(1988), 3).Google Scholar

⁴¹ For the notion of ‘intra-systemic opposition’ see Wiatr, J. J., ‘Intra-system Opposition’, Polish Perspectives, 31, no. 3 (1988), 9–15.Google Scholar

⁴² Feher and Heller clearly represent this point of view when they argue in their recent book that ‘contemporary Soviet totalitarianism, which had left its revolutionary birth-pangs behind, is an entirely conservative society, a legitimized and at least for the time being, a well-functioning one. Unfortunately, all hopes of a near collapse of this social structure seem as misguided as hopes for its eventual thoroughgoing social reform. This does not, of course, exclude changes within the framework of the existing structures, for no society can be completely static’ (Feher, F. and Heller, A., Eastern Left, Western Left: Totalitarianism, Freedom and Democracy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987), p. 250Google Scholar; see also Feher, F., ‘Inherent Weakness and Unfounded Optimism’, Society, 25, no. 4 (1988), 19–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Heller, A., ‘Can Communist Regimes Be Reformed?’, Society, 25, no. 4 (1988), 22–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar). A similar idea can be found in Garton Ash's metaphor of the ‘Ottomanization of the Soviet empire’. Garton Ash not only emphasizes the continued existence of geopolitical obstacles to democratization, but also stresses the fact that ‘socialism has created in all the East European states an array of domestic barriers against the transformation to liberal democracy… These barriers lie not only in the system of politbureaucratic dictatorship… and not merely in the character of interests of the nomenclature ruling class, but also in the interests, attitudes, and fears of many of the ruled’ (Ash, T. Garton, ‘Reform or Revolution?’, New York Review of Books, 35, no. 16 (1988), 47–56, p. 56).Google Scholar

⁴³ This point of view is represented by Chirot, who, in projecting a likely scenario of Romanian developments for the whole region, predicts the formation of a new sort of fascism in a form of xenophobic, anti-rational nationalism (Chirot, D., ‘Ideology and Legitimacy in Eastern Europe’, States and Social Structures Newsletter, 4 (1987), 1–4Google Scholar). Such a possibility seems, however, rather unlikely unless there is a sufficient external threat to mobilize nationalistic fervour.

⁴⁴ Arato, A. and Cohen, J., ‘Social Movements, Civil Society, and the Problems of Sovereignty’, Praxis international, 4 (1984), 266–83Google Scholar. It should be noted, however, that most recent developments in the region and the abrupt collapse of one-party regimes caught the majority of experts by surprise.

⁴⁵ The state–civil society distinction was initially employed to analyse the phenomenon of the Polish self-limiting revolution (see Arato, A., ‘Civil Society against the State: Poland 1980–81, Telos, 47 (1981), 23–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Arato, A., ‘Empire vs Civil Society: Poland 1981–82’, Telos, 50 (1981/1982), 19–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Arato, and Cohen, , ‘Social Movements, Civil Society, and the Problem of Sovereignty’Google Scholar; Pelczynski, Z. A., ‘Solidarity and “The Rebirth of Civil Society”’, in Keane, J., ed., Civil Society and the State (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 361–81Google Scholar)) and the new opposition movements in East Central Europe (see Rupnik, J., ‘Dissent in Poland, 1968–78: The End of Revisionism and the Rebirth of the Civil Society’, in Tokes, R. L., ed., Opposition in Eastern Europe (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 60–112CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Szelenyi, I., ‘Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe: Dilemmas and Perspectives’Google Scholar, in Tokes, , Opposition in Eastern EuropeGoogle Scholar; Havel, V. et al. , The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (Armonk, NJ: Sharpe, 1985)Google Scholar; Skilling, H. G., Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988)Google Scholar; and Judt, T. R., ‘The Dilemmas of Dissidence: The Politics of Opposition in East-Central Europe’, East European Politics and Societies, 2 (1988), 185–241CrossRefGoogle Scholar)). But more recently the notion has been extended to all aspects of independent or semi-independent social life under state-socialist regimes and has even been applied to some aspects of the reform in the Soviet Union (see Scanlan, J. P., ‘Reforms and Civil Society in the USSR’, Problems of Communism, 37, no. 2 (1988), 41–7Google Scholar; Starr, F. S., ‘Soviet Union: A Civil Society’, Foreign Policy, 70 (1988), 26–41).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁶ Pelczynski, , ‘Solidarity and the “Rebirth of Civil Society”’, p. 363.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The conceptual difficulties generated by this classical distinction are aptly analysed by Keane, in Civil Society and the State, pp. 1–33.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Ash, T. Garton, ‘The Opposition’, New York Review of Books, 35, no. 15 (1988), 3–6, p. 3.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ For the lack of a better term I borrowed this notion from the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suares, who in his Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore (1612)Google Scholar points out that ‘human society is twofold: imperfect, or domestic; and perfect, or political’ (cited in Curtis, M., ed., The Great Political Theories (New York: Avon Books, 1961), p. 288).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ I owe the idea of the importance of the concept of political society in Tocqueville and its possible application to state-socialist regimes to Jeff Weintraub. See Weintraub, J., ‘Tocqueville's Conception of Political Society’ (unpublished manuscript, 1986).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Forment, C. A., ‘Socio-Historical Models of Spanish American Democratization: A Review and a Reformulation’ (Harvard University, CROPSO Working Paper Series, No. 0015, 1988), p. 21.Google Scholar

⁵² Touraine, A., ‘An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements’, Social Research, 52 (1985), 742–89, p. 763.Google Scholar

⁵³ For a concise analysis of Stalinization policies in Hungary see Hankiss, E., ‘Demobilization, Self-Mobilization, and Quasi-Mobilization in Hungary, 1948–1987’, East European Poulies and Societies, 3 (1989), 105–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁴ See Hammond, T. T., ed., The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975)Google Scholar and Szajkowski, B., The Establishment of Marxist Regimes (London: Butter-worth Scientific, 1982).Google Scholar This process of destruction was described by the infamous Hungarian leader Rakosi as ‘salami tactics’. In Hungary the Communist party first entered into a coalition with the Smallholders, Peasants and Social Democratic parties in order to annihilate the conservatives. It then crushed the Smallholders party with the help of the remaining two parties. In the next step the Communists suborned the Peasants party and absorbed the Social Democrats, annihilating those parties' leadership. In the course of this manœuvering, politicians were bribed, intimidated, imprisoned, driven into exile or killed.

⁵⁵ Kovacs and Orkeny estimate that Poland lost 77 per cent of her professionals, businessmen and civil servants during the war. By comparison in Hungary losses in these groups were only about 10 per cent, and the situation was similar in other countries (Kovacs, M. M. and Orkeny, A., ‘Promoted Cadres and Professionals in Post-War Hungary’, in Andorka, R. and Bertalan, L., eds, Economy and Society in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Sociological Association, 1986), pp. 139–53Google Scholar). See also Gella, A., Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 167–202.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ This implicit social pact between the party-state and society has sometimes been called a ‘new social contract’ (see Liehm, A. J., ‘The Intellectuals on the New Social Contract’, Telos, 23 (1975), 156–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Liehm, A. J., ‘The New Social Contract and the Parallel Polity’, in Curry, J. L., ed., Dissent in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 173–82).Google Scholar However, the idea of a social contract may be highly misleading in the context of state-socialist regimes and this relationship is better described, following Pakulski, as an example of relations based on ‘conditional tolerance’ (Pakulski, J., ‘Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reflections on Max Weber and Soviet-Type Societies’, British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 35–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Ekiert, G., ‘Conditions of Political Obedience and Stability in State-Socialist Societies: The Inapplicability of Weber's Concept of Legitimacy’ (Harvard University, CROPSO Working Paper Series, No. 0005, 1987)).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See, for example, Shlapentokh, V., Public and Private Life of the Soviel People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Simis, K., USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982)Google Scholar; Walder, A., Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Kamiński, A. Z., ‘Coercion, Corruption and Reform: State and Society in the Soviet-type Socialist Regimes’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989), 77–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jowitt, , ‘Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime’Google Scholar; Tar-kowski, J., ‘Old and New Patterns of Corruption in Poland and the USSR’, Telos, 80 (1989), 51–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁸ See Staniszkis, , Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution, pp. 38–40.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Hankiss, E., ‘The “Second Society”: Is There an Alternative Social Model Emerging in Contemporary Hungary?’ Social Research, 55 (1988), 13–43, p. 31.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Kamiński, A. Z., ‘Uprywatnienie panstwa. O problemie korupcji w systemach post-rewolucyjnych’, in Marody, M. and Sułek, A., eds, Rzeczywistość polska i sposoby radzenia sobie z nia (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, Institute of Sociology, 1987), pp. 137–59.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Feher, F. and Heller, A., Hungary 1956 Revisited (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 147.Google Scholar

⁶² G. Konrad and I. Szelenyi interpreted this development as leading to the formation of a new dominant class in which the party bureaucrats and intellectuals were united as a more inclusive ruling elite (Konrad, G. and Szelenyi, I., The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester, 1979).Google Scholar For a critique of their conclusion see Frentzel-Zagorska, J. and Zagorski, K., ‘East European Intellectuals on the Road of Dissent: The Old Prophecy of a New Class Re-examined’, Politics and Society, 17 (1989), 89–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Haraszti, M., The Velvet Prison: Artists under State Socialism (New York: Basic Books, 1987).Google Scholar

⁶³ Jowitt, , ‘Soviet Neotraditionalism’.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Szelenyi, I., Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 5.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ In a recent article J. Wasilewski analyses the impact of the social mobility of the peasant class in Poland after the war. He argues that the peasants were not only a majority of the population before the war but also the only social stratum which survived the war relatively intact and supplied the human material for the processes of industrialization, urbanization and the formation of new elites. As a result there was a significant ‘ruralization’ of cities, culture and political life. Thus social norms and values, styles of life and aspirations, cultural patterns and practices rooted in the Polish peasant tradition dominated the urban culture destroyed by the war and penetrated institutions of the party-state (Wasilewski, J., ‘Spoleczeństwo polskie, społeczeristwo chłopskie’, Studia Socjologiczne, 3 (1986), 39–56).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Rothschild, J., Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 20–3.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ For more detailed analysis of this process see Scruton, R., ‘The New Right in Central Europe I: Czechoslovakia’, Political Studies, 36 (1988), 449–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scruton, R., ‘The New Right in Central Europe II: Poland and Hungary’, Political Studies, 36 (1988), 638–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kubik, J., ‘John Paul II's First Visit to Poland and the Collapse of the Official Marxist-Leninist Discourse’ (Harvard University, CROPSO Working Paper Series, No. 0025, 1989)Google Scholar; Judt, , ‘The Dilemmas of Dissidence’.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See Hankiss, , ‘The “Second Society”’, p. 29.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See, for example, Ramet, P., ‘Religious Ferment in Eastern Europe’, Survey, 28 (1984), 87–117Google Scholar; Cordell, K., ‘The Role of the Evangelical Church in the GDR’, Government and Opposition, 25 (1990), 48–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and also the interview with father Vaclav Maly (‘Not a Prophet but an Optimist’, Uncaptive Minds, 1, no. 4 (1988), 37–41).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See Rykowski, Z. and Wertenstein-Żuławski, J., eds, Wybrane zagadnienia spontanicznej kultury młodzieżowej w Polsce (Warsaw, 1986)Google Scholar; Bozoki, A., ‘Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary’, Sudosteuropa, 37 (1988), 377–87Google Scholar; Ryback, T. W., Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Scruton, , ‘The New Right in Central Europe I’, p. 461.Google Scholar

⁷² The fusion of the new political discourse with the traditional identities and historical experiences of these nations is likely to produce different results. Szelenyi compares Polish and Hungarian roads to civil society, arguing that the self-organization of society in Hungary finds its expression in the economy while in Poland this self-organization by-passes the economy and is expressed within the polity (see Szelenyi, ‘Eastern Europe in an Epoch of Transition’).

⁷³ See Bugajski, J., Czechoslovakia: Charter 77's Decade of Dissent (Washington, DC: Praeger with the Center for Strategic Studies, 1987)Google Scholar and Stalling, , Samizdat and an Independent Society, pp. 43–157.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ For a brief overview of independent opposition movements in Eastern Europe see Skilling, , Samizdat and Independent Society, pp. 157–239Google Scholar and Pehe, J., ‘Annotated Survey of Independent Movements in Eastern Europe’, Radio Free Europe, Background Report/100, Munich, 13 06 1989.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See Rostowski, J., ‘The Decay of Socialism and the Growth of Private Enterprise in Poland’, Soviet Studies, 41 (1989), 194–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bloch, A., ‘Entrepreneurialism in Poland and Hungary’, Telos, 79 (1989), 95–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁶ Szelenyi argues that the opening of the second economy was a strategy pursued by the Hungarian regime over the last ten years. Although quite successful as a strategy, it was not able to solve the crisis of a centrally planned economy (see I. Szelenyi, ‘Eastern Europe in an Epoch of Transition: Toward a Socialist Mixed Economy?’, in Nee, and Stark, , Remaking the Economic institutions of Socialism, pp. 208–33).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See, for example, Szelenyi, I., ‘Social Inequalities under State Socialist Redistributive Economies’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 19 (1978), 61–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a comprehensive analysis of social inequalities under state-socialism see Kende, P. and Strmiska, Z., eds, Equality and Inequality in Eastern Europe (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Szelenyi, I. and Manchin, R., ‘Social Policy Under State Socialism: Market Redistribution and Social Inequalities in East European Socialist Societies’, in Rein, M., Esping-Andersen, G. and Rainwater, L., eds, Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy (Armonk, NJ: Sharpe, 1987), pp. 102–39, at p. 102.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Dye and Zeigler convincingly argue this point through the comparative study of inequality. They contend that there is ‘no discernible relationship between socialism and equality. Rather, inequality is inextricably linked to low levels of economic development’ (Dye, T. R. and Zeigler, H., ‘Socialism and Equality in Cross-National Perspective’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 21 (1988), 45–57, p. 54).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See ‘Jaka koniunktura – takie bezrobocie’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 7–8 04 1990Google Scholar; see also the interview with Prof. Tymowski, Andrzej, ‘Jutro bçdzie za póżno’, Trybuna, 50, 10 04 1990.Google Scholar

⁸¹ See Bugajski, J., ‘Poland's Anti-Communist Manifesto’, Orbis, 34 (1990), 109–21Google Scholar; Kornai, J., The Road to a Free Economy (New York: Norton, 1990)Google Scholar; Wolnicki, M., ‘Self-Government and Ownership in Poland’, Telos, 80 (1989), 63–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸² Szelenyi, , ‘Eastern Europe in the Epoch of Transition’, p. 208.Google Scholar

⁸³ Szelenyi and Manchin make the point that ‘the expansion of market forces and the reemergence of a market-indexed system of inequalities has created such a complex system of social conflicts that economic reform will be able to continue only if it discovers how to counteract the inefficiencies and inequalities created by the market.’ They persuasively claim that ‘the unity of social and economic reform or no reform at all – these are the real alternatives facing Eastern Europe’ (Szelenyi and Manchin, ‘Social Policy under State Socialism’, p. 136).

⁸⁴ By supporting and promoting private ownership, property rights and free exchange, neo-liberal and neo-conservative groups within political society desire to create a new social force which, as classical liberalism would have it, might serve as the foundation for a free political system. This potential alliance was designed to form an irresistible, democratic political force confronting the party–state and forcing political concessions. T. Syryjczyk, the new Polish Minister of Industry, stressed this point of view in arguing that ‘the only guarantee of democracy is a middle class that prizes the notions of contract and property’ (Applebaum, A., ‘Polish Government appointees stress pragmatism, steer clear of ideology’, Boston Globe, 10 09 1989).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ The state, by relaxing control over some dimensions of economic life and thus accommodating private interests and individualistic acquisitive drives in the economic sphere, hoped to protect its political domination. It sought to channel people's attention into the accumulation of goods and the struggle for economic survival and success. Such a policy could create an alliance for what Ash ironically calls ‘a suitably Central European outcome of Socialism’ – ‘Capitalists and Communists, shoulder to shoulder against the proletariat’ (Ash, , ‘Reform or Revolution?’ p. 56Google Scholar). But, as Szelenyi and Manchin point out, it may also result in an alliance between anti-reformist groups within the state and party apparatus and pauperized sectors of domestic society, an outcome which could threaten any economic and political reforms (see Szelenyi, and Manchin, , ‘Social Policy under State Socialism’).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ In his study dealing with transitions to democracy in Europe and Latin America, Adam Przeworski concludes that ‘we cannot avoid the possibility that a transition to democracy can be made only at the cost of leaving economic relations intact, not only the structure of production but even the distribution of income’ (Przeworski, A., ‘Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy’Google Scholar, in O'Donnell, , Schmitter, and Whitehead, , eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, pp. 47–64, at p. 63Google Scholar). I would suggest, however, that in Eastern Europe a fundamental reform both of allocation mechanisms and the structure of ownership constitutes a pivotal element in the transition from state-socialist regimes. The fusion of the state and the economy in state-socialism forces a thorough remaking of economic institutions. And while the new economies rising on the rubble of the state-owned and run economic system will diner in many respects, there will certainly not be a painless road to a market system.

⁸⁷ Morawska, E., ‘On Barriers to Pluralism in Pluralist Poland’, Slavic Review, 47 (1988), 627–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁸ See, for example, Adamski, W., Bielecki, I., Jasiewicz, K., Kolarska, L. and Rychard, A., ‘Konflik-torodne interesy i wartości a szanse zmian systemowych’, Studia Socjologiczne, 2 (1987), 101–17Google Scholar; Smolar, A., ‘Perspektywy Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej’, Aneks, 50 (1988), 27–55Google Scholar; McGregor, J. P., ‘Economic Reform and Polish Public Opinion’, Soviet Studies, 41 (1989), 215–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Curry, J. L., ‘Psychological Barriers to Reform in Poland’, East European Politics and Societies, 2 (1988), 484–510CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bauman, Z., ‘Poland: On its Own’, Telos, 79 (1989), 47–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁹ Comisso, E., ‘Market Failures and Market Socialism: Economic Problems of the Transition’, East European Politics and Societies, 2 (1988), 433–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹⁰ This fragmentation of political forces was clearly reflected in elections held in all countries in 1990. Local elections in Poland in May 1990, for example, were contested by 240 organizations, including eighty political parties forming forty different coalitions. In Czechoslovakia, where thirty-seven political parties exist, the elections were contested by twenty-two parties, movements and coalitions. In Hungary the complex electoral procedure determined that among approximately fifty political parties and movements only the six biggest parties were able to contest the second round of elections. Although in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania front-like coalitions (Citizens' Committees, Civic Forum, National Salvation Front), won the elections this fact does not secure political stability. These groups represent a loose association of political actors with different political orientations and sooner or later will have to decide either to transform themselves into a hegemonic political party or to split along major political lines.

⁹¹ See, for example, Montias, J. M., ‘Observations on Strikes, Riots and Other Disturbances’, in Triska, J. F. and Gati, C., eds, Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 173–87Google Scholar; Pravda, A., ‘Industrial Workers: Patterns of Dissent, Opposition and Accommodation’, in Tokes, R., ed., Opposition in Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 209–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹² Poland's economic policies represent the most radical example of transition to a free market economy. The Solidarity-led government, confronted with hyperinflation and a virtual breakdown of the economy, opted for a harsh stabilization programme and a rapid restoration of the market and even rejected the idea of a mixed economy. As J. Beksiak, an economic adviser to Solidarity, put it, ‘a socialist economy does not have any prospects for reform… [and] people have to realize this once and for all’ (Beksiak, J., ‘Economic Crisis, Economic Reform’, Uncaptive Minds, 2, no. 4 (1989), 14–16, p. 14).Google Scholar