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²² Disagreements over rationes may be informative about judges’ politics, but are not relevant to the analysis I present here.

²³ Lords Emslie, Irvine of Lairg, Taylor of Gosforth, Havers, Wheatley, Avonside and Parker of Waddington.

²⁴ This (North American-influenced) coding of cases may seem strange to British lawyers, who might expect left-leaning judges to find against the state in public law, particularly in immigration and deportation disputes.

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³³ Values of Geweke's diagnostic were within the range ±1.96 for all but two judges. Trace plots are available on request.

³⁴ The percentage reduction in error (PRE) for each vote is the number of votes in the minority, minus the number of incorrect predictions, divided by the number of votes in the minority. A perfectly predicted vote has an PRE of 1. The APRE is simply the PRE averaged over all votes.

³⁵ The GMP is the exponential of the average log-likelihood.

³⁶ These coefficients are not reported here, but are available on request.

³⁷ Note that, though Viscount Dilhorne was appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary by the Wilson government, he is considered a Conservative appointee, as he previously served as Lord Chancellor under Macmillan and Douglas-Home.

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