¹ Very little scholarly work has been carried out on constituency agents. The most extensive material is to be found in Butler, David and Pinto-duschinsky, Michael, The British General Election of 1970 (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 259–92.Google Scholar For an earlier period see Nicholas, H. G., The British General Election of 1950 (London: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 22–41Google Scholar; and Rose, Richard, ‘The Professionals of Polities’, New Society, XLV (1963), pp. 10–12Google Scholar, reprinted in a substantially revised form in Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 167–97.

² In conjunction with party leaders and Chief Whips, they were charged with establishing a system of correspondence in constituencies around the country to prepare for elections. For full details see Sir Jennings, Ivor, Party Politics: The Growth of Parties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961)Google Scholar, Chap. 3–6 and Gash, Norman, Politics in the Age of Peel (London: Longmans, 1953), passim.Google Scholar

³ Interestingly, the functional equivalents of modern-day party agents were active in a handful of large constituencies by the middle of the eighteenth century. See Sir Namier, Lewis, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (London: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 78–80Google Scholar, for an example of instructions to agents in an election which concluded with the injunction, ‘between this time and the election get what doubtful persons you can into your private houses and entertain them there till the election comes on’.

⁴ We do not deal with the Liberal party in this paper other than to note that the Liberals normally employ only about twenty full-time agents. Liberal agents tend to be located in constituencies in the areas of greatest Liberal strength such as the English West Country and Scotland. In their flurry of by-election victories in 1973, the Liberals used flying squads of agents and organizers to inundate a contested constituency.

⁵ It should be noted that in 1951 approximately 8 per cent of the agents in each party were women. The proportion of women has remained relatively constant in the Labour party. In the Conservative party the proportion of women agents had risen to 19 per cent by 1973. Most of the small number of women who either returned questionnaires or whom we interviewed felt that they had not encountered any unusual difficulties in their work because of their sex. However, one Conservative agent from an industrial West Midlands seat claimed that women agents encountered great difficulty functioning in constituencies with a large working-class population. In her view, working-class voters generally and working-class Tories in particular often were reluctant and at times were totally unwilling to work with a party agent who was a woman. She felt that most of her own effort ‘has been a waste of time’.

⁶ Our seeming phenomenal success in having questionnaires returned can be attributed, in our view, to two factors. First, and most important, Mr Stuart Newman of the Conservative party's Central Office sent a letter to each agent endorsing the questionnaire. Although Labour officials did not actually endorse the study, they collaborated with it. We are indebted to the officials of both parties for their co-operation. Second, party agents rarely have been the subjects of empirical research and so they may not yet be jaded by the experience of being inundated with questionnaires by overzealous social scientists.

⁷ Kornberg, Allan and Frasure, Robert C., ‘A Note on Constituency Agents and Conflict in Labour Parties’, Political Quarterly, XLV (1974), 489–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mckenzie, Robert T., British Political Parties (London: Heinemann, 1955).Google Scholar

⁸ Both parties try to eliminate potential parliamentary candidates at the earliest stage possible (e.g., when it becomes apparent that they view themselves as parliamentary timber). Indeed until the summer of 1973 Labour agents could not be adopted as candidates. Adoption is currently permitted but only in another constituency, and it requires the resignation of the individual from the party's agency service.

⁹ See Leonard, R. L., ‘Who are Labour’s Agents?’, New Society, 15 July 1965Google Scholar, for a critical evaluation.

¹⁰ There is a considerable body of literature on the impact of constituency party organizations on electoral outcomes. A sampling of the more recent research would include Bochel, J. M. and Denver, D. T., ‘Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: an Experiment’, British Journal of Political Science, I (1971), 257–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and ‘The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections’, British Journal of Political Science, II (1972), 239–44.Google Scholar See also Pimlott, Ben, ‘Local Party Organization, Turnout and Marginality’, British Journal of Political Science, III (1973), 252–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Party Organisation (Labour Party, 1972), p. 10.

¹² Constituency Finance (Conservative Central Office Organization Series, 1969), p. 4.

¹³ Barker, Anthony and Rush, Michael, The British Member of Parliament and His Information (Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 205.Google Scholar

¹⁴ For example, a South London agent described the most important aspect of his job as ‘the maintenance of ten ward organizations between elections capable of switching to electoral organizations for the election campaign periods’,

¹⁵ Since the money Labour party agents try to raise is intended to pay their salaries, it is not surprising that they regard this task as the most difficult aspect of the job. The following is a typical response: ‘Financing the party to enable the agency to work on a professional basis is the most difficult aspect. Bear in mind that the income needed to maintain the agency and do a worthwhile job in organization and propaganda means raising in the region of £8,000 per year’.

¹⁶ The finding with respect to the difficulty experienced by Labour agents in raising funds undoubtedly reflects the more general weakness of the party in this area, a weakness that some observers feel was sufficient, ceteris paribus, to lose it the 1970 general election. See, for example, Taylor, A. H., ‘The Effect of Party Organization: Correlation Between Campaign Expenditure and Voting in the 1970 Election’, Political Studies, XX (1972), 329–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ In this latter regard, it may well be the case that Tory party activists really are more obstreperous and difficult to deal with than their Labour counterparts. However, the opinion of most of our expert informants is that personality conflicts between agents and constituency party activists occur with approximately the same frequency in the organizations of both parties.

¹⁸ For a discussion of the concept of ‘swing’ and some of its attendant problems, see Steed, Michael, ‘An Analysis of the Results’, in Butler, D. E. and King, Anthony, The British General Election of 1964 (London: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 337–59.Google Scholar Very briefly, swing may be defined as one-half plus a fraction of the difference in the magnitude of the votes that separate a winning and runner-up candidate in any constituency. Thus, for example, a constituency in which the margin of victory was 2–49 per cent in election ‘I’ would be vulnerable to a swing of 1–25 per cent in election ‘II’.

¹⁹ Indeed, in the Labour victory of 1945 there was a change in 249 seat.

²⁰ It should be noted that the constituencies are the old (i.e., 1970) constituencies.

²¹ We decided to include all constituencies, including seats held by third parties or in which third parties ran second. Our assumption is that tactical electoral manoeuvering is possible in certain seats even though a party may not be first or second. That the public responds to such activities is suggested by the remarkable variety of Liberal voting patterns in the February 1974 election.

²² A small number of agents also had secondary responsibility for another constituency. Our analysis of the placement of agents is concerned only with those constituencies for which agents were principally responsible.

²³ Press Release, Conservative Central Office, 20 July 1973

²⁴ There also was considerable enthusiasm. According to Morrison, Sara, ‘The recent decision to phase in central employment of party agents is a real step towards updating our organisation’. ‘Remaking the Party Machine,’ Crossbow, XVII (1973), p. 10.Google Scholar

²⁵ Report of the Seventieth Annual Conference of the Labour Party: Brighton 1971–1972. In 1969, a similar pattern prevailed. Of a total income of £353,885, the unions gave £272,145 or 77 percent. For further details, see Rose, Richard, Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1967), pp. 250–60.Google Scholar

²⁶ He was referring, of course, to the maintenance activities of the party in the interim between elections and not to the elections themselves. Business organizations play the leading role in financing Tory campaigns.

²⁷ Constituency Finance (Conservative Central Office Organization Series, 1971), p. 2.

²⁸ The data are available only for constituencies in England and Wales. For both years, data are not available for some constituencies. In some urban areas, the only figure available was for the entire city (e.g., Manchester in 1972). In those situations, we divided the quota and contribution among the constituencies included and assigned the mean percentage of fulfilment to each constituency.

²⁹ On these points see works such as Leonard, Dick and Herman, Valentine, eds., The Backbencher and Parliament (London: Macmillan, 1972)Google Scholar; Walker, Patrick Gordon, The Cabinet (New York: Basic Books, 1970)Google Scholar; Crossman, R. H. S., The Myths of Cabinet Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972)Google Scholar; and Kornberg, Allan and Frasure, Robert C., ‘The Management of Cohesion in British Parliamentary Parties’, Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, VI (1972), 2–22.Google Scholar

³⁰ Pinto-duschinsky, Michael, ‘Central Office and “Power” in the Conservative Party’, Political Studies, XX (1972), 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³¹ By way of illustration, in 1973 the constituency Labour party in Lincoln refused to readopt Dick Taverne as their candidate for parliament. Taverne resigned and won re-election in a subsequent by-election. In another by-election that took place some months later Mr Edward Milne, running as an independent Labour candidate, was re-elected MP for Blyth although his constituency party also had failed to readopt him. For a personal account of Taverne’s experience see Taverne, Dick, The Future of the Left (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974).Google Scholar For another personal account during an earlier period see Nicolson, Nigel, People and Parliament (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1958).Google Scholar For a report that suggests that Nicolson’s experience may have been atypical see Biffen, John, ‘Conservative Constituency Leaders’, Crossbow, IV (1960), 29–32.Google Scholar

³² See, for example, Wilson, David J., ‘Constituency Party Autonomy and Central Party Control’, Political Studies, XXI (1973). 167–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ According to Julian Critchley, ‘The genius of the Conservative party lies in its own management. The function of Conservative Central Office.has not only been to win but also to moderate the views of its supporters’. ‘Strains and Stresses in the Conservative Party’, Political Quarterly, XLIV (1973), 401–10, p. 402.Google Scholar

³⁴ Whether or not the public really ascribes value to party unity per se is an empirical question. Party leaders obviously believe that it does and they may be correct in their assessment in the sense that party unity may be a condition associated in the public's mind with a party's capacity to govern effectively. A capacity to govern is a skill to which the public does ascribe great value. See Butler, David and Stokes, Donald, Political Change in Britain (New York: St Martin's Press, 1969). pp. 200–14.Google Scholar

³⁵ Thus, the constituency party organizations of sixteen safe Conservative seats refused to join the scheme for central employment of agents. According to one of our expert informants in Central Office, ‘In each case, the decision was accepted amicably [by Central Office]’.

³⁶ An expert informant in one of the party organizations believes the absence of material rewards for constituency party workers is a decided plus. According to him, ‘I feel the lack of material rewards has been one of the advantages and strengths of the party organization in the field’ (private communication, 17 December 1974).

³⁷ See, for example, Epstein, Leon D., Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967);Google ScholarClark, Peter B. and Wilson, James Q., ‘Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations’, Administrative Science Quarterly, VI (1961), pp. 129–66;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Kornberg, Allan, Smith, Joel, and Clarke, Harold D., Semi-Careers in Political Work: The Dilemma of Party Organizations, Sage Professional Paper, Comparative Politics Series, 01–008 Vol. I (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970).Google Scholar

³⁸ Richard Rose recognized this potential for conflict in his insightful article on agents. He suggested that one of the most important qualities an agent could possess was tact, ‘He must tactfully co-operate with management committees quarrelling among themselves or sometimes seeking to pick a quarrel with him’; Rose, , ‘The Professionals of Polities’, p. 11.Google Scholar One may speculate that the Labour agents in Lincoln and Blyth were somewhat deficient in this quality since in each constituency the local party’s opposition to Taverne and Milne, both veteran MPs, was organized and led by their agents.

₃₉ See some of the responses of Labour agents to the questions: (I) ‘In any constituency in which you have worked have you ever encountered a serious conflict between the MP and the constituency party?’ (Ia) ‘(If yes) what position did you take?’ (Ib) ‘(If no) what position do you think you might take if such a conflict occurred?’ in Kornberg, and Frasure, , ‘Constituency Agents and Conflicts in Labour Parties’, pp. 490–1.Google Scholar