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¹⁹ There is, however, some ambiguity over what is a ‘democratic’ response for item (i) (the interest of the entire people should always stand above the special interests of the individual). Empirically, this item is only weakly related to other democratic norms (see Appendix).

²⁰ Fieldwork for both studies was done by the respected German polling firm, Marplan. Prior analyses have shown that the East German survey over-represents Catholic and rural segments of the population. Attempts to weight for these demographic characteristics produces only minor changes in the overall aggregate results presented here; therefore we decided to present the unweighted results. Another test of the representativeness of the East German sample is the distribution of party support. The sample estimates are fairly close to the results of the March 1990 elections.

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²⁸ Because the conflict versus order items in Table 1 display sharp differences between the two publics in 1990, one might question whether these specific items will perform in the same way as the general democratic attitudes battery. In response, one should first note that these items do load on a general dimension of democratic attitudes (Table A in appendix). In addition, we replicated the analyses from Table 2 using only the four conflict items and obtain essentially the same correlations. The following correlations for the Eastern sample are illustrative: income (r = 0.03), PDS sympathy rating (r = −0.29), and age (r = 0.15).

²⁹ The lowest support for democratic values is expressed by individuals who have completed the ten-year polytechnic course or those who have not completed even primary schooling.

³⁰ Respondents rated each party on the standard 11-point sympathy ‘scalometer’ that ranges from − 5 ‘reject’ to + 5 ‘sympathetic’, with 0 being the midpoint of the scale.

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