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Coalition Theory and Local Government: Coalition Payoffs in Britain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Michael Laver ,
Colin Rallings  and
Michael Thrasher
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Extract

Formal coalition theory has tended to ignore the existence of local government coalitions. Local government studies have tended to ignore the existence of formal coalition theory. Yet local administrations frequently comprise coalitions of parties. There is clearly a need, therefore, to bring the two areas of study together.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , October 1987 , pp. 501 - 509
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1987

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References

1 See, for example, Browne, Eric and Franklin, Mark, ‘Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, LXVII (1973), 453–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; De Swaan, Abram, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973)Google Scholar; Browne, Eric and Feste, F. A., ‘Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs: Evidence from European Coalition Governments 1945–70’, American Behavioural Scientist, XVIII (1975), 530–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dodd, Lawrence, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar; Schofield, Norman and Laver, Michael, ‘Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Cabinets, 1945–83’, British Journal of Political Science, XV (1985), 143–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Taylor, Michael and Laver, Michael, ‘Government Coalitions in Western Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, I (1973), 205–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 See, for example, Bogdanor, Vernon, ed., Coalition Government in Western Europe (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983).Google Scholar

3 Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority Business, Research Volume 1, The Politicai Organisation of Local Authorities, Cmnd 9798 (London: HMSO, 1986), p. 34.Google Scholar

4 See Collins, C. A., ‘Considerations on the Motivation and Social Background of Councillors’, Policy and Politics, VI (1978), 425–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Saunders, Peter, Urban Politics (London: Penguin, 1980), especially Chap. 5.Google Scholar

5 Conduct of Local Authority Business, Political Organisation of Local Authorities, p. 111.Google Scholar

6 Rallings, Colin and Thrasher, Michael, ‘Parties Divided on Hung Councils’, Local Government Chronicle, 6185 (1986), 12–13.Google Scholar

7 Schofield, and Laver, , ‘Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs’, pp. 156–7.Google Scholar

8 See Laver, Michael, ‘Destruction Testing the Relative Weakness Effect on Fake Data’, Centre for the Study of Irish Elections: Working Papers, Volume 2 (Galway: University College, 1986).Google Scholar

9 Rallings, and Thrasher, , ‘Parties Divided on Hung Councils’, p. 13.Google Scholar

10 Budge, Ian and Laver, Michael, ‘Office-seeking and Policy-pursuit in Coalition Theory’, Legislative Studies Quarterly (forthcoming).Google Scholar