¹ LaPalombara, Joseph, ‘Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm’, Comparative Politics, I (1968), 52–78, p. 63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² One notable exception to the general inattention accorded to interest groups has been Britain. Beer, Samuel H.'s British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York: Knopf, 1965)Google Scholar prompted a number of good empirical studies to verify his hypothesis and develop alternative models. See also Wooton, Graham, Pressure Politics in Contemporary Britain (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1978).Google Scholar

³ Sartori, Giovanni, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, American Political Science Review, LXIV (1970), 1033–53, pp. 1051–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ The best of these remain the works of Meynaud, Jean: Les Groupes de pression en France (Paris: Armand Colin, 1958)Google Scholar; and Nouvelles études sur les groupes de pression en France (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962)Google Scholar; and ‘Les Groupes de pression sous la Ve République’, Revue Française de Science Politique, XII (1962), 672–97Google Scholar. See also Lavau, Georges, ‘Political Pressure by Interest Groups in France’, in Ehrmann, Henry W., ed., Interest Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958)Google Scholar, and Ehrmann, Henry W., ‘Pressure Groups in France’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXIX (1958), 141–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Among the most important, on trade unions: Reynaud, Jean-Daniel, Les Syndicats en France, Vols, 1 and 2 (Paris: Seuil, 1975)Google Scholar; Reynaud, Jean-Daniel, ‘Trade Unions and Political Parties in France: Some Recent Trends’, industrial and Labor Review, XXVIII (1975), 208–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Caire, Guy, Les Syndicats ouvriers en France (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971)Google Scholar; Capdeville, Jacques and Mouriaux, René, Les Syndicats ouvriers en France (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973)Google Scholar; on business interests: Ehrmann, Henry W., Organized Business in France (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957)Google Scholar; Brizay, Bernard, Le Patronat: histoire, structure, strategie du patronat (Paris: Seuil, 1975)Google Scholar; Bunel, Jean and Saglio, Jean, L'Action patronale du CNPF au petit patron (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979)Google Scholar; on farm groups, see Mendras, Henri and Tavernier, Yves, Le Syndicalisme paysan, FNSEA, CNJA (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969)Google Scholar; Tavernier, Yves et al. , L'Univers politique des paysans dans la France contemporaine (Paris: Armand Colin, 1972)Google Scholar; Lauga, Louis, Centre National des Jeunes Agriculteurs (Paris: Editions de l'Epi, 1971)Google Scholar; on other groups: Boniface, Jean, ‘Les Mouvements de consommateurs’, Esprit (06 1978), 57–63Google Scholar; Wieviorka, Michel, L'Etat, le patronat et les consommateurs: études des mouvements des consommateurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977)Google Scholar; Chauvrière, Michel and Le Drian, Marie-Françoise, ‘Les Associations familiales’, Informations Sociales, Nos. 6–7 (1978), 32–51Google Scholar; Clark, James, Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure Group Study of the Fédération de l'Education Nationale (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1967)Google Scholar; Fields, A. Beiden, Student Politics in France: A Study of the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France (New York: Basic Books, 1970)Google Scholar; Grunberg, Gérard and Mouriaux, René, L'Univers politique et syndical des cadres (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979).Google Scholar

⁶ For recent examples, see Keeler, John T. S., ‘The Corporatist Dynamic of Agricultural Modernization’, in Andrews, William G. and Hoffmann, Stanley, eds., The Fifth Republic at Twenty (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981)Google Scholar; and Schain, Martin A., ‘The Dynamics of Labor Policy in France: Industrial Relations and the French Trade Union Movement’, The Tocqueville Review, 11 (1980), 77–109.Google Scholar

⁷ Truman, David B., The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, 2nd edn (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. xxi.Google Scholar

⁸ Fomerand, Jacques, ‘Policy Formulation and Change in Gaullist France: The 1968 Orientation Act of Higher Education’, Comparative Politics, VIII (1975), 59–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cohen, Stephen S. and Goldfinger, Charles, ‘From Permacrisis to Real Crisis in French Social Security: The Limits of Normal Politics’, in Lindberg, Leon N. et al. , eds, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975)Google Scholar; Brown, Bernard E., ‘Pressure Politics in the Fifth Republic’, Journal of Politics, XXV (1963), 509–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ See Brown, Bernard E., ‘The Decision to Subsidize Private Schools’, in Christoph, James B. and Brown, Bernard E., eds., Cases in Comparative Politics, 2nd edn (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969)Google Scholar; Brown, , ‘Pressure Politics in the Fifth Republic’Google Scholar; Clark, , Teachers and PoliticsGoogle Scholar; Francheschi, Joseph, Les Croupes de pression dans la défense de l'enseignement public (Paris: Libraires Techniques, 1964).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Much of the best information we have about interest-group politics comes as the incidental by-product of studies of other phenomena. See, for example, Suleiman, Ezra N., Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Friedberg, Erhard, ‘Administration et entreprise’, in Crozier, Michel et al. , eds, O` va l'administration française? (Paris: Editions d'Organisation, 1974)Google Scholar; Hayward, Jack and Watson, Michael, eds., Planning, Politics, and Public Policy: The British, French, and Italian Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975)Google Scholar; MacArthur, John H. and Scott, Bruce R., Industrial Planning in France (Cambridge, Mass.: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1969)Google Scholar; Cohen, Stephen S., Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model, 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Zysman, John, Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Suleiman, Ezra N., ‘Industrial Policy Formulation in France’, in Warnecke, Steven J. and Suleiman, Ezra N., eds, Industrial Policies in Western Europe (New York: Praeger, 1975).Google Scholar

¹¹ These four models differ slightly from the form chosen by Wright, Vincent in The Government and Politics of France (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 174–85Google Scholar. I have added the neo-Marxist model and lumped together his domination-crisis model and endemic and open-conflict model into the protest model.

¹² The pluralist model is used in Meynaud, , Groupes de pression and Nouvelles étudesGoogle Scholar; Lavau, , ‘Political Pressures’Google Scholar, and Brown, , ‘Pressure Politics’Google Scholar. For a general discussion of the pluralist model, usually with reference to the American scene, see: Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961)Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert A., Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967)Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert A., ‘Pluralism Revisited’, Comparative Politics, X (1978), 191–203CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Truman, , The Governmental ProcessGoogle Scholar; Polsby, Nelson W., Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963)Google Scholar; and Key, V. O., Political Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964).Google Scholar

¹³ In practice access for groups representing privileged groups is easier than for disadvantaged groups. See Chevallier, Jacques, ‘La Participation dans l'administration française: discours et pratiques’, Bulletin de l'Institut International d'Administration Publique, 11 (1976), p. 139Google Scholar. For general critiques of pluralism, see Lowi, Thomas J., The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Political Authority (New York: Norton, 1969)Google Scholar and Connolly, William E., ed., The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton, 1969).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Schmitter, Philippe C., ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’Google Scholar and ‘Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe’, in Schmitter, Philippe C. and Lehmbruch, Gerhard, eds, Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979)Google Scholar; Wiarda, Howard J., ‘Does Europe Still Stop at the Pyrenees? Politics and the Party System in Spain and Portugal’, in Merkl, Peter, ed., Western European Party Systems (New York: Free Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Lehmbruch, Gerhard, ‘Liberal Corporatism and Party Government’Google Scholar, in Schmitter, and Lehmbruch, , Trends Toward Corporatist intermediationGoogle Scholar; Beer, , British Politics in the Collectivist AgeGoogle Scholar; Harrison, Reginald J., Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of Modern Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980)Google Scholar; and Winkler, J. T., ‘Corporatism’, Archives Européenes de Sociologie, XVII (1976), 100–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Ehrmann, , Organized Business in FranceGoogle Scholar; Ehrmann, Henry W., ‘French Bureaucracy and Organized Interests’, Administrative Sciences Quarterly, V (1961), 534–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schmitter, , ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’ pp. 21–2Google Scholar; Kolinsky, Martin, Continuity and Change in European Society (New York: St Martin's Press, 1974), p. 174Google Scholar; Harrison, , Pluralism and Corporatism, pp. 64–97Google Scholar; and Crouch, Colin, ‘The Changing Role of the State in Industrial Relations in Western Europe’, in Crouch, Colin and Pizzorno, Alesandro, eds, The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968, Vol. 2 (New York: Holmes Meier, 1978), pp. 215–16.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Brenner, Michael J., ‘Functional Representation and Interest Group Theory: Some Notes on British Practice’, Comparative Politics, 11 (1969), 113–34, p. 119.Google Scholar

¹⁷ To this need for consensus, Colin Crouch adds another prerequisite for successful corporatism, economic prosperity. It is only when rising mass demands can be met due to a prosperous economy that corporatism works best. See Crouch, Colin, ‘The Changing Role of the State in Industrial Relations in Western Europe’, p. 215–16.Google Scholar

¹⁸ McConnell, Grant, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1966)Google Scholar; Domhoff, G. William, Who Rules America? (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1967)Google Scholar; and Domhoff, G. William, The Powers That Be: Process of Ruling-Class Domination in America (New York: Random House, 1978).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Poulantzas, Nicos, State, Power, Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978), pp. 232–3.Google Scholar

²⁰ Poulantzas, Nicos, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975), p. 157.Google Scholar

²¹ Fabre, Jean et al. , Les Communistes et l'état (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1977), p. 210Google Scholar. See also Francais, Parti Communiste, Traité marxiste d'économie politique: le capitalisme monopoliste d'état, Vols, 1 and 2 (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1971).Google Scholar

²² Poulantzas, Nicos, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 190.Google Scholar

²³ Claudin, Fernando, Eurocommunism and Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978), p. 101.Google Scholar

²⁴ de Tocqueville, Alexis, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1955), pp. 210–11.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Shonfeld, William, Obedience and Revolt: French Behavior Toward Authority (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976)Google Scholar. See also Pitts, Jesse R., ‘La Communauté délinquante’, Esprit (01 1970)Google Scholar; Pitts, Jesse R., ‘Continuity and Change in Bourgeois France’, in Hoffmann, Stanley et al. , eds, In Search of France (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1965)Google Scholar; Crozier, Michel, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964)Google Scholar; Crozier, Michel, The Stalled Society (New York: Viking, 1974)Google Scholar; and Wylie, Lawrence, ‘Social Change at the Grass Roots’Google Scholar, in Hoffmann, et al. , eds, In Search of France.Google Scholar

²⁶ Hoffmann, Stanley, Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s (New York: Viking, 1974), pp. 113–14.Google Scholar

²⁷ Luethy, Herbert, France Against Herself (New York: Praeger, 1955).Google Scholar

²⁸ Wylie, , ‘Social Change’, p. 223.Google Scholar

²⁹ Williams, Philip M., Crisis or Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1966), p. 393.Google Scholar

³⁰ Hoffmann, , Decline or Renewal, p. 115–16.Google Scholar

³¹ Meynaud, , Groupes de pressionGoogle Scholar. The membership of the Economic and Social Council, an official advisory body made up of government and interest group representatives was also used to establish the principal groups. But the sample was not restricted to the ESC members alone since many groups are not represented on this body.

³² Lorwin, Val R., The French Labor Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).Google Scholar

³³ Suleiman, , Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy, pp. 346–50.Google Scholar

³⁴ The text of this question was: ‘You have said that your organization belongs to several committees or work groups. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of your participation in these bodies?’

³⁵ Le Monde, 6 10 1979.Google Scholar

³⁶ The one exception is the recent change in leadership of the Chambre Syndicale de la Métallurgie. When the government reorganized the steel industry in 1978–79, apparently one of the conditions for bailing out the industry was that the Chambre replace its president. The president, Jules Ferry, then stepped aside.

³⁷ Respondents were asked to choose the three they felt most important from a list of possible disadvantages of government-interest-group contacts. Only 16·8 per cent included among their three ‘These contacts lead to manipulation of the groups by the government’. This fear was expressed most frequently by consumer spokesmen (60 per cent); business representatives selected this disadvantage more frequently (16·1 per cent) than trade-union leaders did (8·3 percent).

³⁸ The chambers sometimes represent different interests and have different goals from the non-public interest groups. But the key point is that they are more under the influence of the autonomous interest groups than victims of government manipulation.

³⁹ For a slightly different version of this incident, see Zeldin, Theodore, France 1848–1945: Politics and Anger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁰ The question was: ‘In general, do you believe that the means and opportunities for groups to express their needs and concerns are sufficient, insufficient, or excessive?’

⁴¹ The questions were: ‘When the government prepares a draft law or decree which affects your interests, does the ministry consult you on the content of this new policy?’ ‘If yes, is it seeking to obtain information and suggestions from you or is it simply to inform you of its actions?’ Of those claiming to be consulted in advance, 52·1 per cent felt the consultations were usually genuine; 13·7 per cent said they were usually only formal; the rest said they varied in effectiveness.

⁴² For example, the Economic and Social Council and the various planning committees. See Hayward, Jack, Private Interests and Public Policy: The Experience of the French Social and Economic Council (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966)Google Scholar, and Cohen, , Modern Capitalist Planning.Google Scholar

⁴³ Suleiman posed similar questions in his study of the administrative elite. The rejection of disadvantages was equally strong with two-thirds seeing no disadvantages. Some of Suleiman's respondents, however, viewed the question as impugning the neutrality of the administration. None of my respondents saw the question as offensive. See Suleiman, , Power, Politics, and Bureaucracy, pp. 325–30.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ This is based on the selection by the interviewee of the three most important advantages of regular contacts between groups and government from a list of nine possible advantages.

⁴⁵ See Schain, , ‘The Dynamics of Labor Policy’.Google Scholar