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Agenda Control and Electoral Success in the US House

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2018

David Fortunato Open the ORCID record for David Fortunato [Opens in a new window]  and
Nathan W Monroe
David Fortunato*
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
Nathan W Monroe
Affiliation:
University of California, Merced
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

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Keywords

US CongressAgenda SettingPartiesCartel ModelElections
Type
Letter
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , October 2020 , pp. 1583 - 1592
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2018

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References

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Supplementary material: Link

Fortunato and Monroe Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KTGFRE
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Fortunato and Monroe supplementary material

Appendix

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