¹ Przeworski, Adam, ‘Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon’, New Left Review, no. 122 (1988)Google Scholar, reproduced as chap. 1 in Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J., Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Przeworski, Adam and Wallerstein, Michael, ‘The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies’, American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), 215–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² See the essays in Roemer, John, ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)Google Scholar and Roemer, J., A General Theory of Exploitation and Class (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roemer, J., Free to Lose (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Elster, Jon, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Cohen, G. A., Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).Google Scholar

³ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 5.Google Scholar See Also Przeworski, A., ‘Marxism and Rational Choice’, Politics and Society, 14 (1985), pp. 379–409.Google Scholar

⁴ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social DemocracyGoogle Scholar: writes, Przeworski, ‘I think I have demonstrated that they [workers] are unlikely to opt for socialism in an exclusive pursuit of their economic interests’, p. 239.Google Scholar

⁵ One other central theme to Przeworski's work not addressed in this article is a consideration of Michels, 's ‘iron law of oligarchy’ problemGoogle Scholar; see Paper Stones, pp. 19–20Google Scholar and Capitalism and Social Democracy, chap. 1.

⁶ Przeworski, and Sprague, , Paper Stones, passim, especially pp. 55–6Google Scholar, and Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, pp. 24–9.Google Scholar

⁷ For definitions of workers see Przeworski, and Sprague, , Paper Stones, p. 34Google Scholar, and Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 104.Google Scholar

⁸ Przeworski, and Sprague, , Paper Stones, p. 25.Google Scholar

⁹ Przeworski, and Sprague, , Paper Stones, p. 31.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Esping-Andersen, Gosta, Politics Against Markets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985)Google Scholar, for an analysis of Scandinavian socialist parties which pursued this strategy successfully.

¹¹ See Esping-Andersen, , Politics Against MarketsGoogle Scholar; Stephens, J. D., The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London: Macmillan, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stephens, E. H. and Stephens, J. D., Democratic Socialism in Jamaica (London: Macmillan, 1986)Google Scholar; and Korpi, W., The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).Google Scholar For discussions and assessment see Fulcher, J., ‘Labour Movement Theory versus Corporatism’, Sociology, 21 (1987), 23–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and King, D. S., ‘The State and the Social Structures of Welfare in Advanced Industrial Societies’, Theory and Society, 16 (1987), 841–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² These claims are reminiscent of Peter Gay's study of Bernstein and the SPD, from which Gay concluded that only through the abandonment of socialist policies could a social democratic party be elected to office. Gay, Peter, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism (New York: Basic Books, 1970, originally 1952).Google Scholar

¹³ Przeworski, and Sprague, , Paper Stones, pp. 50–62.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Przeworski, and Sprague, , Paper Stones, pp. 55–6.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 27.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Przeworski, and Sprague, , Paper Stones, p. 185.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Buraway, Michael, ‘Marxism without Micro-Foundations’, Socialist Review, 19 (1989), 53–86, at pp. 60, 61.Google Scholar In a rejoinder to Buraway's criticisms, Przeworski observes of the charge that he and Sprague ‘treat individual behaviour as an eflect of activities of organisations, but… do not explain why individuals behave the way they do’ that it is ‘valid and devastating’ (Przeworski, A., ‘Class, Production and Politics: A Reply to Buraway’, Socialist Review, 19 (1989), 87–111, at p. 93.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See, for example, Alt, James, The Politics of Economic Decline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Kavanagh, D., ed., The Politics of the Labour Party (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982)Google Scholar; and Whiteley, Paul, The Labour Party in Crisis (London: Methuen, 1983).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Webb, R. and Wybrow, R., The Gallup Report (London: Sphere, 1982), p. 28.Google Scholar

²⁰ Crewe, I., ‘The Disturbing Truth Behind Labour's Rout’, The Guardian, 13 06 1983Google Scholar, and ‘A New Class of Politics’, The Guardian, 15 06 1987.Google Scholar See also Dunleavy, P. and Husbands, C., British Democracy at the Crossroads (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), for a discussion of these issues.Google Scholar

²¹ Särlvik, B. and Crewe, I., Decade of Dealianment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 90.Google Scholar Further evidence about the static proportion of middle-class Labour supporters is provided by Robertson, D., in ‘Class and the British Electorate (Oxford: Black well, 1984).Google Scholar He reports an unchanged 20 per cent of the middle-class electorate voting for Labour in 1964 and 1979 (p. 28).

²² Crewe, I., ‘Why the Conservatives Won’, in Penniman, H., ed., Britain at the Polls 1979 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 277.Google Scholar

²³ writes, Crewe, ‘the Labour vote remains largely working class but the working class has ceased to be largely Labour’, The Guardian, 13 06 1983.Google Scholar

²⁴ Ironically, Przeworski and Sprague's analysis may be more accurate for the Labour party itself. The party has an increasingly middle-class membership, a development which may discourage working-class members. However, such middle-class members are not necessarily moderate but may be more left-wing than working-class ones. For evidence of this phenomenon see Seyd, P., The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left (London: Macmillan, 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ Esping-Andersen, , Politics Against Markets.Google Scholar

²⁶ Lewin, Leif, Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

²⁷ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, chaps 1, 4, 5 and the postscript.Google Scholar

²⁸ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, pp. 133–4, 171.Google Scholar

²⁹ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 3.Google Scholar

³⁰ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 138.Google Scholar

³¹ This model is not made explicit in Przeworski's earlier writings but the model is presented in Wallerstein, M. and Przeworski, A., ‘Workers’ Welfare and the Socialization of Capital’ in Taylor, M., ed., Rationality and Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

³² This equation is derived from Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 179.Google Scholar

³³ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 179.Google Scholar

³⁴ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 139.Google Scholar

³⁵ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 43.Google Scholar

³⁶ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 139.Google Scholar

³⁷ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 139.Google Scholar

³⁸ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 180.Google Scholar

³⁹ Capitalists may even disinvest because workers are simply taking too much from profits and this will provoke an economic crisis. This argument, notice, assumes that workers negotiate collectively and the problems of free-riding amongst groups of workers are avoided.

⁴⁰ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 157.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 164.Google Scholar

⁴² Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 43.Google Scholar

⁴³ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 46.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 177.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For example, capitalists' consumption may be perceived as excessive, profits may not be re-invested immediately (or allocated elsewhere in the economy). Such developments may lead workers to conclude that wages and investment can rise together under some circumstances. If workers can respond to changing conditions, it would be regarded as an error term in Przeworski's model. However, the existence of radically different responses suggests a more complex and fundamental process than this model assumes. The assumption of an inverse relationship between wages and investment is unsupported.

⁴⁶ Van Der Wee, H., Prosperity and Upheaval (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1985), p. 240.Google Scholar Despite this rise in real wages, investment did not fall. The trend remained constant from the turn of the century until the late 1940s at circa 7 per cent, rising considerably in the postwar period (Van Der Wee, , Prosperity and Upheaval, p. 196).Google Scholar More recently, Maynard has argued that rising wages have continued to be a major influence on falling profits. Maynard writes, ‘the major factor underlying the fall in the rate of profit on capital in the UK manufacturing sector during the last 20 years was the determination and ability of labour to increase its share of the income created in that sector and to maintain its real wage’ (Maynard, G., ‘Factors Affecting Profitability and Employment in UK Manufacturing Industry 1960–1978’ in Martin, W. E., ed., The Economics of the Profits Crisis (London: HMSO, 1981), pp. 210–11.Google Scholar See also Glyn, A. and Sutcliffe, B., British Capitalism, Workers and the Profit Squeeze (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1972).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ For accounts of British incomes policy see Fishbein, W., Wage Restraint by Consensus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984)Google Scholar; and Panitch, L., Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁸ Lange, P., ‘Unions, Workers and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent’, in Goldthorpe, J., ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Wickham-Jones, M., ‘Financial Decision Making and the Labour Government in Britain 1974–1975’, paper presented to the 1989 ECPR meetingsGoogle Scholar; and Boston, J., ‘Corporatist Incomes Policies, the Free Rider Problem and the British Labour Government's Social Contract’, in Cawson, A., ed., Organised Interests and the State (London: Sage, 1985).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, chap. 1 and postscript.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 42.Google Scholar

⁵² Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 43.Google Scholar

⁵³ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 45.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, chap. 6.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Przeworski, , Capitalism and Social Democracy, p. 42.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Bleaney, M., The Rise and Decline of Keynesian Economics (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 130.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See O'Connor, J., The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martin's Press, 1973) for general discussions.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁸ This outcome can arise for two main reasons. First, a radicalized electorate will elect a social democratic government committed to rapid nationalization. Second, a government may respond to economic crisis and under-investment by nationalization.

⁵⁹ Butler, G. and Butler, D., British Political Facts 1900–1985 (London: Macmillan, 1986).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁰ Aaronovitch, S. and Smith, R., The Political Economy of British Capitalism (New York: McGrawHill, 1981), p. 290.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Aaronovitch, and Smith, , Political Economy of British Capitalism, p. 279.Google Scholar

⁶² Holland, S., The Socialist Challenge (London: Quartet, 1975).Google Scholar

⁶³ See the discussion in Whitehead, P., Writing on the Wall (London: Michael Joseph/Channel 4, 1985).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ OECD, Economic Survey UK 1980 (Paris: OECD, 1980), p. 56Google Scholar (1975 prices). OECD data indicate that a much more severe fall in manufacturing investment occurred between 1979 and 1981 under a Conservative government than that of 1974–75. Capital expenditure on manufacturing fell, in 1980 prices, from £7,495 million in 1979 to £6,479 million in 1980 and £4,865 million in 1981. OECD, Economic Survey UK 1987 (Paris: OECD, 1987), p. 80.Google Scholar Although investment remained stable in distribution and services Przeworski's model would not explain why capitalists are shifting from manufacturing to these other sectors. The model does not explain changes in the structure of the economy between sectors; it is a static model.

⁶⁵ Aaronovitch, and Smith, , Political Economy of British Capitalism, p. 279.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Economic Trends (London: HMSO, various issues).