¹ Riker, William H., The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962).Google Scholar

² See for example Browne, Eric C. and Dreijmanis, John, eds, Government Coalitions in Western Democracies (New York: Longman, 1982).Google Scholar

³ Riker, William H., Study of Local Politics: A Manual (New York: Random House, 1959).Google Scholar

⁴ Riker, William H., Democracy in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1953).Google Scholar In the text I have relied upon the second edition, published in 1965, since it is more accessible and substantially unchanged from the first.

⁵ Riker, William H., Liberalism Against Populism (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982).Google Scholar

⁶ ‘Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System’, a Report of the Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, supplement to American Political Science Review, XLIV (1950), No. 3.Google Scholar

⁷ Liberalism Against Populism, pp. 10, 251.Google Scholar

⁸ Democracy in the United States, pp. 1–34.Google Scholar

⁹ Democracy in the United States, p. 66.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Democracy in the United States, p. 86.Google Scholar

¹¹ Democracy in the United States, pp. 98–104.Google Scholar

¹² Arrow, Kenneth, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edn (New York: Wiley, 1963).Google Scholar

¹³ Black, Duncan, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).Google Scholar

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¹⁵ Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Riker does pay some attention to the relative costs of forming different coalitions by introducing the idea of ‘side-payments’ which the members of a proto-coalition may offer to outsiders to induce them to join. Some aspects of ideological compatibility or incompatibility might be captured through the use of this idea – for instance where a side-payment takes the form of a promise to modify one's legislative programme. This is a less demanding way for ideological considerations to enter a theory of coalition formation than would be true of those theories in which ideological similarity is explicitly required. Compare, for instance, Axelrod, Robert, Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1970)Google Scholar and de Swaan, Abram, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formations Applied to Nine European Parliaments After 1918 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973).Google Scholar

¹⁷ I have constructed my interpretation of the argument from The Theory of Political Coalitions, Chap. 2 and Appendix 1, and from Riker, William H. and Ordeshook, Peter C., An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973)Google Scholar, Chap. 7.1 advise the interested reader who is new to Riker's theory to begin with Chap. 2 of The Theory of Political Coalitions, then to go to Positive Political Theory and then back to the appendix of the former work.

¹⁸ Hardin, Russell, ‘Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition’, American Political Science Review LXX (1976), 1202–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ There is of course a long-standing debate about realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science. See, for example, Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961)Google Scholar, Chap. 6 and Ryan, Alan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 84–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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²³ The Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 248.Google Scholar

²⁴ Madison, James in The Federalist Papers, edited with an introduction by Rossiter, Clinton (New York: Mentor, 1961), No. 51.Google Scholar

²⁵ Barry, Brian, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier Macmillan, 1970), Chap. 2.Google Scholar

²⁶ For this strict public choice assumption, see, e.g. Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 17–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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²⁸ Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance.

²⁹ Federalism, p. 11.Google Scholar

³⁰ Federalism, p. 111.Google Scholar

³¹ An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Chap. 3.

³² Federalism, p. 136.Google Scholar

³³ May, Kenneth O., ‘A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision’, Econometrica, XX (1952), 680–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Still, Jonathan W., ‘Political Equality and Election Systems’, Ethics, XCI (1981), 375–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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³⁵ Liberalism Against Populism, pp. 233–53.Google Scholar

³⁶ Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, Stale and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), Chap. 10.Google Scholar

³⁷ Wolff, Robert Paul, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 58–67.Google Scholar

³⁸ See, for example, Rowley, Charles K. and Peacock, Alan T., Welfare Economics: A Liberal Restatement (London: Martin Robertson, 1975), pp. 19–22.Google Scholar

³⁹ Such a theory is advanced in Ackerman, Bruce A., Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980)Google Scholar; I have discussed aspects of this neutrality condition in Weale, Albert, ‘Review Article on Social Justice in the Liberal State’, Minnesota Law Review, LXV (1981), 685–700.Google Scholar