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The Rise of New Politics and Market Liberalism in Australia and New Zealand
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
Extract
The rise of ‘New Politics’ concerns since the 1970s parallels the rise in popularity of market liberalism. Although often considered to be opposites, both goals have been pursued vigorously and simultaneously by social democratic governments in Australia and New Zealand. This article examines the circumstances of this unlikely marriage and, by applying multivariate analysis to election survey data collected in each country in 1990, examines the implications of these apparently contradictory policies for public opinion and party support. We conclude that value orientations associated with New Politics have mixed associations with party support. Postmaterialist and materialist value orientations are linked to attitudes towards the specifically Australasian old left strategy of ‘domestic defence’. The findings suggest that the effects of value change are more far-reaching in New Zealand, where social liberalism may have overtaken collectivism as the dominant value cleavage in the party system.
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References
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43 The study of political ideology and voting in New Zealand is severely limited by the relative absence of trend data, making it difficult empirically to infer change over time. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the historical record of political discourse in New Zealand before the 1970s, and particularly from debates between the two parties and what is known of the political values of their representatives, that social liberalism could not then have formed the basis of an ideological cleavage between the two major parties in the way that it can be shown to do in 1990.
44 This is best illustrated by an example. In the case of the 11.3 percent change in the value of L2 when collectivism is regressed on the Labor vote for postmaterialists, this is estimated as follows. The L2 value for the constant alone is 299.3, with 223 degrees of freedom. Once collectivism is entered into the equation, along with the control variables (age, gender and education) the L2 becomes 265.5, with 218 degrees of freedom. The resulting change to the L2 of 33.76 is 11.3 percent ((33.76/299.27)* 100); together with the change in the degrees of freedom of 5, this represents a change that is statistically significant at p < 0.01. The other figures are calculated in Table 4 in the same way.
45 While higher for postmaterialists, the figure is not statistically significant.
46 This is in line with other research which has concluded that any realignment of the party system would tend towards a Labor—Democrat—Green versus Liberal—National conflict. See McAllister, Ian, Political Behaviour: Citizens, Parties and Elites in Australia (Melbourne: Longman-Cheshire, 1992), p. 250ff.Google Scholar
47 The postmaterialist vote is more effective in Australia because of second preference voting, a factor which we cannot assess here.
48 In fact, all the signs for the attitude variables that are statistically significant in Table 4 are the same across the value groups and as reported in Table 3. While intervention augmented by controls has the expected effect on coalition voting in Australia, the variable itself is not statistically significant in the equation.
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