¹ Pitkin, Hanna F., The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 77.Google Scholar

² A good discussion of representation as an emergent characteristic is Eulau, H. and Prewitt, K., Labyrinths of Democracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), pp. 37–53.Google Scholar

³ The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, Mandate for Reform (Washington, D. C.: Democratic National Committee, 1970), p. 26.Google Scholar

⁴ Pitkin, so termed this approach. Concept of Representation, p. 76.Google Scholar

⁵ These efforts have been discussed in various places which will be cited in the course of this paper. Notable among them is Austin Ranney’s ‘The Line of Peas: The Impact of the McGovernFraser Commission’s Reforms and their Probable Impact in 1972 and Beyond’ (paper delivered at the 1971 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association); and Ranney, , Curing the Mischiefs of Faction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).Google Scholar I wish to thank Professor Ranney for having made galleys of this book available to me.

⁶ Whether representation is treated as an attribute of an interpersonal relationship or a system characteristic depends of course on one’s observational standpoint. The importance of observational standpoint has always been emphasized by Lasswell, Harold D.. The most complete explication is perhaps that found in ‘Person, Personality, Group, Culture’, Psychiatry, II (1939), 533–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This article is available in Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences, P.S. 163, and in Lasswell, Harold D., The Analysis of Political Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948).Google Scholar

⁷ It is perhaps appropriate to state explicitly that the reverse is sometimes true: that there are arenas in which my concerns are political rather than scholarly. I have been an active Democrat during the period with which I am concerned here. And in 1972 I was an active supporter of Hubert Humphrey. I have of course attempted to be rigorously objective in my analysis of this topic. It is probably true that my partisan commitments sensitized me to questions concerning the representativeness of the 1972 convention, and also to questions about the relations between conventions and election outcomes. In any case, it is always important to recall that objectivity depends ultimately on the public character of science rather than the success of scientists in achieving total objectivity. See especially Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1963), Vol. II, pp. 216–23.Google Scholar

⁸ A New York-based polling organization founded by the late Elmo Wilson which conducts opinion studies in many countries.

⁹ The pre-convention questionnaire was designed by Evron Kirkpatrick and me, with some participation by Warren Miller, for use in the presidential campaign of Hubert H. Humphrey. We also determined the size and character of the sample. The survey of convention delegates was designed by Warren Miller, William Crotty, Elizabeth Douvan and me as the basis of a comprehensive study of the 1972 presidential elite with special emphasis on the role of women in that elite. This study was financed by grants from the Russell Sage Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund. A book reporting findings of this larger study is now in preparation. Naturally, I wish to thank the foundations which supported this work.

¹⁰ I am convinced that in considering representation in a particular year or institutional context, such as a political convention, it is important to relate the discussion to the theory and practice of political representation more generally. I have provided a brief overview of this theory and practice with references to some relevant literature. The reader who is knowledgeable about this subject may wish to skip this discussion and go directly to page 275 where the discussion of representation in the political conventions of 1972 begins.

¹¹ Hanna Pitkin examines and analyzes conceptions of representation in her book previously cited. Gilbert, Charles E. identifies five intellectual traditions concerned with representation in ‘Operative Doctrines of Representation’, American Political Science Review, LVII (1963), 604–18.CrossRefGoogle ScholarFairlie, John A. catalogues approaches to representation in ‘The Nature of Political Representation I’, and ‘II, American Political Science Review, XXXIV (1940), 236–48, 456–66.Google Scholar The Nomos volume discusses most important aspects of representation. Pennock, J. Roland and Chapman, John W., Representation, Nomos x (New York: Atherton Press, 1968).Google Scholar Also, Neuman, A., ‘Conceptions of Political Representation in the United States: Some Preliminary Findings’, Journal of Politics, XXXIII (1971), 831–9.CrossRefGoogle ScholarBirch, A. H., Representative and Responsible Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964)Google Scholar is a useful source on the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

¹² Birch, , Representative and Responsible Government, p. 16.Google Scholar

¹³ What I call the ‘embodiment’ theory of representation is one variant of what Pitkin terms the conception of representation by authorization. See her discussion of this view in Pitkin, , Concept of Representation, Chap. 3, pp. 38–59.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Harvey Mansfield, Jr. notes that ‘Medieval representation used “representative machinery” to secure consent. But “representative government” is government that uses representative machinery because it is authorized solely and entirely by consent.’ See ‘Modern and Medieval Representation’, in Pennock, and Chapman, , Representation, p. 78.Google Scholar Of course, these concepts were not always associated with the theory or practice of representation. Representative institutions were initially established by strong governments which sought the help – usually financial – of notable citizens. In Charles Beard's words, ‘It began its career as an instrument of power and convenience in the hands of the state.’; Beard, Charles A., ‘The Teutonic Origins of Representative Government’, American Political Science Review, XXVI (1932), 28–44, p. 44.CrossRefGoogle ScholarAlso, Birch, , Representative and Responsible Government, p. 1.Google Scholar Also, Beard, Charles A. and Lewis, John D. ‘Representative Government in Evolution’, American Political Science Review, XXVI (1932), 223–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Federalist, No. 52, emphasized the modern character of the ‘scheme of representation, which was “at most but very imperfectly known to ancient policy”.’ Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John and Madison, James, The Federalist (Washington, D.C.: National Home Library Foundation), p. 343.Google Scholar The notion that a representative body was a substitute for a meeting of all citizens and could speak for them was expressed in the sixteenth century by Sir Thomas Smith, who wrote that the Parliament of England ‘representeth and hath the power of the whole realme both the head and the bodie. For everie Englishman is entended to be there present, either by person or by procuration and attornies, of whatever prehiminence, state, dignitie or qualities soever he be, from the Prince (be he King or Queen) to the lowest person of England, and the consent of Parliament is taken to be everie man's consent’. Alston, L., ed.,De Republica Anglorum, 1583 (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1906), p. 49.Google Scholar Quoted in Beard, and Lewis, , ‘Representative Government’, p. 225.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Beard, and Lewis, , ‘Representative Government’, p. 235Google Scholar, assert that in modern representation, ‘speaking politically, all adult heads are equal and alike, each having an equal share of governing power’. They also refer, p. 236, to the change from a time when economic classes were represented to one which substituted ‘the representation of free and equal heads’.

¹⁷ Some democratic governments, notably the Fifth French Republic and the German Federal Republic, have undertaken to represent individuals as incumbents of economic and social roles. However, the bodies based on these representative principles have lesser policymaking roles and most power is vested in legislative bodies which represent citizen opinion. For a good discussion of functional representation, see Finer, Herman, Theory and Practice of Modern Government, Vol. II (New York: L. McVeagh, the Dial Press, 1932)Google Scholar; Friedrich, Carl J., Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1946)Google Scholar; and Friedrich, Carl J., Man and His Government (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963)Google Scholar; also Pitkin, Concept of Representation. The representation of groups takes place in various ways in modern governments. These are discussed in a British context in Beer, Samuel, British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York: Knopf, 1965)Google Scholar and, briefly, in Birch, A. H., ‘The Theory and Practice of Representation: Some Preliminary Notes’, a paper prepared for the International Political Science Association Round Table in Warsaw, 1966.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Rousseau was, of course, the author of the most famous theory distinguishing between the existential opinions and the ‘real’ will of the people. Idealist conceptions of the state typically postulate this distinction. See, e.g., Hegel, Fichte, Bosanquet. Most modern non-democratic theories also make this distinction. For a discussion of it see Maclver, R. M., The Web of Government (New York: Free Press, 1965).Google Scholar

₁₉ In democratic theory and practice the legitimacy of rulers depends on their selection as representatives in lawful competitive processes. In embodiment theories of representation theruler's claim to legitimacy rests on his prior claim to 'embody' this true will or these true interests.

²⁰ Monarchy, communism, nazism, and dictatorship in the ‘new’ nations have all been justified by some version of the doctrine of false consciousness. For versions of this doctrine see, e.g., Bodin, J., The Six Books of the Republic, V. I. Lenin, on the dictatorship of the proletariat, Hitler, A., Kampf, Mein, Fanon, Franz, trans. Constance Farrington, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1956).Google Scholar For an unexpected defense of this doctrine as applied to colonial peoples, see J. S. Mill, On Representative Government. Doctrines that postulate the existence of abstract or objective individual interests deny the individual freedom to choose or to change his identifications. They are incompatible with the premises and practice of democratic government and constitute the epistemological and moral basis of despotism. The figure of the philosopher king who knows better than those he governs their true, objective interests is familiar to students of political philosophy: Plato's formulation in The Republic remains the classic statement of this doctrine. An interesting variation is John of Salisbury, Policraticus, translated by Dickinson, (New York: Knopf, 1927).Google Scholar Most recently this doctrine has reappeared in the writings of certain theorists associated with the New Left. Perhaps its most persuasive contemporary exponent outside the Communist world is Marcuse, Herbert, especially One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).Google Scholar

²¹ This distinction is grounded in the historical association of the representation of groups and interests, and of opinions, with individual representation.

²² This characteristic distinguishes contemporary systems of individual representation from functional representation, which is based on a single status determined not by the individual but by the system.

²³ Research on voting has demonstrated that, for many, the aspects of social position most salient for elections vary through time and space.

²⁴ Hamilton, , Jay, and Madison, , Federalist, No. 57, p. 372.Google Scholar The importance of frequent elections for securing responsiveness and accountability is emphasized repeatedly by the authors of the Federalist Papers. Publius makes clear that frequent elections are not only useful because the person seeking re-election must ‘account’ for his stewardship, but also because they limit the power of the lawmaker. This latter aspect is sometimes overlooked in discussions of representative institutions. Note that the limits are the same whether or not the lawmaker seeks re-election. Earlier, in Federalist No. 52, Publius asserted: ‘As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an immediate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectively secured’ (p. 343). Note that the authors of the Federalist Papers also expected representatives to be restrained by the fact that ‘they can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society’ (p. 373). These and many similar statements demonstrate that at least in American practice frequent elections have been regarded as the principal institutional guarantee of responsiveness. The duty of elected officials and the strategy of accountability was defined by Thomas Paine who said of representatives that they ‘are supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act if they were present. ’ Further, ‘that the elected might never form to themselves an interest separate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety of having elections often’. Conway, M. D., ed. The Writings of Thomas Paine (New York: 1894–95) Vol. I pp. 70–1Google Scholar; quoted in Birch, , Representative and Responsible Government, p. 42.Google Scholar

²⁵ ‘Letter to John Penn’, The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States with A Life of the Author (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), Vol. IV, p. 205.Google Scholar

²⁶ Quoted in Fairlie, , ‘Nature of Political Representation I’, p. 16.Google Scholar

²⁷ In Federalist, No. 35, Hamilton notes that ‘all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people’ is that the representative ‘should be acquainted with the general genius, habits and modes of thinking of the people at large and with the resources of the country’ (p. 216).

²⁸ For a discussion of this theory of representation, see Pitkin, Concept of Representation, Chap. 4. Pitkin‘s, Hannah discussion notes that ‘In politics, too, representation as “standing for” by resemblance, as being a copy of the original, is always a question of which characteristics are politically relevant for reproduction’ (p. 87).Google Scholar Her book passes almost imperceptibly from discussion of an assembly which ‘mirrors’ opinions to one which looks like – is a visual representation of – the whole people (see pp. 60–91). In Federalist, No. 3, Hamilton explicitly examines the idea ‘that all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to’ (p. 124). This argument, he says, is ‘very specious and seducing’ but also ‘impracticable,’ ‘unnecessary’, and ‘altogether visionary’ (pp. 212–13). Furthermore, he asserts, ‘This will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free’ (p. 21). Other major democratic theorists – Burke, Locke, Rousseau, Adams – were also concerned with representing opinions and interests, not with representing physical or social characteristics.

²⁹ Sartori, Giovanni says ‘parties become for some the type of political organism that most closely resembles, or should resemble, the prototype of every authentic democratic form’. Democratic Theory (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 120–1.Google Scholar

³⁰ In his new book on party reform, Ranney suggests that within American parties there has been a longstanding ‘three-cornered dispute among purists-for-representativeness, purists-for-direct-democracy, and professionals for competitiveness’. Curing the Mischiefs of Faction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).Google Scholar And he asserts that in this dispute the purists-for-representation have most frequently carried the day. The ‘responsible party’ debate has received most attention from academics. Important proponents have been Schattschneider, E. E., Party Government (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942)Google Scholar, Bailey, Stephen K., The Condition of our National Parties (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1959)Google Scholar, Burns, James Macgregor, The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963)Google Scholar, Broder, David S., The Party’s Over: The Failure of Politics in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).Google Scholar A comprehensive review of this debate is Kirkpatrick’s, Evron M. ‘"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System”: Political Science, Policy Science or Pseudo-Science?’ American Political Science Review, LXV (1971), 965–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Ranney, Doctrine of Responsible Party Government.

³¹ Robert G. Dixon, Jr., emphasizes the revolution in conceptions of representation which led to the ‘one man, one vote’ decision. See Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 3–98.Google Scholar

³² The Guidelines are published in Mandate for Reform, the Report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, Washington, D.C. (04, 1970).Google Scholar

³³ Lucy, William H., ‘Polls, Primaries and Presidential Nominations’, Journal of Politics, XXXV (1973), 830–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar, provides an account of the relations of these three.

³⁴ Abbott, David W. and Rogowsky, Edward T., ‘The Linkage Process: An Essay on Parties and Opinion’, in Abbott, and Rogowsky, , eds., Political Parties: Leadership, Organization, Linkage (Chicago: Rand MacNally, 1971), p. 518.Google Scholar Until 1972 the characterization of David, Goldman and Bain remained essentially accurate: ‘The party conventions bring together a cross section of officialdom from the executive and legislative branches of all levels of government and from all parts of the party hierarchy.’ David, Paul T., Goldman, Ralph M., Bain, Richard C., The Politics of National Conventions (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1960), P. 343.Google Scholar

³⁵ Mcclosky, Herbert, ‘Are Political Conventions Undemocratic?’ New York Times Magazine, 4 August 1968, pp. 10–11,62–8.Google Scholar McClosky added, ‘Primaries, in fact, sometimes turn out to be the least representative since they assign the entire state’s delegation to the presidential candidate who gets a plurality.’

³⁶ A good description of the traditional convention is Polsby, Nelson W., ‘Decision-Making at the National Convention’, Western Political Quarterly,XIII (1960), 609–19.Google Scholar A good description of the entire presidential nominating process is Polsby, Nelson W. and Wildavsky, Aaron B., Presidential Elections, 3rd edn. (New York: Scribners, 1971).Google Scholar Also Wildavsky, Aaron B., ‘On the Superiority of National Conventions’, Review of Politics, XXIV (1962), 307–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ Though note that the Republican party adopted new rules which aimed at providing ‘timely’ selection and wider representation of the rank and file. The absence of a contest in the Republican party doubtless enhanced the identification of the party organization and the convention.

³⁸ The following is typical of the many popular accounts which emphasized this change:Actually, there are two Democratic parties now. One was in the convention hall, relishing its ascension to power. The other, beaten and bitter, was on the sidelines. It was not just Richard Daley, but included scores of Democratic Governors, Senators, Congressmen, state party chairmen, local office holders – all the regulars unhorsed by the McGovern reforms and outorganized by what is now the McGovern machine. Only 19 of the nation’s 30 Democratic Governors came to Miami Beach, and none played a significant role. (Time, 24 July 1972.)Theodore White noted, more perceptively, ‘There were quite clearly two Democratic parties on the floor, and a third, far beyond Miami, watching’ Whit, Theodore H., The Marking of the President 1972 (New York: Atheneum, 1973), p. 179.Google Scholar

³⁹ The mandate is contained in the ‘Minority Report of the Rules Committee’, adopted by the Convention on 27 August 1968, and reprinted in Mandate for Reform, p. 53.

⁴⁰ Ranney, , Curing the Mischiefs of Faction, p. 153.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Mandate for Reform, p. 32 (emphasis added).

⁴² In an informal endorsement of ‘representativeness’, the Commission described itself as representing ‘all ideological and geographical elements of the Party’. Mandate for Reform, p. 15.

⁴³ Ranney, , Curing the Mischiefs of Faction, pp. 108–9.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Mandate for Reform, p. 26.

⁴⁵ Mandate for Reform, p. 10.

⁴⁶ Eli Segal, Chief Counsel to the Mcgovern, Commission also describes this as the purpose of the treatment of women, blacks and youth in ‘Delegate Selection Standards: The Democratic Party's Experience’, George Washington Law Review, XXXVIII (1970), pp. 880–1.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ No argument is made that ‘if a group's numerical strength at a convention is increased, then the members of that group in society at large will be inclined to accord more legitimacy to the convention's decisions’, which is described as a chief justification of quotas by Sullivan, Dennis G., Pressman, Jeffrey L., Page, Benjamin I., Lyons, John J., The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1974), p. 35. This book is very friendly to group quotas.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Note that the rationale endorsed by the Commission does not provide a basis for permanent group quotas, but only for as long as may be needed to overcome the vestiges of past discrimination. The other arguments, not included in the Commission report, would have provided a rationale for permanent quotas for these groups.

⁴⁹ A similar assumption is, of course, made by the various ‘affirmative action’ programs which use the absence of ‘appropriate’ proportions of various categories of people – especially women and blacks – as prima facie evidence of discrimination. Only such an assumption can serve as the basis for regarding racial, sexual or age ‘imbalance’ as prima facie evidence of discrimination. There is no discussion in the report of this assumption.

³⁰ This language occurs in Mandate for Reform, Guidelines A-1 and A-2, p. 40, and in the summary, p. 34.

⁵¹ In Curing the Mischiefs of Faction, Ranney provides some information on this point:Many people have asked since, why only those groups? Why not also guarantee representation for, say, people over sixty-five, or labor union members, or poor people? The answer is simple, if not edifying: the commissioners who believed in descriptive representation spoke only for the special interests of women, youth and minority ethnic groups; and those of us who sought a different kind of representation did not counter by pressing for the special interests of other groups (p. 114).Such political realities constitute an adequate explanation for decisions, but are obviously irrelevant to moral justification.

⁵² This shift of attention is consistent with the lower salience of economic questions for the elite, especially the elite (liberal Democratic) most concerned with representing the new constituencies.

⁵³ Note that, although age is a biological characteristic with a relationship to power, it has some distinctive characteristics. It is not a permanent characteristic in the way that sex and color are permanent; everyone who lives long enough is every age. Furthermore, age has a special relationship to biological and social maturation. In most political systems (except monarchy) long periods of apprenticeship typically precede access to power.

⁵⁴ The scarcity of women in top political positions is a characteristic of virtually all modern governments – democratic and non-democratic. In the contemporary world, only in India, Ceylon, Israel, and Britain have women achieved top posts, and these governments are also heavily dominated by males.

⁵⁵ The ‘Mississippi Compromise’ of 1964 provided that in subsequent years racial discrimination in party processes would be the grounds for exclusion of state delegations. The Special Equal Rights Committee asserted that ‘failure to comply [with the nondiscrimination call] can and in our opinion will mean forfeiture of the right to be seated at the 1968 Democratic National Convention.’ See Report of the Special Equal Rights Committee, 20 April 1966, on file with the Democratic National Committee. The 1968 Credentials Committee rejected quotas and the shifting of evidentiary burdens but ‘In fact, the Committee’s judgment was certainly affected by an evident “underrepresentation” of Negroes.’ For a discussion of this see Schmidt, John R. and Whalen, Wayne W., ‘Credentials Contests at the 1968 and 1972 Democratic National Convention’, Harvard Law Review, LXXXII (1969), 1445–54.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ This principle is most clearly reflected in the practice of giving ‘bonuses’ in the form of additional votes to states carried by the party in previous elections. The courts specifically upheld this as a legitimate practice in Bode vs. National Democratic Party (452 # F2d # 1302, D.C. Cir. 1971, cert. denied 92 S.Ct. 684, 1972). The practice of U.S. and other political parties is to take account of political affiliations as well as total numbers, awarding a larger voice within the party to groups which support the party. This practice is compatible with the view that a party should be governed by its ‘members’ – loosely, by persons sympathetic to it.

⁵⁷ The estimates of the percent that various population categories constitute of the total of party identifiers were derived from the pre-convention study. The figures on women are from the CBS study. All others on delegates are derived from the delegate study. These latter differ slightly from those of other surveys (notably the CBS survey and the Washington Post survey) which also disagree slightly with each other. All these differences are small and without substantive importance. For a survey (though not up to date) of women’s presence in national political conventions, see Fisher, Marguerite J. and Whitehead, Betty, ‘Women and National Party Organization’, American Political Science Review, XXXVIII (1944), 895–903.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Additional comparative data on delegates is found in David, et al. , Politics of National Conventions, pp. 325–54.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ And they constituted about 19 per cent of the total Democratic presidential vote in 1968, and 5 per cent of the Republican. My source for this figure is Paul R. Abramson, ‘Why the Democrats are No Longer the Majority Party’, a paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans, September 1973. In 1972 they cast 26 per cent of the total McGovern vote according to Miller, Arthur H., Miller, Warren E., Raine, Alden S., Brown, Thad A., ‘A Majority Party in Disarray: Party Polarization in the 1972 Election’, another paper prepared for delivery at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (p. 76).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ The ‘imbalance’ of the age composition of the two conventions is relevant to the clientele of the two groups. Gallup estimates that in 1968 persons under 30 gave Humphrey 47 per cent of their votes compared with 38 per cent for Nixon and 15 per cent for Wallace, and that the votes of persons over 50 split 41 per cent for Humphrey, 47 per cent for Nixon and 12 per cent for Wallace. In 1964 71 per cent of persons under 30 supported Lyndon Johnson, as compared to 63 per cent over 50. In fact, voters under 30 have given 50 per cent of their votes to Democratic candidates in all but two presidential elections since 1952. In 1956 they voted 57 per cent to 42 per cent for Eisenhower, and in 1972 they voted 52 per cent to 48 per cent for Nixon. If a party convention should represent its regular clientele, then one would expect to find relatively more persons over 30 in a Democratic convention and more over 50 in a Republican convention.

⁶⁰ Free, Lloyd A. and Cantril, Hadley, in The Political Beliefs of Americans (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 151.Google Scholar Note that one third of their sample did not have a grandparent born in the United States, and that, of these, 52 per cent consider themselves Democrats as compared to 42 per cent of respondents at least some of whose grandparents were born in the United States.

⁶¹ Charges were heard repeatedly during the period of the Democratic convention that the ‘reforms’ had resulted in the gross under-representation of those Democratic stalwarts – socalled ‘white ethnics’. One widely broadcast charge was that of Chicago Daily News columnist Mike Royko, whose column was widely reprinted. In it, he compared the ‘balance’ of the ‘Singer’ delegation, which was finally seated with that of the ousted Daley group. In this column, addressed to Singer, Royko noted that ‘About half of your delegates are women. About a third of your delegates are black. Many of them are young people. You even have a few Latin Americans’. but. ‘There's only one Italian name there. Are you saying that only one out of every 59 Democratic votes cast in a Chicago election is cast by an Italian? And only three of your 59 have Polish names. Does that mean that only 5 per cent of Chicago's voting Democrats are of Polish ancestry?. Your reforms have disenfranchised Chicago's white ethnic Democrats, which is a strange reform.’ Reprinted in the Miami Herald during the convention.

⁶² The composition of the McGovern delegate group and of the Democratic convention bore less resemblance to those who had voted for the party in 1968 than to those who would cast their votes for George McGovern in 1972.

⁶³ Mandate for Reform, p. 41.

⁶⁴ All qualisy for membership in what David Apter has termed the ‘national elite’. Apter, David, ldeology and Discountent (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1964), pp.38–9.Google Scholar Recently the social correlates of political participation have received new emphasis. Wilson, ,Eulau, ,Prewott, ,Thompson, ,Verba, andNie, , for example, have recently explored the links between social status and organizational participation: Wilson, James Q., Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973), esp. pp. 56–77Google Scholar; Prewitt, Kenneth and Eulau, Heinz, ‘Social Bias in Leadership Selection, Political recruitment, and Electoral Context’, Journal of Politics, XXXIII (1971), 293–315CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thompson, Dennis F., The Democratic Citizen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 53–85Google Scholar; Verba, Sidney and Nie, Norman, Particiption in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 123–223.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The figures quoted on national population income and education are from the 1970 U.S. Census. A growing body of evidence suggests that views on the ‘new issues’ may be more influenced by the kind than by the amount of education, and more influenced by the character of occupation than by the associated income. Gallup reported that juniors and seniors were more likely than freshmen and sophomores to support McGovern, and that students in the humanities and social sciences supported McGovern 58 per cent to 37 per cent as compared with students in the physical sciences, mathematics, and engineering who supported Nixon 51 per cent to 42 per cent. Miller et al., ‘Majority Party in Disarray’, report that education was related to opinion in 1972. See also Hero, Alfred O. Jr., ‘Liberalism-Conservatism Revisited: Foreign vs. Domestic Federal Policies, 1937–1967’, Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXIII (1969), 399–408, p. 407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also Christenson, Reo M. and Capretta, Patrick J., ‘The Impact of College on Political Attitudes: A Research Note’, Social Science Quarterly, IL (1968), 315–20.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ The percent of teachers was described as a ‘healthy’ 22 per cent of the total delegates in Miami by Sullivan, et al. , Politics of Representation, p. 24.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ In 1952, businessmen constituted 57 per cent of Republican delegates as compared to 18 per cent in 1972. See David, et al. , Politics of National Conventions, p. 340.Google Scholar The 1968 Democratic figure is from the CBS survey.

⁶⁸ Mcclosky's, classic article is Mcclosky, Herbert, Hoffman, Paul J. and O'hara, Rosemary, ‘Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers’, American Political Science Review, LIV(1960), 406–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar An aspect of mass/elite opinion which has had more attention from political scientists concerns attitudes toward the ‘rules’ of democratic competition. See Mcclosky, Herbert, ‘Consensus and Ideology in American Polities’, American Political Science Review, LVIII (1964), 361–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Prothro, J. W. and Grigg, C. M., ‘Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement’, Journal of Politics, XXII (1960), 276–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stouffer, S. A., Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955)Google Scholar; Dahl, R. A., Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961)Google Scholar; Cnudde, Charles F., ‘Elite-Mass Relationships and Democratic Rules of the Game’, American Behavioral Scientist, XIII (1969), 189–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This inquiry should shed light on a number of other interesting subjects including the distance between the parties at both the mass and elite levels; the ‘rationality’ of the electorate's presidential votes; the ideological coherence of the two parties at both the elite and mass levels; the areas of major inter-party and intra-party disagreement. These are, of course, subjects of interest to political scientists, but comments on them will be reserved for another discussion.

⁶⁹ Ranney, , Curing the Mischiefs of Faction, p. 196.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ The correlations among candidate preference and various issue positions in 1972 confirmed that these two dimensions were related in 1972.

⁷¹ Adams, ‘Letter to John Penn’.

⁷² The tendency of the political elite to be either more liberal or more conservative than the rank and file has been noted and documented in McClosky et al. ‘Issue Conflict’; McClosky, ‘Consensus and Ideology’; Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties; Constantini, Edmond and Craif, Kenneth H., ‘Competing Elites Within a Political Party: A Study of Republican Leadership’, Western Political Quarterly, XXII (1969), pp. 879–904.Google ScholarKey, V. O. discusses political stratification and opinion on issues in Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp. 184–95.Google Scholar A book devoted to examining relations between mass and elite opinion in Britain is Budge, Ian, Agreement and the Stability of Democracy (Chicago: Markham, 1970).Google Scholar

⁷³ Difference scores reflect the direction of opinion, not the intensity. They were calculated simply by finding the difference between those who supported and opposed a position or group. This difference, termed a ‘preponderance score’, reflects the consensus on an issue. If the preponderance score of a group of delegates on busing is +14 and the Democratic rank and file preponderance score is +60 then the difference score is 46. Had the delegate preponderance score been –1 4 then obviously, the difference score would have been 74. Difference scores range from 0 to 200.

⁷⁴ Data are available to check the correspondence of opinion of supporters of candidates and their pre-convention mass supporters. Analysis, which will not be presented here, demonstrates that Democratic delegate groups other than Wallace’s were more liberal than their rank and file, and that the Wallace group of delegates was more conservative than its mass support.

⁷⁵ Mcclosky, and associates found large inter-party elite differences on welfare state economic questions. ‘Issue Conflict’, p. 411.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Mcclosky, et al. found that on such questions the views of the Republican rank and file were closer to the Democratic elite than their own party’s elite. ‘Issue Conflict’, p. 422.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Converse places respondents who evaluate parties and candidates in terms of their expected treatment of groups in the third level of ideological sophistication. I tend to think that this classification underestimates the universality with which politics is conceived in (cont. on p. 295) terms of groups. Converse, Philip E., ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, in Apter, David, ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1967), p. 216–17.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Converse, Philip E., Miller, W. E., Rusk, J. G. and Wolfe, A. C., ‘Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election’, American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), 1083–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁹ Miller et al. describe the ideological gaps between Democrats who did and did not support McGovern. ‘Majority Party in Disarray’, pp. 10–13.

⁸⁰ Wilson, emphasizes the rise of general consensus about the enlarged powers of government in Political Organizations, pp. 330–2.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Perhaps the lower salience of economic questions for the presidential elite reflected their relatively high socio-economic status. Perhaps it was a consequence of the diminishing role of business and labor in American politics. In any case, it is significant that among McGovern voters four times as many mentioned foreign policy as the principle problem as mentioned an economic problem.

⁸² See fn. 85 below for specific data on the widespread presence of opinions on these issues.

⁸³ Lasswell’s conception of political perspectives emphasizes the relation to self. See especially Lasswell, Harold D., World Power and Personal Insecurity (New York: McGraw Hill, 1935)Google Scholar, Power and Personality (New York: Viking, 1948), Chaps. I-V, pp. 7–107Google Scholar; also Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), especially pp. 3–28.Google Scholar Robert E. Lane also emphasizes the centrality of identifications in political perspectives; see especially Political Ideology: Why the Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962)Google Scholar; also, Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham, 1969)Google Scholar, and ‘Patterns of Political Belief’, in Knutson, Jeanne.ed. Handbook of PoliticaI Psychology (Washington, D.C.: Jossey-Bass, 1973).Google Scholar This perspective may be contrasted with those approaches which focus on cognitive aspects of belief systems as found, e.g., in Converse, ‘Nature of Belief Systems’, pp. 206–61. Cantril also distinguishes between opinion which does and does not concern ego values: Cantril, Hadley, The Psychology of Social Movements (New York: Wiley, 1941), pp. 74–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a discussion of some of the issues involved see Sartori, Giovanni, ‘Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems’, American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), 398–411Google Scholar, and Cobb, Roger W., ‘The Belief-Systems Perspective: An Assessment of a Framework’, Journal of Politics, XXXV (1973), 121–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁴ No students of politics believe that all elements of a belief system are equally important. Converse asserts that ‘idea elements within a belief system vary in a property we shall call centrality, according to the role they play in the belief system as a whole’. Converse, , ‘Nature of Belief Systems’, p. 203.Google Scholar His discussion includes a useful comment on ‘felt’ interrelations among beliefs but he is principally concerned with logical constraints. A suggestive critique of this emphasis on intellectual constraints is Lane, ‘Patterns of Political Belief’, pp. 98–105. My own view is that depth interviews probably provide the most reliable basis for determining centrality, but, since it is impossible to be certain that the few persons interviewed in depth are in fact representative of large collectivities, depth interviews do not solve the problem of how to determine centrality. Robert E. Lane has pushed further than anyone else the effort to determine the structure of political beliefs from long interviews with a few persons. Good examples of this approach are Lane, Political Ideology and Political Thinking and Consciousness. The same approach is, of course, exemplified in Robert Cole’s excellent work on white southerners.

⁸⁵ Over 50 per cent of voters of both parties had an opinion for or against all issues and symbols discussed here. The items on which most people had no opinions were ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’, ‘blacks’ and ‘politicians’. At least 70 per cent had positive or negative views about other groups, and over 85 per cent had positive or negative views about the specific policy areas tested–crime, welfare, busing, inflation, South-east Asia. Note, however, that, as Key pointed out, there may be wide agreement on issues about which no one feels strongly. He called this ‘permissive consensus’ (see Key, Public Opinion, pp. 32–5) but might have easily called it ‘prohibitory consensus’ since negative consensus can prohibit as well as positive consensus permit.

⁸⁶ Feeling was intense on a number of the policy areas tested. Seventy-one per cent of Democratic voters and 81 per cent of Republicans took the strongest possible anti-busing position. Eight per cent of Democrats and 2 per cent of Republicans took the strongest possible probusing position. Fifty per cent of Democratic voters and 60 per cent of Republican voters gave the strongest endorsement possible to the proposition that the able-bodied had an obligation to work; another 12 per cent of Democrats and 8 per cent of Republicans took the extreme opposite view – that abolishing poverty had priority over the obligation to work. Twenty-eight per cent of Republicans took the extreme ‘anti-crime’ position, while 19 per cent of Democrats and 15 per cent of Republicans were equally strongly committed to protecting the rights of the accused. (The extreme position on these measures is considered either 1 or 7 on a seven-point scale.) On ‘feeling thermometers’ an eleven-point scale is offered, which reduces the likelihood of respondents choosing the ‘extreme’ position, but nonetheless 35 per cent of Democratic voters and 40 per cent of Republicans took the strongest possible ‘anti’ demonstrator position; approximately 27 per cent of each group offered the strongest possible support for the police, and 21 per cent of each for the military.

⁸⁷ Forty-four per cent of Democratic and 36 per cent of Republican party identifiers described busing as very important to them in deciding how to vote. Seventy-five per cent of Democrats and 68 per cent of Republicans said it was at least ‘somewhat important’; 55 per cent of Democratic and 56 per cent of Republican voters reported that the question of welfare vs. work was very important while 88 per cent of Democrats and 90 per cent of Republicans said it would be at least somewhat important in deciding their vote for president. Sixty per cent of Democrats and 53 per cent of Republicans described government initiative in solving inflation as very important while 89 per cent and 87 per cent respectively said it was at least somewhat important in determining their vote.

⁸⁸ Responses to questions about ‘the most important problem facing this country’ confirm the existence of large discontinuities between the Democratic elite and rank and file but offer only limited confirmation of the importance of the issues separating Democratic elite and rank and file.Voters – 87 percent of Democrats and 82 per cent of Republicans-mentioned an economic issue in answer to this question: the high cost of living, high taxes, unemployment and related ‘pocketbook issues’. Law and order ranked second, with 62 per cent of Democrats and 65 per cent of Republicans; Vietnam ranked a close third with 62 per cent of Democrats and 59 per cent of Republicans; 31 per cent of Democratic voters and 21 per cent of Republicans mentioned race relations as a major problem.

⁸⁹ A factor analysis provides still further confirmation of the centrality of many of these issues and groups to voters in 1972. Busing, civil rights leaders, liberals, black militants, welfare recipients and political demonstrators are all importantly related to the most inclusive issue dimension. Police, the military, politicians, and courts comprise a second factor. Busing, crime, police, conservatives and the military are linked in a factor. At the elite level interconnections are still stronger and broader; busing, crime, conservatives, liberals, black militants, welfare policy, civil rights leaders, the military, welfare recipients, political demonstrators and women's liberation occur in the same most inclusive factor. An example of the use of factor analysis to explore centrality is Luttbeg, Norman R., ‘The Structure of Beliefs among Leaders and the Public’, Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXII (1968), 398–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar (The criterion for inclusion in each of the above factors was 4 or above.)

⁹⁰ I am using the term ‘cultural’ in the sense that it is normally used in the social sciences: namely, to refer to patterns of meaning, to the web of values, valuations, cognitions, goals, symbols characteristic of a group. Some important components of political culture are conceptionsof citizenship, authority, legitimacy, obligation, of the appropriate application of deprivations and indulgence, of the appropriate spheres of government activity, of the appropriate modes of political behavior of government and in politics. Political culture is not the only aspect of culture which may be involved in the political arena. Other aspects of culture such as work and child-rearing may become political issues. Culture may be analytically differentiated from society as the system of identifications, beliefs and goals associated with patterned behavior. This conception of culture is broader than that found in some recent discussions which use cultural issues to refer to more limited phenomena such as drugs, abortion, women's liberation and rock festivals. See, e.g., Levitan, Teresa and Miller, Warren E., ‘The New Politics and PartisanRealignment’, a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1972.Google Scholar A somewhat broader conception of culture, but one still narrower than that employed here is found in Miller et al., ‘Majority Party in Disarray’. As I am using the term, culture includes clashing conceptions of authority, of indulgences and deprivations, of socialization; that is, it includes a large part of what has been termed the ‘social issue’ by Scammon, Richard M. and Wattenberg, Ben J., in The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970).Google Scholar I have dealt with the salience of culture in the 1972 elections in Kirkpatrick, Jeane, ‘The Revolt of the Masses’, Commentary, LV (1973), 58–62.Google Scholar Related explanations of the politics of 1972 are Seymour Lipset, Martin and Raab, Earl, ‘The Election and the National Mood’, Commentary, LV (1973), 43–50Google Scholar, and Novak, Michael, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New York: Macmillan, 1971).Google Scholar

⁹¹ This relationship is illustrated in a recent letter disseminated by supporters of Alabama Governor George Wallace which stated the Governor's concern with five issues. One read, ‘I am concerned that most politicians in Washington want to take a lot of your money and give a guaranteed income to people even if they are healthy and refuse to work’ (quoted in the column of Buckley, William J. Jr, published in the International Herald Tribune, 4 July 1974.)Google Scholar

⁹² V. O. Key noted the prevalence of consensus among the electorate on many such ‘concrete but broad questions of public policy’, in Public Opinion, p. 50.

⁹³ Both the candidate support groups included persons with diverse views, suggesting that a good deal of issue aggregation had gone on within these groups.

⁹⁴ Wilson emphasizes the rise of general consensus about the enlarged powers of government in Political Organizations, pp. 330–2.

⁹⁵ Mcclosky, et al. , ‘Issue Conflict’, p. 423.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Time, 17 July 1972. More conservative estimates in the McGovern camp gave their candidate a net plurality of 3.6 million votes among young voters (National Journal, 23 September 1972, p. 1504). Note that at the same time that McGovern strategists predicted a youth landslide for their candidate, psephologist Richard Scammon predicted that the youth vote would divide about like that of their parents – with perhaps 5 per cent to 10 per cent more liberal. Scammon's prediction proved the more correct, as the votes of persons 18–30 split almost evenly between McGovern and Nixon. Note also that Fred Dutton, author of the most optimistic estimate, was an active and influential member of the McGovern Commission.

⁹⁷ Note, though, that Epstein, Leon D. points out that in Wisconsin the McGovern and Goldwater candidacies had very different impacts on their respective parties’ voters, ‘Who Voted for McGovern? The Wisconsin Case’, American Politics Quarterly, I (1973), 465–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹⁸ The Illinois case is, of course, different. The ousting of the delegation elected in the primary and headed by Richard Daley and its replacement by the pro-McGovern ‘Singer’ group affected the political composition of the convention. But it would doubtless have been possible for the Daley delegation to have had the prescribed racial, sexual and age ‘balance’ without having altered its political composition.

⁹⁹ The priority of political over sexual identifications was most dramatically demonstrated when scores of female McGovern delegates voted – for political reasons – against the Women’s Caucus challenge to the seating of South Carolina, and against a more liberal abortion plank in the Democratic platform.

¹⁰⁰ The view that people can only be truly represented by someone like themselves is enormously influential in our times. As developed by some critics of democracy, the observation that elected representatives are drawn from relatively privileged strata of society proves that ‘representative’ government is fundamentally a sham perpetrated by a ruling class on a gullible mass who only thinks it ‘chooses’ its leaders. Others conclude only that the system of representation should be overhauled. The most impressive version of this view is Michels, Robert O., Political Parties (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1949).Google Scholar Also, Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946)Google Scholar, and Hunter, Floyd, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959)Google Scholar, and Top Leadership, USA (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Elected public officials, party leaders who have been successful in winning elections, presumably bring to party deliberations a habit of taking account in their decisions of mass views and values.

¹⁰² Prewitt, Kenneth and Eulau, Heinz, ‘Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem’, American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), 427–41, p. 428.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰³ The Supreme Court has ruled in Bode vs. National Democratic Party that the equal protection clause and the line of reasoning applied to the representation cases related to Baker vs.

¹⁰³ The Supreme Court has ruled in Bode vs. National Democratic Party that the equal protection clause and the line of reasoning applied to the representation cases related to Baker vs. Carr (369, U.S. 186, 1962) does not apply to the apportionment of delegates to the national conventions. For a discussion of these issues see ‘Bode vs. National Democratic Party: Apportionment of Delegates to National Political Conventions’, Harvard Law Review, LXXXV (1973), 1460–77.Google Scholar For discussion of related issues and cases see Schmidt, and Whalen, , ‘Credentials Contests’, and ‘One Man, One Vote, and Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions’, University of Chicago Law Review, XXXVII (1970), 536–58.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ On this question see especially Ranney, Austin and Epstein, Leon D., ‘The Two Electorates: Voters and Non-Voters in a Wisconsin Primary’, Journal of Politics, XXVIII (1966), 598–616CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ranney, , ‘Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections’, American Political Science Review, LXVI (1972), 21–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ranney, , ‘The Representativeness of Primary Electorates’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (1968), 224–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Political Organizations. A New York Times report suggests that Richard Taylor Stearns, McGovern's campaign manager for the twenty-eight non-primary states, may have understood very well that masses would not turn out to participate in the new ‘open’ processes. ‘The real force of the Democratic party's new rules on delegate selection, as Mr Stearns perceived in a 1971 Rhodes Scholar's thesis at Oxford, was not to open the door wide to mass participation in the nominating process, but rather to open just large enough a crack to let new “elites” come in and challenge the old hierarchy.’ Lyden, Christopher, York Times, 9 05 1972, p. 24.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Voters who do not turn out also cannot ‘screen out’ persons whose views and values are not acceptable to the constituency, a function the late V. O. Key, Jr. described as one of the important sanctions available to force compliance with constituency opinion (Public Opinion).

¹⁰⁸ Bagehot, quoted in Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, p. 124. See his discussion of this point as applied to Britain on pp. 124–5. Also Butler, David, ‘The Paradox of Party Difference’, American Behavioral Scientist, IV (1960), 3–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Especially Wilson, James Q., The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Epstein, Leon D., Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967)Google Scholar; Ippolito, Dennis S., ‘Motivational Reorientation and Change Among Party Activists’, Journal of Politics, XXXI (1969), 1098–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carney, Francis, The Rise of Democratic Clubs in California (New York: Holt, 1958)Google Scholar; Mitchell, Stephen A., Elm Street Politics (New York: Oceana, 1959)Google Scholar; Salisbury, Robert H., ‘The Urban Party Organization Member’, Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX (1965–1966), 550–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹⁰ A politics dominated by symbol specialists is likely to differ in both style and substance from a politics in which businessmen and workers are more numerous. The business and trade union ethos alike stress material concerns and self interest. Professionals tend to be more interested in rectitude and power than in the pursuit of material rewards. Lasswell, Harold D. notes some special characteristics of such politics in Power and Personality, pp. 47–60.Google Scholar Also, Lasswell, H. D. and Lerner, Daniel P., World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965).Google Scholar Also, Parsons, Talcot, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), p. 186Google Scholar; Hayek, F. A., ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, University of Chicago Law Review, XVI (1949), 417CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Wilson, , Amateur Democrat, p. 62.Google Scholar A politics dominated by symbol specialists will have a higher ideological content and a lower concern for goods and services; the political process will be conceived rather more as an arena for debating and resolving moral questions and less as an arena for maximizing and compromising material interests.

¹¹¹ Federalist, No. 35, p. 213.

¹¹² In the language of the Commission, the Guidelines sought to eliminate practices which either ‘inhibited’ or ‘diluted’ the influence of Democrats in the selection process (Mandate for Reform, p. 12).

¹¹³ Leiserson pointed out nearly two decades ago that parties (like governments) are not limited to reflecting social relations: ‘Political organization, whether formal, constitutional structure of government or the formal-informal systems we call interest groups and political parties is rooted in social structure… In other words, political organization is not identical with, but functionally related to (dominated by, superior to, or integrated with) the spatial, functional, and interpersonal distribution of power in society.’ Leiserson, Avery, ‘The Place of Parties in the Study of Polities’, American Political Science Review, LI (1957), 943–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In recent years, perhaps especially since the first serious efforts to implement Brown vs. Board of Education,

¹¹³ Leiserson pointed out nearly two decades ago that parties (like governments) are not limited to reflecting social relations: ‘Political organization, whether formal, constitutional structure of government or the formal-informal systems we call interest groups and political parties is rooted in social structure In other words, political organization is not identical with, but functionally related to (dominated by, superior to, or integrated with) the spatial, functional, and interpersonal distribution of power in society.’ Leiserson, Avery, ‘The Place of Parties in the Study of Polities’, American Political Science Review, LI (1957), 943–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In recent years, perhaps especially since the first serious efforts to implement Brown vs. Board of Education, the powers of government have been increasingly used to achieve positive goals among which racial equality is outstanding. The use of government as a positive moral force has, of course, been advocated by idealists from Plato to Bosanquet. In the relatively recent past the most persuasive spokesmen for the possibilities of using democratic government to achieve positive goals have been Lindsay, A. D., The Modern Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press, 1943)Google Scholar; Green, T. H., Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, Green, 1895)Google Scholar; Maclver, R. M., The Modern State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926)Google Scholar; and The Web of Government. It is, of course, one thing to use government to achieve positive goals desired by a majority, and another to use government to achieve goals not desired by a majority.

¹¹⁴ To be sure, the politics as well as the rules determined who did and did not become a delegate. An effort to demonstrate the independent effects of the reform rules (especially the quotas) and the politics of the year is made in Sullivan, et al. ,Politics of Representation, especially Chap. 2, pp. 17–39.Google Scholar