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Principals, Agents and Human Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2013

David Cingranelli ,
Paola Fajardo-Heyward  and
Mikhail Filippov
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Abstract

This article argues that human rights could be improved by motivating politicians and bureaucrats to put more effort into protecting human rights. It conceptualizes the production of human rights practices as the outcome of two principal-agent relationships that constrain politicians and bureaucrats. Reliance on taxes is a non-electoral, fiscal factor that makes politicians more willing to protect human rights. Increased government revenue, no matter the source, raises bureaucratic compensation and helps create a more accountable bureaucracy. Thus both a higher reliance on taxes and larger state revenues lead to the better protection of human rights. Each fiscal factor promotes a different type of accountability, both of which independently contribute to good human rights practices.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , July 2014 , pp. 605 - 630
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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Footnotes

*

Binghamton University, SUNY (email: [email protected]); Canisius College (email: [email protected]); Binghamton University, SUNY (email: [email protected]). Data replication sets are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123413000070 and online appendices are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123413000070.

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Supplementary material: PDF

Cingranelli Supplementary Material

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