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¹⁰ To be fair, Stimson and his colleagues include a model that summarizes dynamic representation across all four institutions, but they themselves call this design ‘a fiction’ and ‘a rough answer to a rough question’ (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, ‘Dynamic Representation’, p. 556).

¹¹ Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

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³¹ Ferejohn, John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control’, Public Choice, 50 (1986), 5–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Some have argued that policy responsiveness might still occur when uncertainty is low. Parties that realize that their seats are quite safe could for example opt to respond to the public out of a sense of duty. See Bartels, Larry, ‘Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup’, American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 457–474CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁴² Brooks, Clem and Manza, Jeff, Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public Opinion in Democracies (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ The latest CMP publication is Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald, Mapping Policy Preferences II. The CMP uses human coders to classify sentences in election manifestos into more than fifty policy categories. The left–right score of each manifesto, and hence government, is calculated by subtracting the percentage of right-wing categories from the percentage of left-wing categories. The CMP scale thus has a range of −100 (for a party devoting its entire manifesto to left-wing issues) to +100 (for a party devoting its complete programme to right-wing issues). Substantively, the scale ‘opposes emphases on peaceful internationalism, welfare and government intervention of the left, to emphases on strong defence, free enterprise and traditional morality on the right’, see Budge, Ian and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, ‘Finally! Comparative Over-Time Mapping of Party Policy Movement’Google Scholar, in Budge, Ian, Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Volkens, Andrea, Bara, Judith and Tanenbaum, Eric, Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2001), pp. 19–50Google Scholar, at p. 21.

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⁴⁵ On average, the Budget speech is almost ten times as long as the ‘Queen’s Speech’, which is likely to contribute to the reliability of position estimates, see Laver, Michael, Benoit, Kenneth and Garry, John, ‘Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts: Using Words as Data’, American Political Science Review, 97 (2003), 311–331CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Klemmensen, Robert, Hobolt, Sara B. and Hansen, Martin E., ‘Estimating Policy Positions Using Political Texts: An Evaluation of the Wordscores Approach, Electoral Studies, 26 (2007), 746–755CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁴⁸ Benoit, and Laver, , Party Policy in Modern DemocraciesGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ Laver, , Benoit, and Garry, , ‘Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts’, p. 312Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ See, respectively, Proksch, Sven-Oliver and Slapin, Jonathan B., ‘Institutions and Coalition Formation: The German Election of 2005’, West European Politics, 29 (2006), 540–559CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Laver, Michael, Benoit, Kenneth and Sauger, Nicolas, ‘Policy Competition in the 2002 French Legislative and Presidential Elections’, European Journal of Political Research, 45 (2006), 667–697CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bertelli, Anthony M. and Grose, Christian R., ‘The Spatial Model and the Senate Trial of President Clinton’, American Politics Research, 34 (2006), 535–559CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Klemmensen, , Hobolt, and Hansen, , ‘Estimating Policy Positions Using Political Texts’Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Laver, , Benoit, and Garry, , ‘Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts’, p. 330Google Scholar.

⁵² For a detailed exposition on Wordscores, see Laver, , Benoit, and Garry, , ‘Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts’Google Scholar.

⁵³ In the example above, the left–right score of ‘business’ would be 0.17(2) + 0.83(7) = 6.15, which as expected lies closer to the score of the Conservative text score than the Labour text.

⁵⁴ Laver, , Benoit, , and Garry, , ‘Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts’, p. 316Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Laver, Benoit, and Garry have written a Wordscores algorithm for STATA, which was used to analyse the speeches; available from www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/wordscores/.

⁵⁶ Laver, , Benoit, and Garry, , ‘Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts’Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ On the CMP scale, which runs from −100 on the left to +100 on the right, the respective scores for the Budget Speeches from 1987, 2005 and 1974 are 30.5, −2.9 and −48.5. These scores are identical to the left–right score of the election manifesto of the relevant governing party at that time (Conservative party in 1987 and Labour in 1974 and 2005).

⁵⁸ Klemmensen, , Hobolt, and Hansen, , ‘Estimating Policy Positions Using Political Texts’Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Klingemann, et al. , Mapping Policy Preferences II, p. 104Google Scholar, fn. 6.

⁶⁰ These eight combinations are 1987–2005–1974, 1987–2005–1975, 1987–1971–1974, 1987–1971–1975, 1983–2005–1974, 1983–2005–1975, 1983–1971–1974, and 1983–1971–1975.

⁶¹ In fact, factor analysis of these eight time series results in a one-factor solution with an eigenvalue of 6.93 that explains 87 per cent of the variance. All of the eight reference sets have factor loadings between 0.87 and 0.96. Comparable results are found for Danish government speeches by Klemmensen, Hobolt and Hansen, ‘Estimating Policy Positions Using Political Texts’.

⁶² The mean score is identical to the one-factor solution (Pearson’s r = 0.994).

⁶³ These four sources of cross-validation are described in detail in Hakhverdian, , ‘Capturing Government Policy on the Left–Right Scale’Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ The question is formulated as follows: ‘In political matters, people talk about “the Left” and “the Right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?’ The scale runs from 1 on the left to 10 on the right.

⁶⁵ Huber, John D., ‘Values and Partisanship in Left–Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology’, European Journal of Political Research, 17 (1989), 599–621CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 618.

⁶⁶ For the United Kingdom, the classic statement is Butler, David and Stokes, Donald E., Political Change in Britain, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁶⁸ Following Stevenson, Randolph T., ‘The Economy and Public Mood: A Fundamental Dynamic of Democratic Politics?’ American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 620–633CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Sani, Giacomo and Sartori, Giovanni, ‘Polarization, Fragmentation, and Competition in Western Democracies’, in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds, Western European Party Systems (London: Sage, 1983), pp. 307–340Google Scholar. This measure is only consistently available since 1976 (Eurobarometer, 5).

⁶⁹ Hall, Stuart, ‘The Great Moving Right Show’, Marxism Today, January 1979, pp. 14–20Google Scholar.

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⁷¹ Stimson, James, Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kim, HeeMin and Fording, Richard, ‘Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946–1989’, European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), 73–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kellstedt, Paul, The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A question on left–right self-placement was included in the 1973 European Community Study, which was the precursor of the Eurobarometer series. The mean value for that year is 5.37, indicating that the opinion time series is distinctively sine-shaped from the early 1970s to the present.

⁷² Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960)Google Scholar; Converse, Philip E., ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261Google Scholar; Butler, and Stokes, , Political Change in BritainGoogle Scholar.

⁷³ Durr, Robert H., ‘What Moves Policy Sentiment?’ American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 158–170CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stevenson, , ‘The Economy and Public Mood’Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Pearson’s r equals 0.40, 0.74 and 0.85, respectively for these economic indicators. The ‘Misery Index’ represents the sum of unemployment and inflation and it is used by some as a proxy for the state of the economy. See Franklin, and Wlezien, , ‘The Responsive Public’; Soroka and Wlezien, ‘Opinion-Policy Dynamics’Google Scholar.

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⁷⁷ E.g., Evans, Geoffrey, Heath, Anthony F. and Lalljee, Mansur, ‘Measuring Left–Right and Libertarian–Authoritarian Values in the British Electorate’, British Journal of Sociology, 47 (1996), 93–112CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁷⁹ See Stimson, , MacKuen, and Erikson, , ‘Dynamic Representation’, p. 546Google Scholar. In the bivariate case, x ‘Granger causes’ y if past values of x contain information that helps predict y above and beyond the information contained in past values of y alone. For present purposes, lagged opinion adds to predicting policy, while the reverse does not hold. These results are available upon request.

⁸⁰ Stimson, , MacKuen, and Erikson, , ‘Dynamic Representation’Google Scholar; Smith, , ‘Public Opinion, Elections and Representation within a Market Economy: Does the Structural Power of Business Undermine Popular Sovereignty?’, American Journal of Political Science, 46 (1999), 842–863CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wlezien, Christopher, ‘Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy’, Journal of Politics, 66 (2004), 1–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Soroka, and Wlezien, , ‘Opinion–Policy Dynamics’; Hobolt and Klemmensen, ‘Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective’Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Assuming, of course, that the first stage of electoral turnover is met (the coincidence of right-wing mood and Conservative election victories).

⁸² Hobolt, and Klemmensen, , ‘Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective’Google Scholar (data are taken from the Gallup Poll (pre-1980) and Ipsos-MORI). These polls have monthly data on party support, so an annual mean is a more reliable measure than one item from the Eurobarometer.

⁸³ A similar logic concerning American presidential responsiveness is used by Hicks, Alexander, ‘Elections, Keynes, Bureaucracy and Class: Explaining U.S. Budget Deficits, 1961–1978’, American Sociological Review, 49 (1984), 165–182CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hibbs, Douglas A. Jr, The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ See Hendry, David F., Dynamic Econometrics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; DeBoef, Suzanna and Keele, Luke, ‘Taking Time Seriously’, American Journal of Political Science, 52 (2008), 184–200Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ DeBoef, and Keele, , ‘Taking Time Seriously’, p. 185Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ Similar post-war policy trends for Anglo-Saxon democracies are found by Budge, Ian and McDonald, Michael D., ‘Election and Party System Effects on Political Representation: Bringing Time into a Comparative Perspective’, Electoral Studies, 26 (2007), 168–179CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁷ Budge, and McDonald, , ‘Election and Party System Effects on Political Representation’, p. 171Google Scholar, fn. 1.

⁸⁸ Budge, and McDonald, , ‘Election and Party System Effects on Political Representation’, p. 171Google Scholar, fn. 1.

⁸⁹ These results are not reported here, because differencing has serious disadvantages. Most notably, it becomes impossible to identify long-term dynamic effects.

⁹⁰ Hailsham, Lord, Elective Dictatorship (London: BBC, 1976)Google Scholar.

⁹¹ A skeletal model was estimated with Conservative party seat share as the dependent variable and left–right self-placement as the independent variable, while controlling for party identification. This design has obvious limits, not least because we only have seven points of observation, but the results confirm the link between macro-level public preferences and election outcomes. Similar results are found with vote shares on the left-hand side of the equation and whether or not public preferences are lagged one year. Election results were acquired from Rallings, Colin and Thrasher, Michael, British Electoral Facts, 1832–2006 (Aldershot, Surrey: Ashgate, 2006)Google Scholar. The party identification data were taken from the British Election Studies. Conservative Seat Share_t = 159.3 + 0.6 Macropartisanship_t + 33.6 Public Preferences_t. All coefficients are statistically significant and the adjusted R ² = 0.92. As the public moves to the right with one standard deviation, the Conservative party’s share of seats increases by 0.30 × 33.6 = 10.1. The size of the House of Commons fluctuates around 640 seats, and therefore 10 per cent is roughly equal to 60 seats.

⁹² Brambor, Thomas, Clark, William R. and Golder, Matt, ‘Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses’, Political Analysis, 14 (2006), 63–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹³ Some have argued that the relationship between policy responsiveness and popularity is Λ-shaped, or non-monotonic, see Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Shotts, Kenneth W., ‘The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion’, American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2004), 690–706CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In other words, both highly popular and unpopular governments are said to reduce the likelihood of responsiveness. However, using the present data, no evidence of non-linearity of the conditional effect of opinion on policy is found.

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