¹ Oakeshott does not much like the term political philosophy. As he recently put it, ‘something important was lost when we began to speak of “political philosophy” instead of “civil philosophy”’, ‘The Vocabulary of a Modern European State’, Political Studies, XXIII (1975), pp. 319–41, 409–14, p. 410.Google Scholar This view is reflected in the changes introduced in his recent republication of his 1946 Introduction to Hobbes's Leviathan in Hobbes On Civil Association (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).Google Scholar Unless inappropriate, wherever he had once used the term ‘political’, he now uses ‘civil’. He also generally replaces the expression ‘civil society’ with ‘civil association’ and at places ‘polities’ with ‘civility’. Interestingly he does not replace ‘political philosophy’ with ‘civil philosophy’ and, what is even more striking, omits the paragraph about politics being a second-rate and corrupting activity. Oakeshott has also rewritten several parts of the original Introduction and revised his interpretation of Hobbes' theory of ‘civil’ obligation. In view of the fact that he is uneasy with the terms politics and philosophy, I should perhaps have entitled this essay Oakeshott's theory of civil society or, if it did not sound odd, Oakeshott's civil theory.

² Introduction to Hobbes, 's Leviathan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), pp. xxvii and xxix.Google Scholar

³ Oakeshott, Michael, Experience and its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Oakeshott, , Experience and its Modes, p. 70.Google Scholar Also ‘The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence’, Politica, III (1938), pp. 203–22, 245–60, pp. 346f.Google Scholar This article is hereafter referred to as CPJ.

⁵ Oakeshott did not say much about political philosophy in Experience and its Modes. However his comparison of it with moral philosophy, which he discussed at length, and his discussion of legal philosophy in ‘The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence’ published only a few years later give a fairly clear idea of what he took to be its nature and task.

⁶ Introduction to Leviathan, p. ix.Google Scholar

⁷ Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 132. This work is hereafter referred to as RP.Google Scholar

⁸ Oakeshott, , Experience and its Modes, p. 352.Google Scholar When Oakeshott talks of ‘conversation’ between different voices, it is difficult to see what he means. Since each mode is a self-contained world with its own distinct language and shares nothing in common with others, they cannot engage in any form of conversation. Oakeshott realizes this and builds rather feeble bridges between them. See, e.g., Rationalism in Politics, pp. 242f.Google Scholar

⁹ Oakeshott, , On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 30.Google Scholar This work is hereafter referred to in the text as HC.

¹⁰ Professor Oakeshott was kind enough to confirm this impression in a personal conversation.

¹¹ The three essays constituting On Human Conduct are not consistent in this respect. Throughout the first and third essay s the conjunction ‘of’ is dropped, and throughout the second retained; see, e.g., pp. 36, 67, 182 and 201. Oakeshott was kind enought to inform me that the conjunction is incompatible with the transitive nature of theorizing and should be dropped.

¹² Oakeshott, , On Human Conduct, pp. 14 f.Google Scholar Oakeshott generally uses the term ‘categorial’ and occasionally ‘categorical’. I doubt if he intends to distinguish the two. The latter seems to be a misprint.

¹³ Oakeshott, , On Human Conduct, pp. 3, 17 and 19.Google Scholar Sometimes Oakeshott equates theorems and postulates, on other occasions he distinguishes them. This is also the case with his distinction between features and postulates. On several occasions a characteristic is presented both as a feature and a postulate; for example, pp. 109 and 111 where law and justice are presented as both features and postulates.

¹⁴ Oakeshott, , On Human Conduct, p. 25.Google Scholar Also p. 33 where Oakeshott says that political philosophy moves on the ‘intermediate level of understanding’ represented by the platform of human conduct.

¹⁵ Oakeshott, , On Human Conduct, pp. 56, 58, 86 and 120.Google Scholar It is not clear whether Oakeshott thinks this to be the case with all or only the moral practices. If the former, then a purposive association cannot be as inhospitable to moral autonomy as he maintains.

¹⁶ Oakeshott, , On Human Conduct, pp. 55 and 63.Google Scholar Oakeshott's philosophical analysis shapes his style of writing, and hence his general preference for verbs and adverbs, and such coinage as ‘considerabilities’ and ‘unacceptabilities’. Even his introduction of the term ‘going-on’ signifies a desire to stress movement and activity. Someone like Bentham, who saw the universe as a collection of static entities and therefore preferred nouns and adjectives, presents an interesting stylistic contrast to Oakeshott.

¹⁷ The reasons could be found in On Human Conduct, pp. 119, 242, 314, 316, 317 and 319Google Scholar and in ‘On Misunderstanding Human Conduct: A Reply to My Critics’, Political Theory, IV (1976), 353–67, PP. 356 and 366.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Oakeshott, , ‘The Vocabulary of a Modern European State’, p. 340.Google Scholar

¹⁹ ‘On Misunderstanding Human Conduct’, p. 367Google Scholar, and On Human Conduct, pp. 158 and 168.Google Scholar

²⁰ Oakeshott, , On Human Conduct, p. 154.Google Scholar I wonder if the emergence of Mr Kerry Packer and his World Series Cricket, as well as the strong judicial disapproval of the MCC's treatment of the cricketers, pose any problems for Oakeshott's formalist theory of authority.

²¹ Oakeshott, , On Human Conduct, p. 180.Google Scholar See also Rationalism in Politics, p. 124.Google Scholar In Rationalism in Politics Oakeshott pleaded for a resolute attack on the ‘accumulated maladjustments resulting from the negligence of past generations’ and a ‘clearly formulated libertarian policy of reform’ (pp. 50f.). In On Human Conduct he takes a more austere view of government action.

²² Oakeshott, , ‘The Vocabulary of a Modern European State’, pp. 320 f.Google Scholar

²³ Oakeshott, , ‘The Vocabulary of a Modern European State’, pp. 321, 335 and 421 f.Google Scholar

²⁴ Broadly speaking, Oakeshott's view of philosophy and his style of thought are Hegelian, and his theory of civil society is Hobbesian. This may perhaps explain why he is so difficult to classify, as also why his admirers and critics come from such very different philosophical backgrounds.

²⁵ Oakeshott, 's On Human Conduct, pp. 321 and 180.Google Scholar Cf. ‘On Misunderstanding Human Conduct’ p. 362Google Scholar where Oakeshott strangely denies this.

²⁶ ‘On Misunderstanding Human Conduct’, p. 356Google Scholar; see also On Human Conduct, pp. 236 and 274.Google Scholar