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¹⁶ Cox and McCubbins develop an explanation of developments within the US Congress along similar lines. They seek to downplay the image of ‘committee government’ within the House and to place renewed emphasis on the ways in which parties manage the legislature as a whole, and specifically the ways in which the majority party manages the legislature, committee system included, to its own benefit. See Cox, G. and McCubbins, M., Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).Google Scholar

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¹⁸ To an extent, it reflects the fact that (uniquely in Europe), to date, the Union's governmental system is characterized by a separated system of powers, allowing the EP greater freedom of action in running its own affairs. Whether this will be maintained in the future–and the recent decision in the Maastricht Treaty to grant the EP investiture powers over the Commission raises doubts–is debatable. See Bowler, Shaun and Farrell, David M., ‘The Internal Organization of the European Parliament’ (paper given at the Western Political Science Association, Pasadena, 1994).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Another way of assessing the importance of committees is to examine their role in the Union's policy process. See Jacobs, et al. , The European Parliament.Google Scholar

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²¹ Even US Senators from some states in the upper Midwest can be said to have relatively small constituencies.

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²¹ The following discussion is based on three sets of data: an analysis of parliamentary questions in 1989; information on leadership and committee positions gathered from the EP's List of Members (Luxembourg: Official Publications, 1989–1991)Google Scholar; material on MEPs' personal backgrounds obtained from The Times Guide to the European Parliament (London: Times Publications, 1989)Google Scholar. The membership of the EP's committees is renewed in the mid-term. Therefore, this discussion relates to the first half of the 1989–94 term.

²⁴ Krehbiel, , ‘Where's the Party?’Google Scholar

²⁵ Unfortunately, we do not have the data to assess the degree of procedural protection enjoyed by EP committees, nor, for that matter, the issue of what happens to committee proposals on the floor of the House (i.e. at plenary). On the latter point, however, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is quite uncommon for committee proposals to be rejected or radically altered; certainly the absence of any attention to this question in the highly detailed study by Jacobs and his colleagues, suggests that it is generally uncontentious. If anything, the tendency in recent years, as described by these authors (all senior staff members), has been towards a more influential role for committees in the parliamentary process. Jacobs et at. describe two decision-making procedures which have been introduced as time-saving devices, but which have amounted to a growth in committee influence. First, committees, when presenting a report, increasingly request that it be adopted without debate at the plenary. Secondly, there is the Rule 37 procedure–derived from Italian legislative practice–which allows a report to be adopted by a committee on behalf of the EP and without involving a vote in plenary. According to Jacobs and his colleagues, the application of this rule has become more widespread in recent years. See. Jacobs, et al. , The European Parliament, pp. 123–4.Google Scholar

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²⁷ Jacobs, et al. , The European Parliament, p. 244.Google Scholar

²⁸ Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (Luxembourg: Official Publications, 1989), 24.2Google Scholar. For extended discussion of a similar process within the US Congress, see Cox, and McCubbins, , Legislative Leviathan.Google Scholar

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³⁹ That farmers are attracted to the Agriculture Committee may strike one as obvious: it is easily supported by impressionistic evidence. However, the fact is that we have shown this to be the case across the board, i.e. this is systematically the case across a range of committees and interests.

⁴⁰ Of course, it is always possible that the committee membership is unable to agree on anything!

⁴¹ The fact that we accord a great deal of importance to the position of party groups as a co-ordinating mechanism suggests that we are in broad agreement with the approach of Cox, and McCubbins, (Legislative Leviathan)Google Scholar. However, the predominance of the majority party, which is a feature of their analysis, is not an issue here since the EP conforms more closely to mainland European, rather than Anglo-American, practice.

⁴² ‘Appoints’ is, perhaps, too simple a word for the actual process involved. The appointment of rapporteur usually involves a bidding process between groups which entails a points system, where each report is valued at a given number of points, and each group within the committee has a number of points to spend in bidding for rapporteurships. Rapporteurs are used in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, and have been used in the earlier French Republics. Rapporteurs are sometimes used in the German Bundestag (Section 70 of the Bundestag's Rules of Procedure), and they were common in the Imperial Reichstag. See DiPalma, G., ‘Institutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1 (1976), 147–80Google Scholar; Krugar, F-K., Government and Politics of the German Empire (New York: World Books, 1915)Google Scholar; Meny, Y., Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy and Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Sait, E., Government and Politics of France (New York: World Books, 1926)Google Scholar; Trossman, H., The German Bundestag: Organization and Operation (Neue Darmstadter Verlagsanstalt, 1965)Google Scholar; Weil, , The Benelux Nations.Google Scholar

⁴³ It is a position which some rapporteurs have found difficult to deal with, and, hence, they were removed by a vote of the committee. In general, see Jacobs, et al. , The European Parliament, pp. 115 ff.Google Scholar