Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rdxmf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T19:49:07.903Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Miller on Market Neutrality, Co-operatives and Libertarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Extract

David Miller's article ‘Market Neutrality and the Failure of Co-operatives’ has two principal theses. The first of these, with which I have no quarrel, is that co-operatives will have a difficult time surviving in a free market economy. The second is that the truth of the first thesis suggests that a crucial argument in favour of libertarianism is wrong.

Type
Notes and Comments
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 British Journal of Political Science, XI (1981), 309–29.Google Scholar All subsequent references to this article are by page numbers in the text.

2 Miller might encounter difficulty in stating exactly why the desire that one's employees earn at least £10,000 per annum is not an important desire, if indeed he did wish to maintain this. If a necessary condition on desires is that they are economically feasible (so that it is not a good point against the United States' social system that it has not brought about the plan of Long, Huey: ‘Every man a millionaire’Google Scholar), then why does Miller's demonstration that co-operatives cannot compete with capitalist firms not disqualify from consideration the desire to work in co-opera tives?

3 Of course, one cannot use Miller's analysis of the economics of co-operatives to show that a bank could not compete on the free market since he has not presented it as being a co-operative institution.

4 In the libertarian view, coercing someone in order to secure the realization of that person's own long-run preferences counts as an unacceptable interference with personal liberty. See my article ‘Comment on Hospers’, Journal of Libertarian Studies, IV (1980), 267–72.Google Scholar