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⁹ The source for these observations is The Times. There are some well-known problems of reliability and validity associated with events data from this type of source. These problems have already received careful scrutiny by other scholars who report the reliability and validity of events. Data sources vary significantly according to the degree of attention which the source allocates to the events in question. See Azar, Edward, Cohen, Stanley, Jukam, Thomas and McCormick, James, ‘The Problem of Source Coverage in the Use of International Event Data’, International Studies Quarterly, XVI (1972), 373–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hoggard, Gary, ‘Differential Source Coverage in Foreign Policy Analysis’Google Scholar, and McGowan, Patrick, ‘A Bayesian Approach to the Problem of Events Data Validity’, both in Rosenau, James, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 353–82 and pp. 407–34.Google Scholar Any findings in this paper should be evaluated in the context of these problems. However, it is our contention that the general problems of source validity and reliability are less severe in our research, because we are dealing with a series of events which were an obviously important focus of attention for The Times.

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¹¹ On 11 September, Chamberlain had declared that Britain would intervene to protect France, ‘our nearest neighbour, the other great democracy and the country with whose integrity and security our own is so closely bound up’. (Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, 11 (London: HMSO, 1946), Appendix 111.)Google Scholar

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³¹ The intercoder reliability coefficient of agreement for the six scale types averaged 0·80, ranging from 0·72 to 0·88 among six coders. The total number of events in the data set is 217, including British and German behaviour towards each other as the direct object or Anglo-German behaviour towards Czechoslovakia and Poland with one another as the indirect object. The use of the latter criterion has the effect of including German verbal and physical behaviour towards Czechoslovakia or Poland (and indirectly toward Britain), as well as British manifestations of support for these nations (which are coded as verbal or physical conflict towards Germany). Normally excluded are behaviour by Britain or Germany towards other targets such as France or Russia during the crises. The only exceptions are the Anglo-German responses to Mussolini's call for a conference to end each crisis. These coding decisions are intended to isolate the Anglo-German aspects of each conflict so as to identify their respective bargaining strategies toward one another. These judgements ‘dismember reality’ but are unavoidable. For a philosophical and technical examination of this problem in the context of events data analysis, see Hermann, Charles, ‘What is a Foreign Policy Event?’ in Hanrider, Wolfram, ed., Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: David McKay, 1971), pp. 295–321.Google Scholar

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³³ The daily mode is calculated by identifying the most frequent scale type for each day; the crisis mode is calculated by identifying the most frequent daily mode. The daily arithmetic mean () for grouped data is calculated by the following formula, which treats all observations ‘as though they were located at the mid-points of their respective intervals’. (Blalock, Hubert, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 50–2.)Google Scholar

In this formula, f_i = number of cases in ith category, m_i = midpoint of ith category, k = number of categories, and N = the total number of cases. The crisis mean is calculated by averaging these daily grouped means, i.e., by summing them and dividing by the number of daily means. Days on which no events are recorded in The Times are not included in the calculation of the crisis mode or crisis mean.

³⁴ The beginning and ending dates for the Munich crisis are 14 and 30 September 1938. On 14 September Chamberlain decided to fly to Germany in order to confer personally with Hitler on the next day; on 30 September the Munich agreement was made. The beginning date for the Polish crisis is 22 August 1939 when Chamberlain sent a personal message to Hitler, appealing for a negotiated settlement and warning that Britain would fulfil its Polish obligations. The ending date in the Polish crisis for Germany is 1 September 1939, when German troops invaded Poland; the ending date for Britain is 3 September 1939, when Britain declared war on Germany. These beginning and ending dates were selected in order to make comparisons of the same phase in both conflicts. This phase is conceptualized as the ‘acute crisis’ stage of each conflict, characterized by McClelland as beginning with an important change in the volume and variety of interactions between protagonists and proceeding to a ‘turning point’ when the conflict moves towards war or a peaceful outcome. See McClelland, , ‘The Beginning, Duration and Abatement of International Crises’Google Scholar, in Rosenau, , ed., Comparing Foreign Policies, pp. 83–105.Google Scholar

³⁵ The formula for calculating the t-score is as follows:

where ₁, is the mean for the first crisis, ₂, is the mean for the second crisis, and

SE is the standard error of variations by the observed means from the population means. SE is estimated as follows:

where S ₁ and S ₂ are the variances for each crisis and n ₁ and n ₂ are the number of observations (days) for each crisis. The variance for each crisis is calculated by squaring the sum of the differences between each daily mean and the crisis mean, then dividing by the number of observations for the crisis. The formula for df, the degrees of freedom, is n ₁ + n ₂ – 2. See Watson, George and McGaw, Dickinson, Statistical Inquiry (New York: John Wiley, 1980), pp. 267–71.Google Scholar

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