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Eccentrically Contested Concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Barry Clarke
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Extract

In a recent exchange in this Journal, K.I. Macdonald took issue with Steven Lukes's claim that power is an essentially contested concept. Macdonald claims that in arguing that power is essentially contested Lukes locates disputes about power in the concept itself rather than in the divergent uses of that concept. Macdonald's claim is that there are at least two types of dispute about concepts: disputes which arise from within the concept and disputes which arise in the differing values ‘from which the concept depends’. In the case of power, Macdonald argues, the dispute lies between contending perspectives and values and not within the concept of power itself. Whilst not denying that there are essentially contested concepts, Macdonald is clear that the concept of power is not essentially contested but reflects a contest between differing value positions. Macdonald argues that whenever a concept is ‘truly essentially contested the proper ground for the contest is the essence of the concept. Our disagreements inhere in that concept’.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , January 1979 , pp. 122 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1979

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References

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