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‘Dethroning Politics’: Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Thought of F. A. Hayek

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Richard Bellamy
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Extract

The relationship between liberalism and democracy is notoriously paradoxical. On the one hand, the justification for democratic procedures most commonly rests on liberal assumptions. Standard liberal arguments for democracy range from the importance of consent due to the moral primacy of the individual, to the role of critical argument and the diversity of opinion for the discovery of truth. On the other hand, liberal institutional arrangements, such as the separation of powers and the rule of law, have frequently been interpreted as constraints upon democracy, albeit necessary ones if democracy is not to undermine itself. The paradox arises from the fact that liberalism provides a philosophical basis for regarding democracy as the only valid source of law whilst apparently appealing to some higher law in order to limit democracy itself. This paradox is embodied in the constitutions of most liberal democratic states. For generally these documents contain provisions – such as a bill of rights guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, assembly and association – designed to secure popular participation in the democratic process, alongside others – such as rights not obviously intrinsic to democratic decision making and mechanisms for judicial review – which seek to limit the power of democratic assemblies.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , October 1994 , pp. 419 - 441
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 Commentators on the history of the liberal democratic tradition frequently divide it into two camps, those who praise the intrinsic virtues of the democratic process and those who favour it for purely instrumental reasons, for example, Macpherson, C. B., The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)Google Scholar, and Held, David, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).Google Scholar I cannot defend this thesis here, but against this view I believe that prior to the twentieth century liberal theories generally involve elements of both models, preferring the first view and seeking to guard against the second: Mill, J. S.'s Considerations on Representative Government (1861)Google Scholar is an obvious case in point. This shift from ethical to economic theories of liberal democracy forms a sub-theme of my Liberalism and Modern Society: An Historical Argument (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).Google Scholar

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