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Carter and Congress: From the Outside In

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Charles O. Jones
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Extract

It seems a reasonable enough proposition that a president will organize his congressional relations to suit his policy goals and his personal style. Available literature supports this expectation – at least before the administration of Jimmy Carter. But, of course, recent presidents have been wise in the ways of Washington as a consequence of lengthy experience in the nation's capital. In fact, most have served in Congress. Among post-Second World War presidents, only Eisenhower before Carter lacked service on Capitol Hill (and Fred Greenstein now assures us that his political savvy was fine tuned).

Type
Research Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , July 1985 , pp. 269 - 298
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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References

1 Greenstein, Fred I., The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982).Google Scholar The other presidents had many years' experience as elected officials in Washington before serving: Truman, 10 years (Senate and Vice President); Kennedy, 14 years (House and Senate); Johnson, 24 years (House, Senate, Vice President); Nixon, 14 years (House, Senate, Vice President); and Ford, 24 years (House).

2 Much of the analysis herein is based on oral history sessions with President Carter's senior staff officials and their assistants at the White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 1981–84, a project directed by James Sterling Young. All quoted material not otherwise noted is drawn from the transcripts of these sessions. The transcripts for the project on the Carter presidency are not presently available to the wider scholarly community but will be made available in the future at the Carter presidential library.

3 All presidents publicly pronounce this goal but in fact practise politics. Carter truly intended to be different.

4 Carter, Jimmy, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982), p. 88 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

5 Carter, , Keeping Faith, p. 89.Google Scholar

6 The speech is reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 21 07 1979, pp. 1470–2.Google Scholar

7 The interview is in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 4 09 1976, pp. 2380–3.Google Scholar

8 This same aide observed a decline in Carter's confidence prior to the Camp David retreat – a discouraged president escaping problems rather than tackling them head on.

9 In her book, Rosalynn Carter confirms her husband's determination to ignore politics and her own effort to get him to consider political effects. See First Lady From Plains (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), pp. 164–5.Google Scholar

10 Davis, Eric L., ‘Legislative Liaison in the Carter Administration’, Political Science Quarterly, XCIV (1979), p. 301.Google Scholar See also his essay ‘Congressional Liaison: the People and the Institutions’ in King, Anthony, ed., Both Ends of the Avenue (Washington. D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), Chap. 3.Google Scholar

11 Bonafede, Dom, ‘Stuart Eizenstat – Carter's Right-Hand Man’, National Journal, 9 06 1979, p. 944.Google Scholar

12 Edwards, George C. III, Presidential Influence in Congress (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1980), p. 119.Google Scholar

13 Wayne, Stephen J., The Legislative Presidency (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 165–8.Google Scholar

14 See Davis, in King, , Both Ends of the Avenue, Chap. 3.Google Scholar

15 It should be noted that presidents differ even when they rely on a similar approach. Thus, for example, though Nixon and Carter were both ‘on call’, Carter was much more willing than Nixon to be used by his staff for contacting members of Congress. Given a list of members to call, he could dutifully go through the list, checking off each name as he made the contact.

16 For details see Abramson, Paul et al. , Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982), p. 142.Google Scholar

17 Bonafede, Dom, ‘Carter's Relationship with Congress – Making a Mountain out of a “Moorehill”’, National Journal, 26 03 1977, p. 456.Google Scholar

18 Carter, , Keeping Faith, p. 44 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

19 Carter, , Keeping Faith, p. 44.Google Scholar

20 See Bonafede, , ‘Carter's Relationships…’, National Journal 26 03 1977. p. 456Google Scholar; ‘Carter and Congress – It Seems that “If Something Can Go Wrong, It Will”’, National Journal, 12 11 1977, p. 1756Google Scholar; and ‘The Tough Job of Normalizing Relations with Capitol Hill’, National Journal, 13 01 1979, p. 54.Google Scholar

21 Bonafede, , ‘Carter's Relationships’, p. 456.Google Scholar

22 Bonafede, , ‘Carter and Congress’, p. 1756.Google Scholar

23 Bonafede, , ‘The Tough Job’, p. 57.Google Scholar

24 It is the case that Moore's daily contact with the president was often in the company of other White House staff with major interest in Congressional strategy, e.g., Jordan, Eizenstat, Powell.

25 See Jones, Charles O., ‘Presidential Negotiation with Congress’Google Scholar, in King, , ed., Both Ends of the Avenue, Chap. 4.Google Scholar

26 This section profits from interviews with personnel from this unit conducted by Stephen J. Wayne, George Washington University. I am much indebted to Professor Wayne for permitting me to listen to his taped conversations.