Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dlnhk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-01T09:14:25.359Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Arms Races: External Security or Domestic Pressure?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Willem Saris  and
Cees Middendorp
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Arms races have been the subject of many and various explanations, but of few formal theories which manage to combine the virtues of plausibility and parsimony. Perhaps the best known is Richardson's, to which interesting modifications have been proposed by Smoker, Saaty and most recently Hamblin et al.2 Common to all these models is the assumption that arms races can be explained by an action-reaction process between the two nations involved.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , January 1980 , pp. 121 - 128
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1980

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Richardson, Lewis F., ‘Generalised Foreign Politics’, British Journal of Psychology Monograph Supplement, XXIII (1939)Google Scholar; and Arms and Security: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War, edited by Rashevsky, N. and Truco, E. (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960).Google Scholar

2 See Smoker, P., ‘Trade, Defense and the Richardson Theory of Arms Races: A Seven Nation Study, Journal of Peace Research, II (1965), 161–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Saaty, Thomas L., Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Wiley, 1968)Google Scholar; and Hamblin, R. L., Hout, M., Miller, J. L. L. and Pitcher, B. L., ‘Arms Races: A Test of Two Models’, American Sociological Review, XLII (1977), 338–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For models containing more variables and more complex equations, see Lambelet, J. C. and Luterbacher, Urs, ‘Dynamics of Arms Races: Mutual Simulations Versus Self-Simulation’ (paper presented to the International Political Science Association Conference in Edinburgh, 1976)Google Scholar; and Wallace, M. D., ‘Arms Races, Domestic Pressures and Alliances: Some Preliminary Curve Fitting’ (paper presented at the International Political Science Conference in Edinburgh, 1976).Google Scholar

3 See Singer, Burton and Spilerman, Seymour, ‘The Representation of Social Processes by Markov Models’, American Journal of Sociology, LXXXII (1976), 1–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 See Stevens, S. S., ‘On the Psychophysical Law’, Psychological Review, LXIV (1957), 153–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See Ekman, G., ‘Quantitative Approaches to Psychological Problems’ in Lindblom, P., ed., Theory and Methods in Behavioural Science (Stockholm: Scandinavia University Books, 1970).Google Scholar

6 McNamara, Robert S., ‘Military Posture Statement’, Documents on Disarmament (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 257.Google Scholar

7 See Bothwell, F. E., ‘Is the ICBM Obsolete?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xxv, 8 (1969), 21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Khrushchev, Nikita, Khrushchev Remembers (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), p. 591.Google Scholar

9 See Bothwell, , ‘Is the ICBM Obsolete?’.Google Scholar

10 Similar exponential relationships have been used in Meadows, Donella H., The Limits of Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972)Google Scholar and Hamblin, et al. , ‘Arms Races: A Test of Two Models’.Google Scholar

11 See Leurdijk, J. H., Wedloop in Kernbewapening (The Hague: Nederlands Instituut voor Vredesvraagstukken, 1972).Google Scholar

12 A similar rationale can be found in Boskma, P., ‘Verde en onveiligheid’, Intermediair, XVI (1978), 57–63.Google Scholar

13 Reported in Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (1961), 179–82.Google Scholar

14 See Hamblin, et al. , ‘Arms Races: A Test of Two Models’.Google Scholar