1 See Kircher's autobiography in the appendix of Hieronymus Ambrosius Langenmantel, Fasciculus epistolarum, Augsburg, 1684, appendix, pp. 32–33.

2 The theatricality of Kircher's work has, of course, received some attention already. See especially Findlen, Paula, ‘Scientific spectacle in Baroque Rome’, Roma Moderna e Contemporanea (1995) 3, pp. 625–665Google Scholar; Vermeir, Koen, ‘Athanasius Kircher's magical instruments’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2007) 38, pp. 363–400CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and two contributions in a special issue of metaphorik.de by Schock, Flemming et al. (eds.), Dimensionen der Theatrum-Metapher in der Frühen Neuzeit. Ordnung und Repräsentation von Wissen, metaphorik.de (2008)Google Scholar 14. For different aspects of Kircher's work see Findlen, Paula (ed.), Athanasius Kircher: The Last Man Who Knew Everything, London: Routledge, 2004Google Scholar.

3 For references, see the Introduction to this issue.

4 The assumed ‘secret’ of many esoteric societies often turns out to be banal or empty when exposed. Instead, it is the dynamics of secrecy that makes an esoteric society function. See, for example, Shaul Shaked‚ ‘Two types of esotericism’, in Jan Assmann and Aleida Assmann (eds.), Schleier und Schwelle, Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1997, Band 1, pp. 221–234; see also the references in the Introduction to this special issue.

5 On secrets of nature see Eamon, William, Science and the Secrets of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996Google Scholar. Hadot, Pierre, Le voile d'Isis, Paris: Gallimard, 2004Google Scholar.

6 This complex interaction between the norms and practices of science, combined with their historical variation, is the subject of the kind of historical analysis that Lorraine Daston has called ‘historical epistemology’. See Daston's commentary at the What (Good) Is Historical Epistemology conference, MPIWG, Berlin, 2007. The current paper might be read as a prolegomenon to a historical epistemology of secrecy.

7 For an exposition of this theme see Bellman, Beryl, ‘The paradox of secrecy’, Human Studies (1981) 4, pp. 1–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Kircher, Athanasius, Oedipus Aegyptiacus, 3 vols., Rome, 1652–1655Google Scholar, vol. 3, p. 590, and vol. 1, p. 212. See Nick Wilding, ‘“If you have a secret, either keep it, or reveal it”: cryptography and universal language’, in Daniel Stolzenberg (ed.), The Great Art of Knowing, Stanford: Stanford University Libraries, 2001, pp. 93–103. Harpocrates (or Sigalion) was well known in ancient as well as modern times as the god of silence and secrecy; see, for a selection of references, Civardi, Jean-Marc, ‘Annexe 2, Textes divers autour de l'oeuvre’, Dix-septième siècle (2008) 238, pp. 118–153CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a fascinating but unexplored early modern treatise on different kinds of silence and secrecy see Caramuel, Juan, Sigalion, Latine Harpocrates, Silentii Genius, Vigevano, 1679Google Scholar.

9 This is a dynamic perceptible, for instance, in McMullin's and Hull's essays in the special issue of Science, Technology and Human Values (1985) 10. One of the definitions in the OED characterizes secrecy as not openly avowed or expressed. Interestingly, openness is then characterized as lack of secrecy, which is circular.

10 Davids, Karel, ‘Craft secrecy in Europe in the early modern period: a comparative view’, Early Science and Medicine (2005) 10, pp. 341–348CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Bok, Sissela, Secrets, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

12 Long, Pamela, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001Google Scholar, pp. 7 and 5 respectively.

13 Bok, op. cit. (11), p. 5, takes a rather strong view in suggesting that a secret may be known to all but one or two from whom it is kept. Should we not characterize such a secret as rather open?

14 Guicciardini, Niccolò, Isaac Newton on Mathematical Certainty and Method, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2009CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Snobelen, Stephen, ‘Isaac Newton, heretic: the strategies of a Nicodemite’, BJHS (1999) 32, pp. 381–419CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Isaac Newton to Henry Oldenburg, 26 October 1676, in Herbert Turnbull et al. (eds.), The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, 7 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959–1977, vol. 2, p. 163.

16 In these cases, it becomes clear that Newton's intention is very important for deciding whether he is secretive or not.

17 See the analysis of Newton's ‘scribal publication’ in Guicciardini, op. cit. (14), p. 348. For the early modern politics of control and accessibility of information see Griffiths, Paul, ‘Secrecy and authority in late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century London’, Historical Journal (1997) 40, pp. 925–951CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 For an exploration of this matter see Biagioli's article in this issue.

19 If secrecy is treated as a privation of openness, it is often presumed that openness is the default mode. This is obviously different from treating openness as a privation, which presumes secrecy as the default. This difference is reflected in a recent statement by Reporters Without Borders on US Attorney General Eric Holder's new guidelines on the Freedom of Information Act: ‘The Bush era presumption was that information should be kept secret and the burden was put on the person making a request for it to be revealed to prove otherwise. In the future it should be the principles of openness and transparency that prevail.’ See http://arabia.reporters-sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=30643.

20 Freud, however, would see some kinds of forgetfulness as the result of an internal censor. See Galison in this issue for an exploration of this theme.

21 It seems that Long defines secrecy positively as intentional concealment, while openness is characterized as a lack of restrictiveness. But, given that Long follows Bok, who interprets intentional concealment as the intentional lack of the circulation of information, also secrecy is a privative notion. Both openness and secrecy seem therefore to be defined negatively, as the lack of something else. Luckily, openness and secrecy are not exactly defined as the lack of each other, which would be circular.

22 Consider an intelligent person. She would be free to develop herself intellectually in the negative sense of freedom if no one restricts her access to education and if no one compels her to do other things. She would be free to develop herself intellectually in the positive sense of freedom if the possibility conditions to realize her potential are there, i.e. there are good educational institutions and she has the means to support herself while studying.

23 See Berlin, Isaiah, ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in idem, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969Google Scholar. Einstein believed that academic freedom morally entailed openness: ‘By academic freedom I understand the right to search for the truth and to publish and teach what one holds to be true. This right also implies a duty; one must not conceal any part of what one has recognised to be true. It is evident that any restriction of academic freedom serves to restrain the dissemination of knowledge, thereby impeding rational judgment and action.’ This quotation attributed to Albert Einstein is inscribed on his statute in front of the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.

24 Today, texts can be placed on the Internet, but even there they might go unread if they are not publicized in the right way. Interestingly, even modern information overload might be a form of secrecy. This is what agnotology – a strategy of disinformation – is about: adding large amounts of trivial, inconclusive or false data might hamper access to the available real and important information. This was, for instance, the strategy of the cigarette industry, when they sponsored and published enormous amounts of pseudoscience with the intention to obliterate the real scientific findings. Here, intentions seem to be crucial in establishing whether adding information is a form of openness or of secrecy. For agnotology see Proctor, Robert and Schiebinger, Londa (eds.), Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008Google Scholar.

25 For a positive concept of secrecy, we need to have a proper means of hiding something and keeping the secret. Anticipating the next section of this article, confounding openness and secrecy, we can go further and claim that for a positive concept of secrecy, we also need channels to promote the secret so that the right people know about it.

26 In a letter to his publisher, Kircher states that his Jesuit network distributed his books over the whole world (including Africa and the Americas) and indicates the number of copies for the different countries. Kircher to Joannes Jansson van Waesberghe, s.l., s.d. (draft), Archivio della Pontificia Università Gregoriana (APUG) 561, f. 079r, ID 1428.

27 Almost inaccessible publications constitute only a very limited form of openness. Intentionally restricting access to your work (because of high expense of access) is a form of secrecy (an esoteric form of elitism). Both can go together. Again, intentions will be crucial to distinguish limited openness from a strategy of secrecy.

28 Kohlhans, Johann Christoph, Neu erfundene Mathematische und Optische Curiositäten, Leipzig: Friederich Lankisch, 1677, pp. 317–320Google Scholar.

29 Kohlhans, op. cit. (28).

30 There are many examples, also today. As everyone who has read detective stories knows, the best secret is kept out in the open – it is just not recognized as relevant or as a secret. Another example in which openness and secrecy are combined in an interesting way today is ‘product placement’. In this subtle form of advertising, a company pays trendy people to show and use their products in public places or media. To understand this phenomenon, it is important to see that there is an intentional attempt at showing the product as publicly as possible, while at the same time secrecy and deception (intentional concealment of the underlying goals) are essential to the phenomenon.

31 On the one hand, one could argue that this is an example only of a partial mix of openness and secrecy, because the material and information levels can be conceptually distinguished. On the other hand, if it is true that the message and the material bearer can never be fully separated conceptually, this is also a real mixture of openness and secrecy.

32 Imagine, however, that the coded book was printed and publicly available, while the code was distributed separately to a limited number of recipients. In this case, one can say that the information is kept secret within a small group, even if the book and the material circulation of the text would be considered public. This situation also compares to the Kohlhans case, in which he tries to encode his message by using foreign languages that are difficult to access.

33 Reeds, Jim, ‘Solved: the ciphers in Book III of Trithemius's Steganographia’, Cryptologia (1998) 22, pp. 291–317CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 It was a standard remark in esoteric traditions that only the worthy would find out the secrets carefully veiled in esoteric texts. Difficult mathematical challenges are another example of elite secrecy. It was common in the early modern period to publicize only a mathematical problem, while the solution was carefully guarded by the challenger. Only the best practitioners were able to discover the secret or ‘crack the code’. This shared ability to reach the same secret often constituted tight social ties – of friendship or of rivalry. In natural philosophy, we find a similar dynamic at work: nature was conceived of as a book, written in a code that only the elite would be able to break. The idea of mathematics and natural philosophy as elite practices that allowed access to ‘secrets’ was common but controversial in the early modern period. Boyle, amongst others, strongly condemned this kind of elitist secrecy. Leibniz, for his part, wrote about the arcana rerum, the secret of things, when discussing the obscure relation between mind and body, stating that this secret could only be penetrated by a few, the most thorough thinkers.

35 See note 17 above. See also Love, Harold, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 Snobelen, op. cit. (14), pp. 412–415. Also Newton's authorship of the optics and some mathematical works, which did not mention his name and were published by his disciples, can be considered an open secret. Quite often, the authorship of anonymous publications was quickly found out, but the fact that their name did not figure on the title page could offer legal and social protection.

37 Examples today may be the liaison of a famous politician, a scandal someone in the company is involved in, the sexual orientation of a public figure, religious views in a context of persecution, that the police force is involved in the drugs trade, or the identity of Santa Claus for children.

38 Its aspect of being a ‘secret’ only disappears when the fact is publicly recognized by those implicated (or when the fact itself disappears). For instance, a liaison between a famous politician and an actress stops being a public secret if they publicly recognize this relationship.

39 An interesting case today is Wikileaks, where, although the secrets are out, government employees are not allowed to refer to them.

40 In French, for instance, ‘secrecy’ relates to a whole lexical field, such as discrétion, silence, cacher, dissimulation, receler, voiler and masquer, and ‘openness’ corresponds best to faire public. In German, ‘secrecy’ comes close to Geheimhaltung and ‘openness’ to Öffentlichkeit, although Öffentlichkeit has more a connotation of public opinion or the public sphere.

41 Newton might think he is publicizing his mathematical results while his competitors still accuse him of secrecy, for instance, because in his publications he still kept certain techniques hidden. This is even clearer in the case of his religious beliefs: while Newton thought he followed the religious injunction not to ‘hide one's light under a bushel’, William Whiston is shocked that Newton does not more freely declare his faith.

42 Assmann and Assmann, op. cit. (4), p. 13. Note also that Petrarch called his book on spiritual exercises ‘the secret’.

43 Michael Giesecke, ‘Den “brauch gemein machen”. Die typographische Erfassung der Unfreien Künste’, in Assmann and Assmann, op. cit. (4), p. 291–311. Eisenstein, Elizabeth, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979Google Scholar. Eamon, op. cit. (5), Chapter 3.

44 Snyder, Jon, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 Eamon, op. cit. (5), Chapter 8.

46 Aleida Assmann, ‘Der Dichtung Schleier aus der Hand der Wahrheit. Esoterische Dichtungstheorien in der Neuzeit’, in Assmann and Assmann, op. cit. (4), pp. 263–280. Hadot, op. cit. (5).

47 Kircher, op. cit. (8), vol. 1, p. 191.

48 These are all types of secrecy that are more general and can be found in different periods. The theatricality of secrecy, in a different mode, can also be perceived in present-day scientific practice, for instance. Every scientific expression is characterized by some kind of hiding and revealing, is set in a certain mode of (‘theatrical’) presentation and uses symbolical representations, and can be analysed with appropriate historiographical tools. For an example see Hilgartner's article in this issue.

49 For the classical view see Vickers, Brian (ed.), Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eamon, William, ‘From the secrets of Nature to public knowledge’, Minerva (1985) 23, pp. 321–347CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Betty Dobbs, ‘From the secrecy of alchemy to the openness of chemistry’, in Tore Frängsmyr (ed.), Solomon's House Revisited, Canton: Science History Publications, 1990, pp. 75–94; David, Paul, ‘The historical origins of “open science”’, Capitalism and Society (2008) 3(2)Google Scholar, article 5.

50 William Newman, ‘Alchemical symbolism and concealment’, in Peter Galison and Emily Thompson (eds.), The Architecture of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 59–77.

51 Jan Golinski, ‘Chemistry in the Scientific Revolution,’ in David Lindberg and Robert Westman (eds.), Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 367–396; Principe, Larry, ‘Robert Boyle's alchemical secrecy’, Ambix (1992) 39, pp. 63–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 Agrippa Von Nettesheim, ‘Letter to Aurelio Acquapendente, September 1527’, in idem, Opera, vol. 2, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1970, pp. 874–875.

53 Long, op. cit. (12), p. 144; see also pp. 174 and 246.

54 Esoteric (versus exoteric) traditions are not the same as ‘esotericism’. As a concept for a current of thought, ‘esotericism’ was only introduced in the nineteenth century, and is not applicable for the early modern period.

55 This was not an idle worry. In fact, this debasement seems to have actually occurred with the wonders presented at the Royal Society, leading to a coup by the mathematically minded natural philosophers. See Shapin, Steven, ‘Robert Boyle and mathematics: reality, representation, and experimental practice’, Science in Context (1988) 2, pp. 23–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moti Feingold, ‘Mathematicians and naturalists: Sir Isaac Newton and the Royal Society’, in Jed Buchwald and I. B. Cohen (eds.), Isaac Newton's Natural Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 77–102.

56 Note furthermore that early modern mathematicians believed that ancient mathematicians followed esoteric methods and practices. Descartes wrote, ‘Nous remarquons assez que les anciens géomètres ont fait usage d'une sorte d'analyse qu'ils étendaient à la résolution de tous les problèmes, bien qu'ils l'aient jalousement cachée à leur postérité.’ René Descartes, Regulae, IV, in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 12 vols., Paris: Cerf, 1897–1910, vol. 10, p. 375. Early modern mathematicians often followed this tradition. The technical nature of mathematics was a way to define and guard the boundaries of a discipline, not completely unlike the boundary work of a secret society.

57 See also Hebrews 5:12–14. Augustine, Confessions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998Google Scholar, Chapter 18. idem, Tractates on the Gospel of John (tr. John Rettig), Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1994, Tractate 98. For a discussion of Augustine see Stroumsa, Guy, Hidden Wisdom: Esoteric Traditions and the Roots of Christian Mysticism, Leiden: Brill, 2005Google Scholar, esp. Chapter 8. For Newton see Snobelen, op. cit. (14).

58 In some cases, secret societies develop with their own specific dynamics built around secrecy. See Simmel, Georg, ‘The sociology of secrecy and of secret societies’, American Journal of Sociology (1906) 11, pp. 441–498CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59 Eamon, op. cit. (5), p. 3.

60 Golinski, Jan, ‘A noble spectacle: phosphorus and the public cultures of science in the early Royal Society’, Isis (1989) 80, pp. 11–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61 Alewyn, Richard and Sälzle, Karl, Das grosse Welttheater, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1959, p. 48Google Scholar, translation mine.

62 Jon Snyder, op. cit. (44), has argued that, from the sixteenth century, dissimulation (as distinct from simulation) became a virtue in an absolutist society.

63 See, for example, Cavallo, Joann, ‘Joking matters: politics and dissimulation in Castiglione's Book of the Courtier’, Renaissance Quarterly (2000) 53, pp. 402–424CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mark Franko elaborates a concept he describes as ‘opaque self-transparency’ in his analysis of the performance of ‘self’ in relation to social and political power encoded in the practices of the French baroque ballet de cour, in Dance as Text: Ideologies of the Baroque Body, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

64 See note 14 above.

65 Zagorin, Perez, Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The last chapters on occultism and libertinism would be the most interesting for our current purposes, if Zagorin had not reduced very different kinds of secrecy to ‘dissimulation’. See also Hallyn, Fernand, Descartes: Dissimulation et ironie, Genève: Droz, 2006Google Scholar, for dissimulation in the works of Descartes.

66 Pascal Colasse, ‘Ballet de Sigalion Dieu du secret, dansé aux Jésuites l'an 1689’, in Philidor Laisné (ed.), Les Ballets Des Iesuistes Composé par Messieurs Beauchant, Desmatins et Collasse, s.l., 1690, pp. 167–189. For the critical review, also attacking the probabilism of the Jesuits, see Les Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques (BnF, Ms. fr. 23499, ff. 294–295), reprinted, with another contemporary description of the ballet, in Civardi, op. cit. (8).

67 This transformation is, of course, not linear and needs to be studied in detail. The – often misogynous – discussion of women's affairs by male medical writers and philosophers seems to have changed from a focus on recipes and knowledge about generation in the Secretis Mulierum tradition into a broader discussion of women's outward appearances and national dresses (e.g. Jost Amman, Gynaeceum, sive theatrum mulierum, 1586) and (often satiric) misogynistic comments about ‘evil women’ and the recipes and tricks they use (s.n., Theatrum Malorum Mulierum, ca. 1700). About women's secrets see Park, Katharine, Secrets of Women, New York: Zone Books, 2006Google Scholar; Green, Monica, ‘Secrets of women’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies (2000) 30, pp. 5–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68 See the essays in Schock et al., op. cit. (2).

69 Kircher sometimes exposed tricks, but he defrauded too, for specific and very diverse local and contextual reasons. See, for example, the interesting account in Hankins, Thomas and Silverman, Robert, Instruments and the Imagination, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995Google Scholar.

70 Roberval's colleague, René-François de Sluse, complained that this cast a suspicion of plagiarism on anyone who came up with a solution to a problem, because a competitor who had not openly disclosed his results might always claim priority.

71 Descotes, Dominique, Blaise Pascal: Littérature et géométrie, Clermont-Ferrand: Presses universitaires Blaise Pascal, 2001, pp. 27–33Google Scholar.

72 Descotes, op. cit. (71). pp. 85, 111.

73 Augustine cited in Stroumsa, op. cit. (57), p. 143.

74 ‘L'Esprit de secte et l'ambition de celuy qui pretend de s'ériger en chef de parti fait grand tort à la verité et aux progrès des sciences. Un auteur qui a cette vanité en teste tache de rendre les autres meprisables, il cherche à faire paroistre leur defauts; il supprime ce qu'ils ont dit de bon et tache de se l'attribuer sous un habit deguisé’. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, in C.I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften, 7 vols., Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1875–1890, vol. 4, p. 304. For more on Descartes's practices of secrecy see Michel Serfati and Dominique Descotes (eds.), Mathématiciens français du XVIIe siècle, Clermont-Ferrand: Presses universitaires Blaise Pascal, 2008, p. 18; and Hallyn, op. cit. (65).

75 Leibniz, op. cit. (74), p. 320.

76 Eamon, op. cit. (5), Chapter 7 and p. 227; Gentilcore, David, Medical Charlatanism in Early Modern Italy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006Google Scholar.

77 On the interaction between theatre studies and the history of science project see the project and book series Theatrum Scientiarum.

78 Vermeir, op. cit. (2).

79 For Ashmole see Newman, Wiliam and Grafton, Anthony (eds.), Secrets of Nature, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, p. 21Google Scholar. For Bacon see Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon (ed. J. von Spedding, R.J. Ellis, D.D. Heath), 14 vols., Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1857–1874, vol. 3, p. 289.

80 Conti, Natale, Natalis Comitis Mythologiae, Venice, 1581, p. 1Google Scholar, ‘omnia philosophiae dogmata non apertè, sed obscurè sub quibusdam integumentis traderentur’.

81 Lewis, Rhodri, ‘Francis Bacon, allegory and the uses of myth’, Review of English Studies (2010) 61, pp. 360–389CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 Bacon, op. cit. (79), vol. 4, pp. 316–317; for the Latin variant see idem, op. cit. (79), vol. 1, p. 520.

83 Bacon, op. cit. (79).

84 Henri Reynolds, Mythomystes, London, 1632, passim, for example p. 62.

85 Newton, for his part, believed that the Mosaic tradition was transmitted to the Egyptians, but they corrupted it by mixing it with polytheism, the Kabbala and gnosticism.

86 Sprat, Thomas, The History of the Royal Society, London, 1667, p. 414Google Scholar.

87 See references in note 55 above.

88 Ayres, Philip, Mythologia Ethica, London, 1689Google Scholar; Hooke, Robert, The Posthumous Works of Robert Hooke, London, 1705, pp. 377, 426Google Scholar.

89 Bacon, op. cit. (79), vol. 4, p. 20

90 Findlen, Paula, ‘Jokes of Nature and jokes of knowledge’, Renaissance Quarterly (1990) 43, pp. 292–331Google Scholar.

91 Nieremberg, Juan Eusebio, Sigalion sive de sapientia mythica in Stromata Sacrae Scripturae, Lyon, 1642, pp. 457–549Google Scholar. For the passage on Echo see p. 539.

92 For the relation between emblems, symbolism and various forms of secrecy see e.g. Claude François Ménestrier's work on a ‘philosophy of images’ (especially his La Philosophie des images enigmatiques, Lyon, 1694) and Silvester Pietrasancta, De Symbolis Heroicis Libri IX., Antwerpen: Plantijn-Moretus, 1634 (esp. book 4: ‘De Notis Clandestinis’).

93 See Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986CrossRefGoogle Scholar, vol. 1, p. 8, for ‘diffuse power’.

94 Peter von Moos, ‘“Herzensgeheimnisse” (occulta cordis). Selbstbewahrung und Selbstentblößung im Mittelalter’, in Assmann and Assmann, op. cit. (4), vol. 1, p. 89–110.

95 Kant, Immanuel, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, vol. 6, Berlin: Akademieausgabe, 1907, pp. 137–138Google Scholar.