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‘Never a credible weapon’: nuclear cultures in British government during the era of the H-bomb

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2013

RICHARD MAGUIRE
RICHARD MAGUIRE*
Affiliation:
School of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ. Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

This article explores British ‘nuclear culture’ by examining how individuals and groups within British government tried to comprehend nuclear weapons after the advent of the hydrogen bomb in 1952. It argues that thinking about nuclear weaponry was not uniform, and there was no monolithic ‘nuclear culture’ in government. Instead, political and social habits interacted with Cold War experience to create views of the nuclear weapon – nuclear cultures – that varied across government to create a diverse, and shifting, set of ideas – nuclear cultures – about what the nuclear weapon meant in British hands, and the role it played in providing military power and political influence.

Type
Research Article
Information
The British Journal for the History of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 4: Special Issue: British Nuclear Culture , December 2012 , pp. 519 - 533
Copyright
Copyright © British Society for the History of Science 2013

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