“To propose to man no more than what is human, Aristotle remarked, is to betray man, to will his unhappiness, for by the principal part of himself, the spirit, he is called to something greater than a merely human life. On this principle, if not on the manner of its application, Ramanuja and Epictetus, Nietzsche and St. John of the Cross are all agreed” (p. 10). Is the remark humanist or anti-humanist? Humanism, like so many other good things, is sometimes looked at askance by pious people because of the associations or the expressions it has wrongly or at least accidentally acquired. The Renaissance humanism, anthropocentric as M. Maritain here calls it, was or became an enemy of humanism as Aristotle, as the Christian, understand it, because it in fact reduced the potentialities and in consequence the possible fulfilment of man to the narrowly human. It was a partial humanism, a half-truth. Against this the Christian sets up the ideal of a humanism which is integral and theocentric, and integral because theocentric, the boundary of the perfection at which it aims being nothing less than the sharing in the life of God, including within this the human life of body and spirit in the world of men. “Let us say that humanism . . . tends essentially to make man more truly human, to manifest his original grandeur by making him a sharer in whatever may enrich the personality in Nature and in history. ...