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The Future of Offensive War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 October 2024
Extract
When two societies which are only materially distinct from each other come into collision neither is to be sacrificed to placate the other, but the interests of each are to be catered for in a rigidly fair manner.
This principle is based on the fact that these two societies are of equal standing, enjoy therefore identical rights and have neither of them any legal advantage over the other; neither in fact is obliged to waive any of its rights in favour of the other. On this account a balance in no way derogatory to either must be struck as accurately as is possible between the conflicting rights; for example, by dividing up the disputed matter (granted it is divisible) or by making compensation. At times indeed the right claimed on one side may be a putative one only, and that on the other side clearly unimpeachable (objective); or at least one rather than the other may have a greater interest at stake or stronger grounds on which to quarrel. But even in situations such as these, peaceful methods of settling the issue must take precedence over all others.
First of all, therefore, every effort should be made to establish the existence of whatever right is being claimed; then an attempt should be made to compose differences amicably; finally, should this fail, war must not be declared without first trying out certain coercive measures which, though of less consequence than war, may be equally effective in the circumstances.
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- Copyright © 1949 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
Footnotes
Adapted from Institutiones Juris Publici Ecclesiastici, Val. 1 (Jus Publicum Internum) Pars I, Titulus iii. art. 3 (Relationes societatum perfectarum in statu conflictus) Principium 2.—Vatican, Polyglot. 3rd Edition (1947) pp. 149–55.
References
The principles and discussion in this text‐book (which was welcomed at its first appearance in 1936 by Cardinal Pacelli himself) are naturally intended for students of law. But this section has already received wide publicity and interest in Ger many and it is thought preferable to give as near a translation as possible, rather than mere comment, for readers to consider. Naturally it must be remembered that this is only one section in a text‐book and that cousequently in order to put it in article form it has had to be adapted. It does however fairly represent the views of Mgr Ottaviani.
2 ‘Society’ in this context means a society which is at once specifically one and numerically many; for states ‐which are many in that They are quite distinct entities, nevertheless may be considered one in that all alike pursue the same specific end, viz., a Temporal well‐being which will leave nothing to be desired. Such societies are only materially distinct when they concern groups which are of equal standing and are divided by locality, ram. etc. Mgr Ottaviani has already explained this distinction earlier in his treatise.—ED.
3 The more so because war, the greatest coercive measure possible, may be out of proportion to the import of the question. These lesser measures are: reprisals, a peaceful blockade, seizure of ships, occupation of territory! threats in the form of an ultimatum.
4 Hence a moral or subjective obligation of trying out these measures, wag recognised. cfr. Laurent, Etude sur l'histoire de l'humanité, t. xi. There has been a celebrated instance of papal mediation, that of Leo XIII in the Hispano‐German dispute over the Caroline Islands. Schioppa. L'arbitrato Pontificio, 1887.
5 A war was not really justifiable unless it were just internally and externally: internally in so far as there was at least a subjective cause to justify it; externally in that all the provisions of the jus gentium covering resort to war had been observed. We know only too well what scant attention has been paid to this second detail at the outbreak of recent wars, even though the obligations imposed by the jus gentium had been reinfoiced by obligations previously undertaken in treaties.
In this century many nations have of their own accord agreed among themselves to use peaceful means only, in the event of disputes. The pacts drawn up to this effect have been filed by the League of Nations. cfr. for example, League of Nations Recueil des Traités, etc., vol. 134, nn. 3081, 3097; vol. 136, nn. 3125, 3137, etc.
6 The enforced conscription common today does civilians a very grave harm; whereas in former times those who took up arms, and they did so voluntarily, received payment.
7 Even then, long before the colossal iniquities perpetrated in twentieth‐century warfare, the tendencies and effects of obligatory conscription and warfare were described by the Fathers as follows: ‘The condition of the world has become wholly intolerable at present, so huge are the armies whether standing or conscript. Nations groan under the expense of their upkeep; the spirit, of infidelity to obligations, and the tendency to ignore the force of law when international interests are in question, give greater opportunities than ever for illegal and unjust war—or rather a greater opportunity for spreading carnage of the most deplorable sort far and wide. As a result the maintenance of the poverty‐stricken is threatened, commercial intercourse is frustrated, the very conscience of men has become grievously blunted or at least ignobly debased, and a vast number of souls are perishing…’ Acta et Decreta Sacr. Oecumenici Concilii Vaticani, vol. VII. Collectio Lacensis, Vol. 861–866, (Herder, Friburg‐im‐Breisgau, 1890.).
8 All the more so because on account of general conscription and the obligation of organising internal defence and resistance imposed in time of war on all citizens, belligerents are no longer willing to distinguish between soldier and civilian; they are inclined therefore to treat all—indiscriminately—as combatants.
9 ‘From a historical point of view war is not so much an instrument of justice as a great practical violation of charity. Today we must needs have the courage to consider carefully the latest methods of war; for the conditions which theology requires to justify a war no longer apply’. Cordovani. Il Santificatore. Rome 1939. p. 490 sq.
10 ‘The wise man is forced to wage wars that are just, because of the wrong‐doing of some other man; and this wrong‐doing should ever be a source of Sorrow to man, (because of its human origin) even when it does not actually make war necessary. Let anyone, then, who is moved to sorrow when he considers how great, how deplorable, how ruthless are all these evils of war, acknowledge the wretchedness he feels. If, however, he endures or contemplates them without any anguish of mind, then his wretchedness is all the greater for thinking himself on a par with the divine because he no longer manifests the feeling natural to a man’. St Augustine. The City of God. Bk. XIX. 7. Cordovani, Il Sanctificatore, Rome, 1939, p. 490 has the following: ‘The winning of a war is no compensation whatever today for the damage incurred in waging it’.
11 De Officiis. I. XI. He did however think that war was allowable: ‘If it be not possible to avail of the former (discussion), then recourse is to be had to the latter (force)…. In my opinion, at least, we should strive always to secure a peace that shall not contain anything of guile’. (ibid.).
12 All these matters are treated in the allocutions of his Holiness Pope Pius XII over the radio during the years 1939–1944.
13 ‘Each citizen has as much right as the people as a whole to be informed whether anyone is with impunity working the downfall (of the nation); all citizens indeed have the right to rebel when the intrigues of their government, presage intolerable miseries. Enforced misery, civil corruption which will undermine the foundations of the state, anarchy which oppresses in the name of liberty, tyranny which for the sake of unbridled ambition violates every law and disrupts the even tenor of life—all these (provided the action will benefit the nation and mankind) are grounds which make a revolution lawful and justifiable’. N. Cordovani, Diritti e doveri sociali secondo St Tommaso, Roma, 1939, p. 18.