There is an inherent conflict between the political marketing model of humans and pioneering theories in electoral behavior research. While political marketing logic implies an issue-based and highly volatile voting behavior, voting theories conventionally assume that positional issues have little effect on how individuals vote, and so parties have little incentive to develop issue-based electoral strategies. However, few people would challenge the role that marketing now plays in the modern campaign process. How can we reconcile these theories? This paper revisits the role and impact of positional issues on voting behavior by testing whether specific issues affect different subgroups of voters as contended by the ‘issue-public’ theory. The results show that previous models underestimate issue voting. Once measurement accuracy is improved and the salience-based heterogeneity of issue effects is taken into consideration, positional issues have non-negligible effects on individual vote choice. Furthermore, salience-based heterogeneity is shown to explain better the variation in issue voting than heterogeneity based on political sophistication.

Few Americans demand that their local policy-makers take action to address the effects of large earthquakes, even in ‘high-risk’ areas. This poses an important political problem. If policy-makers do not perceive a mandate to prepare for catastrophe, certain areas of the country may be vulnerable to loss of life and economic productivity. Why do Americans not demand more from their policy-makers? We propose a simple answer – many Americans do not accurately appraise the likelihood that they will experience a major earthquake. In a unique survey of West Coast adults, we compared respondents’ perceived likelihood of experiencing a major earthquake to their actual geocoded hazard. We uncover a wide disconnect between actual and perceived earthquake hazard, even in areas where earthquakes are comparatively more common. Critically, and in contrast to previous public policy research, we show that threats in the physical environment can shape policy opinion, but only under certain circumstances. We show that accurate appraisals of hazard significantly increase the likelihood that respondents will support preventative local policy measures. Our results shed new light on the opinion dynamics of public attitudes toward natural disasters and ameliorative policy efforts and highlight the policy importance of communicating earthquake hazard to at-risk constituencies.

This paper highlights factors that need to be considered for improving the National Flood Insurance Program in the USA to address the biases that lead individuals to not protect themselves against low-probability, high-consequence flood events. The errors that individuals exhibit in deciding not to purchase insurance or invest in loss reduction measures prior to a disaster can be traced to the effects of six biases: myopia, amnesia, optimism, inertia, simplification and herding. Along with two guiding principles for insurance, a behavioral risk audit can assist in designing a strategy using concepts from choice architecture coupled with economic incentives to encourage property owners in hazard-prone areas to purchase insurance and invest in cost-effective adaptation measures to protect themselves against future disaster losses.

Four experiments examine how lack of awareness of inequality affect behaviour towards the rich and poor. In Experiment 1, participants who became aware that wealthy individuals donated a smaller percentage of their income switched from rewarding the wealthy to rewarding the poor. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants who played a public goods game – and were assigned incomes reflective of the US income distribution either at random or on merit – punished the poor (for small absolute contributions) and rewarded the rich (for large absolute contributions) when incomes were unknown; when incomes were revealed, participants punished the rich (for their low percentage of income contributed) and rewarded the poor (for their high percentage of income contributed). In Experiment 4, participants provided with public education contributions for five New York school districts levied additional taxes on mostly poorer school districts when incomes were unknown, but targeted wealthier districts when incomes were revealed. These results shed light on how income transparency shapes preferences for equity and redistribution. We discuss implications for policy-makers.

We asked individuals about their willingness to pay (WTP) either: (1) for a mandate requiring restaurants to post calorie information on their menus; or (2) to avoid such a mandate. On average, more people were in in favor of the mandate and were willing to pay four times more than those who were against it, thereby leading to a Kaldor–Hicks improvement from this policy. To ensure robustness, we tested the impact of providing three types of information during individuals’ WTP determinations: (1) visual examples of the proposed calorie labels; (2) data on their effectiveness at the individual level; and (3) data on their wider social and economic benefits. For those in favor, providing a simple visual of the label had no impact on WTP. Data on the individual effectiveness of the labels increased the WTP, while evidence on broader obesity reduction and economic benefits reduced it. For opponents, WTP did not change with provision of additional information except when provided with information on social and economic benefits. Under this condition, the opponents increased their WTP 12-fold to avoid a mandate of this policy. Finally, we measured individual well-being under this policy and found directionally similar results, confirming a net improvement in aggregate welfare. Our results suggest that messaging that focuses on private benefits (providing calorie information so that individuals can effectively choose to reduce excessive caloric consumption) rather than wider public benefits (reduction in overall health-related costs and obesity) is more likely to be effective.

Global food consumption threatens climate stability and ecosystem resilience. Because hard regulation of food choice through taxes and bans is politically difficult, behavioral approaches provide a promising alternative, given that they influence food choice to a meaningful extent. We test the effect of framing of a menu on the choice of ordering climate-friendly dishes in a randomized controlled experiment. Rearranging the menu in favor of vegetarian food has a large and significant effect on the willingness to order a vegetarian dish instead of meat. Our results demonstrate that small, inexpensive interventions can be used toward decreasing carbon emissions from food consumption.

Poor compliance of prescription medication is an ongoing public health crisis. Nearly half of patients do not take their medication as prescribed, harming their own health while also increasing public health care costs. Despite these detrimental consequences, prior research has struggled to establish cost-effective and scalable interventions to improve adherence rates. We suggest that one reason for the limited success of prior interventions is that they make the personal health costs of non-adherence insufficiently prominent, while a higher saliency of these costs may motivate patients to adhere more. In the current research, we test whether an intervention that makes the personal health costs of non-compliance more salient for patients will increase their medication adherence. To do so, we conducted a randomized controlled trial with 16,191 patients across 278 UK pharmacies over a 9-month time period and manipulated the perceived consequences of medication non-adherence. We find that patients who received a treatment highlighting the personal health costs of non-compliance were significantly more likely to adhere to their medication than three comparison groups (odds ratio = 1.84, 95% confidence interval = 1.37–2.47). Shifting patients’ focus to the personal health costs of non-compliance may thus offer a potentially cost-effective and scalable approach to improving medication adherence.

This article is a speculative perspective on the behavioural factors that may influence price negotiations between pharmaceutical ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’. It is contended that several behavioural economic-related phenomena may affect price negotiations, including anchoring, loss aversion, a tendency (or otherwise) to reciprocate and a concern for one's reputation. The most important influence, however, is likely to be anchoring, which will particularly benefit the seller of a product if they are allowed to set the initial anchor in a price negotiation. Consequently, it is argued that the most effective way in which to counter the seller's anchor is likely to be to regulate so that the buyer makes the first offer.