Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-21T23:41:27.025Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Nudges that fail

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 May 2017

CASS R. SUNSTEIN
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Why are some nudges ineffective, or at least less effective than choice architects hope and expect? Focusing primarily on default rules, this essay emphasizes two reasons for this. The first involves strong antecedent preferences on the part of choosers. The second involves successful “counternudges,” which persuade people to choose in a way that confounds the efforts of choice architects. Nudges might also be ineffective, and less effective than expected, for five other reasons: (1) some nudges produce confusion in the target audience; (2) some nudges have only short-term effects; (3) some nudges produce “reactance” (though this appears to be rare); (4) some nudges are based on an inaccurate (though initially plausible) understanding on the part of choice architects of what kinds of choice architecture will move people in particular contexts; and (5) some nudges produce compensating behavior, resulting in no net effect. When a nudge turns out to be insufficiently effective, choice architects have three potential responses: (1) do nothing; (2) nudge better (or differently); and (3) fortify the effects of the nudge, perhaps through counter-counternudges, or perhaps through incentives, mandates, or bans.

Type
Articles
Information
Behavioural Public Policy , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , May 2017 , pp. 4 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adler, M. (2011), Welfare and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Akerlof, G. and Shiller, R. (2015), Phishing for Phools, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Alemanno, A. and Sibony, A. L. (eds) (2016), Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective, Oxford: Hart Publishing.Google Scholar
Allcott, H. (2011), ‘Social norms and energy conservation’, Journal of Public Economics, 95(9–10): 1082–1095.Google Scholar
Allcott, H. and Rogers, T. (2014), ‘The short-run and long-run effects of behavioral interventions: experimental evidence from energy conservation’, American Economic Review, 104(10): 3003–3037.Google Scholar
Allcott, H. and Sunstein, C. (2015), ‘Regulating Internalities’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 34: 698–705.Google Scholar
Arad, A. and Rubinstein, A. (2015), The People's Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies, Unpublished manuscript, Retrieved from http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/LP.pdf.Google Scholar
Balz, J., Sunstein, C. and Thaler, R. (2013), Choice Architecture and Retirement Savings Plans, in: Shafir, E. (ed.), The Behavioral Foundations of Policy (428–439), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Bar-Gill, O. (2012), Seduction By Contract, Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barascud, F., Brown, Z., Johnstone, N., Hascic, I. and Vong, L. (2013), ‘Testing the Effects of Defaults on the Thermostat Settings of OECD Employees’, Energy Economics, 39: 128–134.Google Scholar
Benartzi, S. and Thaler, R. (2013), ‘Behavioral Economics and the Retirement Savings Crisis’, Science, 339: 1152–1153.Google Scholar
Beshears, J., Choi, J., Liabson, D. and Madrain, B. (2010), The Limitations of Defaults, Unpublished manuscript, Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/programs/ag/rrc/NB10-02,%20Beshears,%20Choi,%20Laibson,%20Madrian.pdf Google Scholar
Bettinger, E., Long, B., Oreopoulos, P. and Sanbonmatsu, L. (2009), The Role of Simplification and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA Experience (NBER Working Paper No. 15361), Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w15361.Google Scholar
Brehm, J. and Brehm, S. (1981), Psychological Reactance: A Theory of Freedom and Control, New York, NY: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Bronchetti, E., Dee, T., Huffman, D. and Magenheim, E. (2011), When a Nudge Isn't Enough: Defaults and Saving Among Low-Income Tax Filers 28-29 (NBER, Working Paper No. 16887), Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w16887 Google Scholar
Bubb, R. (2015), ‘TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD’, Michigan Law Review, 113(6): 1021–1042.Google Scholar
Bubb, R. and Pildes, R. (2014), ‘How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why’, Harvard Law Review, 127(6): 1593–1678.Google Scholar
Cain, D., Loewenstein, G. and Sah, S. (2012), ‘The Unintended Consequences of Conflict of Interest Disclosure’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 307(7): 669–670.Google Scholar
Carroll, G., Choi, J., Liabson, D., Madrian, B. and Metrick, A. (2009), ‘Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4): 1639–1674.Google Scholar
Chetty, R., Friedman, J., Leth-Peterson, S., Nielsen, T. and Olsen, T. (2012), Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark (NBER Working Paper No. 18565), Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w18565.Google Scholar
Conly, S. (2013), Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Conway, K., Gothro, A., Kyler, B. and Moore, Q. (2015), Direct Certification in the National School Lunch Program Report to Congress: State Implementation Progress, School Year 2013–2014, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Department, Office of Policy Support. Retrieved from http://www.fns.usda.gov/direct-certification-national-school-lunch-program-report-congress-state-implementation-progress.Google Scholar
de Wijk, R., Holthuysen, N., Maaskant, A., Polet, I., van Kleef, E. and Vingerhoeds, M., (2016), ‘An In-Store Experiment on the Effect of Accessibility on Sales of Wholegrain and White Bread in Supermarkets’, PLOS ONE, 11(3), Article e0151915. Retrieved from http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0151915.Google Scholar
Ditto, P. and D. (-) ‘Tannenbaum, Information Asymmetries in Default Options. Unpublished manuscript’. Retrieved from https://webfiles.uci.edu/dtannenb/www/documents/default%20information%20asymmetries.pdf.Google Scholar
Downs, J., Loewenstein, G., Wanskink, B. and Wisdom, J. (2013), ‘Supplementing Menu Labeling With Calorie Recommendations to Test for Facilitation Effects’, American Journal of Public Health, 103(9): 1604–1609.Google Scholar
Duncan, S., Jachimowicz, J. and Weber, E. (2016), Default-Switching: The Hidden Cost of Defaults, Unpublished manuscript, Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=46495#reg.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ebeling, F. and Lotz, S. (2015), ‘Domestic Uptake of Green Energy Promoted By Opt-Out Tariffs’, Nature Climate Change, 5: 868–871. Retrieved from http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v5/n9/full/nclimate2681.html?WT.ec_id=NCLIMATE-.Google Scholar
Egebark, J. and Ekstrom, M. (2013), ‘Can Indifference Make the World Greener?’ Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 76: 1–13.Google Scholar
Emens, E. (2007), ‘Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names’. University of Chicago Law Review, 74(3): 761–863.Google Scholar
Executive Order No. 13707, 3 C.F.R. 56365–56367 (2015), Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/executive-order-using-behavioral-science-insights-better-serve-american.Google Scholar
Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology Council (2015), Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, Annual Report, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/sbst_2015_annual_report_final_9_14_15.pdf.Google Scholar
Fagerlin, A., Sah, S. and Ubel, P. (2016), ‘Effect of Physician Disclosure of Specialty Bias on Patient Trust and Treatment Choice, PNAS: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences’, 113(27), 7465–7469. Retrieved from http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2016/06/16/1604908113.full.pdf.Google Scholar
Finkelstein, S., Liersch, M. and McKenzie, C. (2006), ‘Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults’, Psychological Science, 17(5): 414–420.Google Scholar
Frey, E. and Rogers, T. (2014). ‘Persistence: How Treatment Effects Persist After Interventions Stop’, Insights from Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1: 172–179.Google Scholar
Golman, R., Loewenstein, G. and Sunstein, C. (2014). ‘Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything’, Annual Review of Economics 6: 391–419.Google Scholar
Griskevicius, V., Kenrick, D. T., Li, Y. J. and Neuberg, S. L. (2012), ‘Economic Decision Biases and Fundamental Motivations: How Mating and Self-Protection Alter Loss Aversion’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(3): 550–561.Google Scholar
Halpern, D. (2015), Inside the Nudge Unit. London, United Kingdom: WH Allen.Google Scholar
Hedlin, S. and Sunstein, C. (2016), ‘Does Active Choosing Promote Green Energy Use? Experimental Evidence’, Ecology Law Quarterly, 43(1): 107–142.Google Scholar
Hirschman, A. (1991), The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Homonoff, T. (2013), Essays in Behavioral Economics and Public Policy, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, Retrieved from http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01jw827b79g/1/Homonoff_princeton_0181D_10641.pdf.Google Scholar
Huh, Y. E., Mordwedge, C. and Vosgerau, J. (2014), ‘Social Defaults: Observed Choices Become Choice Defaults’, Journal of Consumer Research, 41: 746–760.Google Scholar
Johnson, E. and Goldstein, D. (2003), ‘Do Defaults Save Lives?’ Science 302(5649): 1338–1339.Google Scholar
Johnson, E. and Goldstein, D. (2013), Decisions by Default. In: Shafir, E. (ed.), The Behavioral Foundations of Policy (417–418), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jolls, C. (2015), ‘Debiasing Through Law and the First Amendment’. Stanford Law Review 67(6): 1411–1446.Google Scholar
Jones, R., Pykett, J. and Whitehead, M. (2014), Changing Behaviors: On the Rise of the Psychological State, Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
Just, D. and Wansink, B. (2009), ‘Smarter Lunchrooms: Using Behavioural Economics to Improve Meal Selection’, Choices, 24(3), Retrieved from http://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file/article_87.pdf.Google Scholar
Keller, P., Harlam, B., Loewenstein, G. and Volpp, K. (2011), ‘Enhanced Active Choice: A New Method to Motivate Behavior Change’, Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21, 376–383.Google Scholar
Krug, S., (2014), Don't Make Me Think, Revisited. San Francisco, CA: New Riders.Google Scholar
Lessig, L. (1995), The Regulation of Social Meaning, University of Chicago Law Review, 62(3): 943–1046.Google Scholar
Madrian, B. and Shea, D. (2001), ‘The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4): 1149–1187.Google Scholar
Manganari, E. and Theotokis, A. (2014), ‘The Impact of Choice Architecture on Sustainable Consumer Behavior: The Role of Guilt’, Journal of Business Ethics, 131: 423–437.Google Scholar
Manoli, D. and Turner, N. (2014), Nudges and Learning: Evidence from Informational Interventions for Low-Income Taxpayers (NBER Working paper No. 20718). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w20718.Google Scholar
Mathis, K. and Tor, A. (eds.) 2016, Nudging – Possibilites, Limitations and Applications in European law and Economics, Switzerland: Springer.Google Scholar
Pavey, L. and Sparks, P. (2009), ‘Reactance, Autonomy and Paths to Persuasion: Examining Perceptions of Threats to Freedom and Informational Value’, Motivation and Emotion, 33(3): 227–290.Google Scholar
Pichert, D. and Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2008), ‘Green Defaults: Information Presentation and Pro-environmental Behaviour, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 28(1): 63–73.Google Scholar
Porat, A. and Strahilevitz, L. (2014), ‘Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data’, Michigan Law Review, 112(8): 1417–1478.Google Scholar
Requirements for Overdraft Services, 45 C.F.R. 205.17 (2010).Google Scholar
Ru, H. and Schoar, A. (2016), Do Credit Card Companies Screen for Behavioral Biases? (NBER Working Paper 22360), Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w22360.Google Scholar
Sharot, T. (forthcoming 2017), The Influential Mind, New York, NY: Henry Holt.Google Scholar
Sunstein, C. and Reisch, L. (2013), ‘Automatically Green’, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 38(1): 127–158.Google Scholar
Sunstein, C. (1996), ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’, Columbia Law Review, 96(4): 903–968.Google Scholar
Sunstein, C. (2015), Choosing Not to Choose, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sunstein, C. (2016), The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of Behavioral Science, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sunstein, C. and Thaler, R. (2008), Nudge, New York, NY: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Thaler, R. (2015), Misbehaving, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1–10, 309–345.Google Scholar
Thaler, R. (2016), ‘Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, and Future’, American Economic Review, 106(7): 1577–1600.Google Scholar
Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977), The Emergence of Norms, Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Wansink, B. (2013), Slim By Design: Mindless Eating Solutions for Everyday Life, New York, NY: William Morrow.Google Scholar
Willis, L. (2011), ‘The Financial Education Fallacy’, American Economic Review, 101(3): 429–434.Google Scholar
Willis, L. (2012), ‘When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults’, University of Chicago Law Review 80(3): 1155–1229.Google Scholar
Willis, L. (2014), ‘Why Not Privacy by Default?’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 29(1): 61–134.Google Scholar
Zamir, E. (2014), Law, Psychology, and Morality: The Role of Loss Aversion, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar