Article contents
Some challenges to the new paternalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 July 2020
Abstract
Behavioural public policy analysts have examined cases of individuals’ failures of reason or judgement to attain their ends and have used these to justify ‘means’ paternalism: a form of government intervention that tries to save individuals from the consequences of those reasoning failures and to enable them better to achieve those ends. This has been challenged on a number of grounds, including too great a focus on choice-preserving interventions such as nudges, the privileging of future preferences over current ones and the possibility of state failures as damaging to individual well-being as the original reasoning failure. This paper summarizes the principal arguments in favour of means paternalism and then addresses these challenges.
- Type
- Annual LSE Behavioural Public Policy Lecture
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
- 3
- Cited by