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You can't have your hypothesis and test it: The importance of utilities in theories of reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

Fenna H. Poletiek
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Leiden University, The Netherlands. [email protected]

Abstract

Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) theory of reasoning cannot predict reasoning in the absence of an argumentative context. Applying the theory to hypothesis testing behavior, I propose that hypothesis testing is often motivated by determining the true inference and that reasoning models should account for utilities (affected by various motives, including the wish to convince) of reasoning outcomes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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