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Why rational norms are indispensable

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Ulrike Hahn
Ulrike Hahn
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3AT, United Kingdom. [email protected]://psych.cf.ac.uk/contactsandpeople/academics/hahn.html
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Abstract

Normative theories provide essential tools for understanding behaviour, not just for reasoning, judgement, and decision-making, but many other areas of cognition as well; and their utility extends to the development of process theories. Furthermore, the way these tools are used has nothing to do with the is-ought fallacy. There therefore seems no basis for the claim that research would be better off without them.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 257 - 258
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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