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When the strong punish: Why net costs of punishment are often negligible

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Christopher R. von Rueden  and
Michael Gurven
Christopher R. von Rueden
Affiliation:
Integrative Anthropological Sciences, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3210. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/chrisvonrueden/[email protected]://www.anth.ucsb.edu/faculty/gurven/
Michael Gurven
Affiliation:
Integrative Anthropological Sciences, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3210. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/chrisvonrueden/[email protected]://www.anth.ucsb.edu/faculty/gurven/
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Abstract

In small-scale societies, punishment of adults is infrequent and employed when the anticipated cost-to-benefit ratio is low, such as when punishment is collectively justified and administered. In addition, benefits may exceed costs when punishers have relatively greater physical and social capital and gain more from cooperation. We provide examples from the Tsimane horticulturalists of Bolivia to support our claims.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 43 - 44
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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