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What sort of representation is conscious?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2003

Zoltan Dienes  and
Josef Perner
Zoltan Dienes
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, Sussex University, Brighton, BN1 9QG, United [email protected] http://www.biols.susx.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/
Josef Perner
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, A-5020 Salzburg, [email protected] http://www.sbg.ac.at/psy/people/perner_e.htm
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Abstract

We consider Perruchet & Vinter's (P&V's) central claim that all mental representations are conscious. P&V require some way of fixing their meaning of representation to avoid the claim becoming either obviously false or unfalsifiable. We use the framework of Dienes and Perner (1999) to provide a well-specified possible version of the claim, in which all representations of a minimal degree of explicitness are postulated to be conscious.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , June 2002 , pp. 336 - 337
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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