Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T03:01:23.406Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What is sentimentalism? What is rationalism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Antti Kauppinen Open the ORCID record for Antti Kauppinen [Opens in a new window]
Antti Kauppinen*
Affiliation:
Department of Practical Philosophy, University of Helsinki, 00014 Helsinki, Finland. [email protected]://anttikauppinen.weebly.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e157
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Audi, R. (2013) Moral perception. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Boehm, C. (2012) Moral origins. The evolution of virtue, altruism, and shame. Basic Books.Google Scholar
Boghossian, P. (2014) What is inference? Philosophical studies 169(1):1–18.Google Scholar
Broome, J. (2013) Rationality through reasoning. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (2006) Moral philosophy, ed. Sayre-McCord, G.. Hackett.Google Scholar
Kauppinen, A. (2013b) Moral sentimentalism. In: Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, winter 2018 edition, ed. Zalta, Edward N.. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/moral-sentimentalism.Google Scholar
Kauppinen, A. (2014) Empathy, emotion regulation, and moral judgment. In: Empathy and morality, ed. Maibom, H., pp. 97–121. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
May, J. (2018) Regard for reason in the moral mind. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nichols, S. (2004) Sentimental rules: On the natural foundations of moral judgment. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Prinz, J. (2007) The emotional construction of morals. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, A. (2002) The theory of moral sentiments, ed. Haakonssen, Knut. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, M. (1994) The moral problem. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Sober, E. & Wilson, D. S. (1998) Unto others. The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Street, S. (2006) A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philosophical Studies 127(1):109–66.Google Scholar
Tappolet, C. (2016) Emotions, values, and agency. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar