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Unconsciously competing goals can collaborate or compromise as well as win or lose

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

Peter Carruthers
Peter Carruthers*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. [email protected]://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/
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Abstract

This commentary offers a friendly extension of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) account. Not only do active goals sometimes operate unconsciously to dominate or preempt others, but simultaneously active goals can also collaborate or compromise in shaping behavior. Because neither goal wins complete control of behavior, the result may be that each is only partly satisfied.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 139 - 140
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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