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The uncertain status of Bayesian accounts of reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2011

Brett K. Hayes  and
Ben R. Newell
Brett K. Hayes
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia. [email protected]@unsw.edu.au
Ben R. Newell
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia. [email protected]@unsw.edu.au
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Abstract

Bayesian accounts are currently popular in the field of inductive reasoning. This commentary briefly reviews the limitations of one such account, the Rational Model (Anderson 1991b), in explaining how inferences are made about objects whose category membership is uncertain. These shortcomings are symptomatic of what Jones & Love (J&L) refer to as “fundamentalist” Bayesian approaches.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , August 2011 , pp. 201 - 202
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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